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ABSTRACT 
More than twenty years have passed since the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 came 
into operation. Although the Act provided context, clarity and regulation in certain areas of 
trust law, it is apparent that there exists a pressing need to develop statutorily the law of 
trusts more extensively.  To this end, the research has a dual objective: 
Firstly, to identify those areas of South African trust law that are not currently regulated 
statutorily but for which, by reason of extensive and, at times, controversial jurisprudential 
development, such regulation is now essential. 
Secondly, to analyse critically the Trust Property Control Act in its current form in order to 
determine the utility of its provisions, particularly in light of jurisprudential development 
since the Act’s commencement. 
The purpose of the study is to formulate comprehensive recommendations for legislative 
reform in the area of South African trust law.   
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CHAPTER 1 
LAYING THE FOUNDATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
1.1 Introduction 
In Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa v Parker,1 Cameron JA stated 
that: 
“the trust-like institutions of the Roman and Roman-Dutch law were designed essentially to 
protect the weak and to safeguard the interests of those who are absent or dead. This 
guiding principle provided the foundation for this Court's major decisions over the past 
century in which the trust form has been adapted to South African law”. 
While our courts have played the biggest role in developing uniquely South African trust law 
principles, the legislature has also contributed to the shaping of the trust institution. Against 
this background, the chapter commences with a brief historical and philosophical analysis of 
the evolution of the trust. The trust as we know it was unknown to both Roman and Roman-
Dutch law. In Braun v Blann and Botha,2 the court considered that the English trust had 
developed by way of the Court of Chancery’s reliance on the Treuhand. However, as will 
become evident, there are in fact several debates surrounding the history of the English 
trust. Of particular interest here are the arguments regarding the origin of the use as the 
forerunner of the trust in England.3 An attempt will be made to illustrate that, regardless of 
the uncertainty of the use’s origin, each of its possible predecessors was developed in 
response to the social and practical problems prevalent at the time. 
In order to understand how the use transformed into the English trust, an examination will 
be undertaken of the use as an institution, highlighting the reasons for its creation, the 
consequences of its utilisation, and the legislative measures that were put in place to 
regulate it (and ultimately the English trust). As acknowledged by the Court in Braun v Blann 
and Botha, the English trust forms an integral part of all common law systems, and it is this 
                                                          
1
 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) 86F-H. 
2
 1984 (2) SA 850 (A). 
3
 See Wilson (2009) 26 where the use is referred to as the earliest form of the trust instrument. See also 
Oakley (2003) 1. 
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notion of a trust that was brought to the Cape by the British when they occupied it for a 
second time.4 
The chapter proceeds with a brief exposition of the development of the South African trust 
in order to foreground the research question pertaining to a re-evaluation of the statute 
that governs trusts in this country. It concludes with a presentation of the core elements of 
the South African trust. These are the elements that will have to be taken into account in 
the legislative recommendations that will be proposed. 
 
1.2 The use as the forerunner of the English trust 
The use is regarded as the forerunner of the English trust and the generally accepted view is 
that it has its origin in the Germanic Treuhand.5 However, at least five theories have been 
proposed regarding the origin of the use. 
 
1.2.1 The Roman fideicommissum theory6 
The fideicommissum was introduced into Roman law to avoid the rigidity of the ius civile 
which prohibited certain persons from becoming beneficiaries of a will.7 The 
fideicommissum permitted a testator to entrust to the faith of a third party that the 
designated property be conveyed to a person whom otherwise he would have appointed as 
a legatee.8 For example, it was not possible to bestow property on non-Romans.9 In 
response, the Romans developed a custom which enabled them to bequeath property to an 
individual who was capable of receiving it, with the request that the property be delivered 
to the named beneficiary (that is, the non-Roman).10 
                                                          
4
 Du Toit (2007) 1; 13. 
5
 Albertus (2014) 268; Bogert (1973) 5-6; Corbett (1993) 262; De Waal (2001) 64; Du Toit (2007) 1; Olivier 
(1990) 7. 
6
       See also Estate Kemp v McDonald’s Trustee 1915 AD 491 508 where Solomon JA noted that some  
         writers argued that the English trust stemmed from the Roman fideicommissa. 
7
 Albertus (2014) 270-271; Avini (1995-1996) 1147; Buckland (1931) 227; Buckland (1932) 354. 
8
 Albertus (2014) 271; Van Rhee (2000) 457. 
9
 Albertus (2014) 271; Johnston (1988) 21. 
10
 Albertus (2014) 271; Bogert (1973) 6. The custom appears to have created a fideicommissum purum, a 
form of the fideicommissum which was relied upon in Estate Kemp v McDonald’s Trustee 1915 AD 491 at 
501 to explain the legal nature of the testamentary trust within the context of South African law. Under 
the fideicommissum purum the fiduciary merely acted as a conduit, whereas the fideicommissary 
acquired a vested right in the fideicommissary property.  See also Braun v Blann and Botha 1984 (2) SA 
850 (A) 861B-C, where the court mentioned that, even though the fiduciary under a fideicommissum 
purum acquired a vested right on the death of the testator, his right was merely transitory as he was 
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Some commentators contend that the fideicommissum was introduced into England by 
ecclesiasts seeking to circumvent the Mortmain Statutes of the late fourteenth century. The 
Mortmain Statutes, inter alia, prevented the gifting of land to church organisations without 
royal consent.11 
Both the use and the fideicommissum were designed to transfer property in future via a 
third party, and the roles played by the various parties12 in these institutions were 
considered to be analogous.13 By extrapolation, therefore, the testator could be taken as 
the “settlor”, the third party could be regarded as the “trustee” and the person who 
acquired the property would be the “beneficiary”.14 
However, regardless of the similarities between the institutions, the fideicommissum was 
primarily a testamentary bequest, whereas the use rarely arose by will.15 Furthermore, the 
fideicommissary, and not the fiduciary, was considered the real owner as the legacy was 
considered to be “restored’ to him.16 Thus, it is argued that the similarities between the 
fideicommissum and the use are superficial and, therefore, that the latter did not originate 
from the former.17 
 
1.2.2 The Germanic Treuhand theory 
The Roman fideicommissum theory held sway until the end of the nineteenth century when 
it was called into question as a result of German scholarship which focused on the 
Treuhand.18 The Salmannus, a fifth-century institution of the Lex Salica,19 allowed a third 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
under an immediate and continuous duty to hand the bequest to the fideicommissary. Thus, the 
fiduciary was merely a conduit for purposes of delivering the property to the fideicommissary.  
11
 Albertus (2014) 271; Avini (1995-1996) 1148; Brown (1934-1935) 358; Gaudiosi  (1987-1988) 1242; Smith 
(1966-1967). 
12
 That is, the feoffee to uses and the haeres fiduciarius, as well as the cestui que use and 
fideicommissarius. See Avini  (1995-1996) 1148; Smith (1966-1967) 42. See also Albertus (2014) 271. 
13
 Avini (1995-1996) 1148. 
14
 Van Rhee (2000) 457. See also Albertus (2014) 271. 
15
 Albertus (2014) 271; Avini (1995-1996) 149; Bogert (1973) 6-7; Gaudiosi (1987-1988) 1241; Van Rhee 
(2000) 457; Van Wynen Thomas (1949) 162. 
16
 Albertus (2014) 271; Avini (1995-1996) 1149. 
17
 Avini (1995-1996) 1149; Gaudiosi (1987-1988) 1241-1242. See also Albertus (2014) 271. 
18
 Gaudiosi (1987-1988) 1241; Van Rhee (2000) 460. See also Albertus (2014) 272. 
19
     The concept of private ownership was unknown to Germanic tribes at the time. Instead, property vested 
in families. If a property owner died, the rules of intestate succession, as applied by the tribes, came into 
play. The tribes adhered to the view that the identity of the ultimate heirs was determined by God and 
no person could vary this through the nomination of beneficiaries in contravention of intestate 
succession rules. An exception to these principles was contained in Title 46 of the Lex Salica. This 
exception condoned deviations from intestate succession principles and allowed an individual to convey 
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party, the Salman, to assist in transferring property.20 He was relied upon to complete the 
transferring of property in matters regarding the appointment or adoption of an heir.21 The 
practice involved an inter vivos transfer of property to a Salman who was entrusted to 
transmit said property to a designated beneficiary upon the death of the original 
transferor.22 
Thus, it is argued that the feoffee to uses23 was merely the Salman under another name,24 as 
the Salman held the property “on account of or to the use of another” and was bound to 
carry out his trust.25 Furthermore, the Salman was given a symbolic staff by the donor, 
which he would hand to the donee. A similar ritual took place in England until modern 
times, whereby a staff was given to the donee in the transfer of copyhold land26 in the 
country.27 A further ground advanced in support of the view that the use was founded on 
the Germanic Treuhand relates to the migration of Germanic tribes to England. Thus, the 
origin of the use should be dated to the time of the Norman Conquest, as the concept of the 
Salman did not exist in Anglo-Saxon law and it has been reported authoritatively that many 
elements of Salic law were introduced into England by William the Conqueror in the 
aftermath of the Norman Conquest.28 
However, this theory on the Treuhand as forerunner to the use has also been criticised as 
relying on merely cosmetic likenesses between the two institutions. For example, Gaudiosi 
argues that, firstly, there is insufficient evidence that the Salman was employed in the 
conveyance of land or that the Salmannus was an institution of Norman law; and, secondly, 
that the Salman and feoffee performed essentially different functions, in that the Salman 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
property to an intermediate party with instructions that, after such person’s death, said property was to 
pass to nominated beneficiaries. See Du Toit (2007) 12; Olivier (1990) 8-9. See also Albertus (2014) 272. 
20
 Albertus (2014) 272; Avini (1995-1996) 1149; Smith (1966-1967) 42. 
21
 Albertus (2014) 272; Gaudiosi (1987-1988) 1243; Smith (1966-1967) 42. 
22
 Albertus (2014) 272; Avini (1995-1996) 1149. 
23
 The feoffee to uses would be known as the trustee today. 
24
 Avini (1995-1996) 1150; Smith (1966-1967) 42. See also Albertus (2014) 272. 
25
 Avini (1995-1996) 1150; Gaudiosi (1987-1988) 1243. See also Albertus (2014) 272. 
26
 This is an estate at will of the Lord (the holder of the legal title to land/owner of the land). See Avini 
(1995-1996) 1150 fn 87. 
27
 Avini (1995-1996) 1150; Gaudiosi (1987-1988) 1243; Smith (1966-1967); Van Wynen Thomas (1949) 162-
163. See also Albertus (2014) 272. 
28
 Avini (1995-1996) 1150; Brown (1934-1935) 357; Gaudiosi (1987-1988) 1243; Smith (1966-1967) 42. See 
also Braun v Blann and Botha at 859A; Albertus (2014) 272. 
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acted as an intermediary for a conveyance whereas the feoffee fulfilled the role of a 
trustee.29 
Some scholars also point to the difficulty of demonstrating the actual relationship between 
the two institutions. The issue here is whether the similarities between the two resulted 
from common roots or whether they were a consequence of comparable social needs 
prevalent at the time of their emergence.30 Furthermore, the origins of the Treuhand remain 
uncertain, with arguments about is roots being Roman, Germanic or possibly both.31 These 
criticisms of the Treuhand theory cast doubt on its accuracy. 
 
1.2.3 The Roman-Germanic theory 
This theory proceeds from the premise that the use is a fiduciary arrangement, which was 
not legally recognised at its inception, but resulted in an intermediate proprietary interest in 
favour of a beneficiary.32 Etymologically, the word use is said to derive from the Latin term 
opus.33 It made its appearance in England during the ninth century and can be found in the 
records of the early Franks and Lombards. Thus, the concept of the use evidently had roots 
in Germanic sources.34 
This theory postulates also that medieval Roman law influenced the development of the use 
by virtue of the Franciscan Friars relying upon the phrase ad opus to justify their 
circumventing their vow of poverty. In fact, the phrase was really a reference to the usus of 
Roman law rather than the fideicommissum. In the event, the identification of ad opus with 
the Roman notion of usus engendered the term use.35 However, the criticisms levelled 
against the theories founded on the fideicommissum and Treuhand, mentioned above, are 
held to apply equally to the Roman-Germanic theory.36 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 Gaudiosi (1987-1988) 1244. See also Albertus (2014) 273. 
30
 Van Rhee (2000) 461. See also Albertus (2014) 273. 
31
 Van Rhee (2000) 461. See also Albertus (2014) 273. 
32
 Avini (1995-1996) 1151; Brown (1934-1935) 59; Smith (1966-1967) 42-43. See also Albertus (2014) 273. 
33
 Albertus (2014) 273; Smith (1966-1967) 43. 
34
 Albertus (2014) 273; Avini  (1995-1996) 1152; Brown (1934-1935); Smith (1966-1967) 43. 
35
 Albertus (2014) 273; Avini  (1995-1996) 1152; Brown (1934-1935) 360. 
36
 Avini  (1995-1996) 1152. See also Albertus (2014) 273-274. 
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1.2.4 The English theory 
This theory considers the origin of the use from a purely institutional point of view, positing 
that it was introduced as a relationship from which certain rights and duties flowed. It is a 
theory which contends that the use has no continental ancestor and is a purely English 
product of the maxim that equity acts on the conscience.37 According to this theory, the use 
was created by the English Chancellor when he issued the first decree to enforce the rights 
of the cestui que use38 in the early fifteenth century.39 It is submitted, however, that this 
view is highly speculative as, firstly, uses were being utilised before the Court of Chancery 
came into existence and, secondly, the Chancellor was approached in order to give effect to 
pre-existing uses. The point is that an institution cannot be enforced if it is not already in 
existence. Thus, the English theory of the birth of the use appears to be flawed historically.40 
 
1.2.5 The Islamic waqf theory 
The waqf is an unincorporated charitable trust that is created upon the declaration of the 
owner that the income of the designated property is to be reserved permanently for a 
specific purpose.41 It arose as a device to overcome, inter alia, restrictions upon the transfer 
of property to heirs.42  
This theory places much reliance on historical time periods to show that the waqf may be 
the predecessor of the use. It postulates that uses and trusts were introduced into England 
upon the return of Crusaders, who had observed the workings of the waqf in the Middle 
East and considered it a possible instrument to avoid feudal dues.43 Unsurprisingly, this 
theory was disregarded generally by Western legal scholars whose primary focus was 
Roman and Germanic law.44 
The following are regarded as the similarities between the waqf and the use: 
                                                          
37
 Keeton and Sheridan (1974) 19. See also Albertus (2014) 274. 
38
 Today known as the “beneficiary”. 
39
 Albertus (2014) 274; Brown (1934-1935) 360; Keeton and Sheridan (1974) 19; Smith (1966-1967) 43. 
40
     Albertus (2014) 274.  
41
 Avini (1995-1996) 1153; Gaudiosi (1987-1988) 1233. See also Albertus (2014) 274. 
42
 Albertus (2014) 274; Smith (1966-1967) 43-44. 
43
 Albertus (2014) 276; Avini (1995-1996) 1159; Smith (1966-1967) 43; Van Wynen Thomas (1949) 163. 
44
 Albertus (2014) 274; Gaudiosi  (1987-1988) 1232; Smith (1966-1967) 43. 
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 Property is reserved and its usufruct appropriated to benefit specific individuals or for 
charitable purposes;45 
 The corpus becomes inalienable;46 
 Estates for life in favour of successive beneficiaries can be created;47 
 Continuity is ensured through successive appointment of trustees;48 
 The same parties are found in both institutions: the waaqif/settlor; the 
mutawalli/trustee and the beneficiaries both present and future;49 
 Both institutions were used to circumvent limitations in respect of owning land as well 
as to avoid the financial burdens of land ownership.50 
The only significant distinction between the waqf and the English trust is the express or 
implied reversion of the waqf to charitable purposes when its object ceases to exist.51 
However, Avini argues that the differences between the two institutions in fact highlight 
their similarities: the use (like the waqf) was made in perpetuity, until the rule against 
perpetuities came into effect; and the waqf (like the use) was initially devoid of juristic 
personality.52 
The Islamic waqf theory is arguably the most potent of the theories on the origin of the use 
discussed above, given its historical probability and the similarities between the use and the 
waqf.53 Be that as it may, it is evident that the precise origins of the use remain a matter of 
contention. As noted by Van Rhee, the exact source of the English trust is not known as its 
precise origin cannot be traced with certainty.54 Nevertheless, the common denominator of 
the theories discussed above is that the trust-like institutions of Roman, Germanic and 
Islamic law were established for specific purposes, often practical or pragmatic in nature, as 
a consequence of the social realities of the time. Similarly, the use was created in response 
to prevailing social and economic demands. Once in existence, both the use and the English 
trust were the subject of significant judicial and statutory development. This development 
                                                          
45
 Gaudiosi (1987-1988) 1246. See also Albertus (2014) 275. 
46
 Gaudiosi (1987-1988) 1246. See also Albertus (2014) 275. 
47
 Gaudiosi (1987-1988) 1246. See also Albertus (2014) 275. 
48
 See Gaudiosi (1987-1988) 1246. See also Albertus (2014) 276. 
49
 Avini (1995-1996) 1161; Gaudiosi (1987-1988) 1246. See also Albertus (2014) 276. 
50
 Avini (1995-1996) 1161. See also Albertus (2014) 276. 
51
 Gaudiosi (1987-1988) 1246-1247. See also Albertus (2014) 276. 
52
 Avini (1995-1996) 1161. See also Albertus (2014) 276. 
53
     Albertus (2014) 277. 
54
 Van Rhee (2000) 462. See also Albertus (2014) 277. 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
will be analysed briefly hereafter as a precursor to the later exposition on the judicial and 
statutory development of the South African trust55 to show that the English courts’ and 
legislature’s responsiveness to the socio-economic challenges associated with the English 
trust have been replicated in the South African courts’ and legislature’s development of 
South African trust law in response to prevailing social and economic demands. 
 
1.3 The trust in England 
1.3.1 Common Law and Equity 
Feudalism in England came into being as a result of chief landowners resisting the attempts 
by William the Conqueror to assert supremacy over them. It existed elsewhere in 
continental Europe before the Norman Conquest in 1066, and was imposed on England in 
the aftermath of the Conquest.56 The feudal system meant that all land was confiscated by 
the King and could be held only from the Crown in exchange for money or services.57 
Routinely, the holder of the legal title to land under the feudal system was required to pay 
feudal dues to the King.58 
A principal reason for utilising the use was to circumvent the payment of feudal dues 
because the rights under a use could not be forfeited or burdened with such dues.59 In other 
words, the landowner would avoid feudal dues by divesting himself of the legal title to the 
land by enfeoffing another with the legal title to fulfil his wishes.60 An example of utilising 
the use in this way would be where A transferred property to B to the use of C: here B is the 
owner of the property in law, but the legal estate would be held by B for the benefit of C.61 
Significantly, a use was merely an honorary obligation.62 Consequently, a person holding 
land to the use of another could deny that he was doing so and suffer no consequences.63 
Furthermore, early English law was characterised by a rigidity of form, and technicalities 
were observed strictly. Royal writs lay at the heart of English common law. Thus, the 
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Common Law Court provided no relief unless there was a relevant writ in respect of the case 
at hand.64 In regard to the use, it became custom for the cestui que use to petition the King 
and his Council for relief where the common law could not provide a remedy against an 
errant feoffee.65 
Initially, the Council would instruct its principal officer, the Chancellor, an ecclesiastic usually 
learned in Roman and Canon Law,66 to investigate the matter and provide an appropriate 
remedy.67 Over time, the Chancellor became known as the custodian of the King’s 
conscience and his court was referred to as the Court of Conscience.68  
The Chancellor, who performed an analogous function in relation to the rigidity of the 
common law, had the power to issue royal writs, which power came to be exercised in a 
discretionary manner based on notions of conscience and justice.69 As the Chancellor did 
not consider himself bound by the strict principles of the common law, he gave judgment on 
the basis of equity. This custom resulted in the formation of the Court of Chancery.70 The 
Chancellor started giving effect to uses, which resulted in the recognition of both a legal 
estate and an equitable estate in the property held to use.71 Legal ownership vested in the 
feoffee (trustee) and equitable ownership vested in the cestui que use (beneficiary).  In 
modern parlance, the trustee held the legal estate while the beneficiary held the equitable 
estate.72 
 
1.3.2 Legislative developments in respect of the use and the trust 
The Crown was placed at a disadvantage by the growing popularity of the use.73 By the 
sixteenth century uses involved such serious injustices and frauds that Parliament was 
persuaded by King Henry VIII to take steps against them74 as a means of curtailing or 
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negating their advantages75 and of restoring to the King his feudal revenue.76 The result was 
the Statute of Uses,77 which was passed in 1535 and became effective in 1536.78 
One of the objectives of the Statute of Uses was to eliminate the separation between legal 
and equitable ownership in respect of uses.79 The legislation was aimed at converting the 
use into a legal estate. In other words, it was designed to cancel the estate of the feoffee to 
uses and grant the beneficiary the use of the entire legal estate.80 For example, if A, B and C 
(the feoffees to uses) held land to the use of X (the cestui que use), the Statute would have 
the effect of removing the legal estate from A, B and C and vesting it entirely in X. This 
would result in feudal dues being levied on X’s death.81 Thus, the purpose of the Statute was 
not to abolish uses; in fact, the legislation made provision for both existing as well as future 
uses. Instead, it merely sought to remove the division between legal and equitable 
ownership.82 
However, to circumvent the effect of the legislation, jurists employed the following scheme: 
A conveyed property to B to the use of C to the use of D. In so doing, a use upon a use was 
created. English courts decided that the Statute of Uses applied to the first use only and not 
to the second.83 As time progressed, the second use was enforced, initially to prevent fraud 
or to remedy a mistake, and then as a matter of standard practice, as feudal incidents were 
no longer due.84 It is the second use which evolved into the trust.85 
It is noteworthy here that the common law and equity were administered by separate 
courts. Thus, the Common Law Courts could not grant equitable remedies and the Court of 
Chancery could not provide common law relief. This divide meant that a litigant could 
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commence two separate actions to obtain justice.86 To remedy this dualism, the Judicature 
Act of 1873, which came into effect in 1875,87 provided that the High Court, although 
divided, could administer both systems.88 The Act allocated to the Chancery Division the 
work of the old Court of Chancery, and to the King’s Bench the work of the old Common Law 
Courts.89 
It is has been highlighted that equity rules have never been codified. Instead, equity rules 
were developed by the Chancellors and are derived principally from decided cases as 
opposed to legislation.90 However, intervention by the legislature occurred as early as 
167791 in relation to the formal requirements for the creation of inter vivos trusts of land 
and in respect of interests under pre-existing trusts. In 183792 the legislature introduced 
formal requirements for wills, which applied to post mortem trusts also.93 The Trustee Act of 
1925 and later of 2000 was enacted to provide rules regarding the appointment and 
removal of trustees as well as their administrative duties and powers.94  
These developments illustrate the continuous efforts of the English courts and legislature to 
keep pace with the evolution of the trust institution, both in consequence of socio-
economic realities and practical demands, as well as in response to judicial decisions 
regarding uses and trusts. 
 
1.4 Research questions 
The trust as an institution is relatively new in South Africa. It was introduced by the English 
after the second British occupation of the Cape in 1806, through general usage rather than 
legislative action.95 Although South African law readily received that trust as an institution 
from English law, it was not receptive of English law’s rules pertaining to trusts.96 Instead, 
our courts developed and are still in the process of developing a uniquely South African law 
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of trusts.97 The legislature also has played a role, albeit a limited one, in this development, 
most recently by enacting the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 (TPCA).98 
Prior to the enactment of the TPCA, aspects of the South African law of trusts were 
governed by the Trust Moneys Protection Act.99 However, this Act provided limited 
regulation of trustees’ control over trust property and it did not contain certain essential 
definitions.100 Chapter 3 of the Administration of Estates Act101 was an even earlier attempt 
at regulating trusts statutorily by requiring letters of administratorship for trustees, but it 
was repealed by the TPCA before coming into operation.102 In 1987 the South African Law 
Commission (now known as the South African Law Reform Commission or SALRC) reviewed 
the law of trusts, with the aim of addressing certain problematic areas. However, it 
emphasised that any attempt at codifying trust law was not feasible as it would be too great 
a task. 
The purpose of the review was to deal with those issues which the SALRC regarded as 
requiring legislative intervention at the particular time, keeping in mind that the trust’s 
growth in popularity was attributable directly to a lack of state control.103 The SALRC also 
highlighted certain trust law issues which it felt should not be regulated by legislation. These 
will be analysed here, as well as certain other issues which the SALRC did not consider at all. 
The TPCA was born of the SALRC review. Although it did not regulate all or even most 
aspects of South African trust law, it was welcomed104 and, according to some, was seen as 
an evolutionary step towards the improvement of this area of the law.105 More than twenty 
years have passed since the TPCA came into effect and, as expected, its limited ambit of 
regulation and most of its provisions have stimulated debate. Although the TPCA provides 
context, clarity and regulation in certain areas of trust law, it has become apparent that 
there exists a pressing need for more extensive and innovative statutory development of 
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South African trust law. Certain commentators and the Supreme Court of Appeal have 
recently voiced the opinion that legislative intervention regarding particular and newly-
emergent problematic aspects of South African trust law is required. Cameron JA remarked 
in Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker, for example, that the matter of the 
abuse of the family business trust – a phenomenon that has increased in prominence since 
the enactment of the TPCA – “may in due course require legislative attention”106 and Smith 
and Van der Westhuizen opined that the TPCA’s statutory regulation of the authorisation of 
trustees is in urgent need of legislative reform.107 It is evident, therefore, that, in the same 
way as the English courts and legislature have responded to newly-emergent challenges, 
occasioned by the changing social and economic milieu in which the use and trust operated 
in England, so the need has arisen to reform the statutory framework within which the 
South African trust operates. This need has come about not merely because of the passing 
of time – given that more than two decades have elapsed since the enactment of the TPCA – 
but also by reason of some novel applications of the South African trust institution in recent 
times, and the (at times unforeseen) challenges associated therewith. 
Against this backdrop, the research undertaken in this study has a dual purpose: 
 firstly, to analyse critically the TPCA in its current form in order to determine the utility 
of its provisions, particularly in the light of jurisprudential developments since its 
commencement; and 
 secondly, to identify those areas of South African trust law that currently are not 
regulated statutorily but which, by reason of extensive and sometimes controversial 
jurisprudential developments, stand in need of such regulation. 
Thus, the research questions posed for the purpose of this study are: firstly, which of the 
TPCA’s current provisions demand re-assessment with a view to reform; and, secondly, 
which of the areas of South African trust law that are currently not regulated by the TPCA 
require re-evaluation for possible inclusion in a new amended statute on South African trust 
law? 
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The ultimate aspiration of the study is to formulate comprehensive recommendations for 
legislative reform of the South African law of trusts, as called for by South African courts and 
commentators. However, this aspiration cannot be achieved without a comprehensive 
historical analysis of the development of the South African trust by our courts and 
legislature. This analysis, which will be conducted in the next chapter, will illustrate the 
approaches that the South African courts and legislature have adopted as a means of finding 
solutions for problematic trust law issues. 
It is also imperative that the core elements of a trust be highlighted at this juncture, as 
reference to these elements will assist in strengthening arguments for certain proposed 
legislative recommendations to be made at the study’s conclusion. The next part will 
consider these elements briefly. 
 
1.5 Core elements of a trust 
The following are regarded as the core elements of trust for the purpose of this study:108 
 the fiduciary position of a trustee; 
 separation of estates (patrimony); 
 real subrogation; and 
 trusteeship as an office. 
 
1.5.1 The fiduciary position of a trustee 
It is a fundamental feature of trust law that the relationship between the trustee and the 
beneficiary is fiduciary in nature.109 The fiduciary obligation that a trustee has towards the 
trust beneficiaries is regarded as a necessary element of trusteeship and entails that a 
trustee, inter alia, must refrain from profiting from his position and must avoid a conflict of 
interests.110 The fiduciary duty of a trustee arises by virtue of the office of trustee.111 This 
fact was confirmed in Doyle v Board of Executors112 where the court held that it is 
unquestionable that a trustee occupies a fiduciary office which office gives rise to a trustee’s 
duty of utmost good faith towards trust beneficiaries.  
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1.5.2 Separate estates/patrimony 
This idea means that a trustee holds two estates, that is, a private estate and the trust 
estate, which are separate from each other. Thus, for example, a trustee’s personal 
creditors cannot claim trust assets, and a trustee’s personal assets cannot be taken into 
account if the trust is insolvent.113 This much is confirmed in section 12 of the Trust Property 
Control Act which states that trust property shall not form part of a trustee’s personal 
estate except in so far as a trustee as a trust beneficiary is entitled to the trust property. In 
WT v KT114 the court stated, therefore, that section 12 precluded the court from including 
trust assets in a joint estate where a trustee-spouse who was married in community of 
property engaged in divorce proceedings and the other spouse claimed that, by reason of 
the trustee-spouse’s abuse of a trust, the trust assets constituted part of their joint estate. It 
should be stressed that South African trust law differs from English law in that the duality of 
estates typify our trust, while the duality of ownership typifies the English trust. Trust 
beneficiaries are nevertheless protected in both instances.115 
 
1.5.3 Real subrogation 
Real subrogation means that the proceeds of a trust asset or a substitute asset remain 
subject to the trust, thereby ensuring the continuity of the trust estate.116 Furthermore, it is 
a mechanism that regulates the day-to-day turn-over of trust assets and thus is essential for 
the functioning of a proper trust.117 This element is however, restricted to lawful alienations 
and substitutions,118 and thus, South African law does not recognise English law remedies 
such as the constructive trust119 or tracing.120  
 
1.5.4 Trusteeship as an office 
A functionary who administers trust property in terms of the Trust Property Control Act 
does so in an official position.121 A trustee is thus an office-holder who acts in the capacity of 
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trustee.122 Trusteeship is furthermore an office that invests a trust with a “public” element 
that is not present in other private law institutions such as contracts.123  
 
1.6 Outline of chapters 
Chapter two consists of an exposition of the historical development of the South African 
trust by the courts and the legislature. The chapter also highlights the approaches adopted 
by our courts to finding solutions in respect of problematic trusts issues. 
Chapter three confronts the TPCA in its current form. Each provision will be examined with a 
view to providing legislative proposals, where apposite. Following an approach that South 
African courts have used on previous occasions, legislation regulating other fiduciary 
functionaries will be analysed in order to extract rules or principles which could help 
improve the TPCA. To enhance the comprehensiveness of the analysis, interviews with 
persons who specialise in trusts and fiduciary practice have been conducted. These 
interviews yielded insights into the practical difficulties that specialists face as a 
consequence of the current provisions contained in the TPCA. The interviews also provided 
the opportunity to test whether the proposals for reform to the TPCA advanced in this study 
were viable from a practical point of view. The questions, results and outcomes of the 
interviews are incorporated into chapter five.  
Chapter four will consist primarily of an analysis of those aspects of trust law which the 
SALRC recommended at the time should not be regulated by the TPCA. However, the 
chapter will touch also on other areas of trust law which the SALRC did not consider in its 
investigation. Reliance once again will be placed on legislation regulating other fiduciary 
functionaries with a view to identifying rules or principles which could contribute to the 
betterment of the TPCA. The aforementioned interviews were utilised also to ascertain 
whether the non-regulation of these aspects causes practical difficulties, and to determine 
whether they should now be regulated or whether the status quo should be retained. The 
questions, results and outcomes of the interviews are incorporated into chapter five. 
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Chapter five concludes the study. An overview of each chapter will be provided and the data 
obtained from the interviews will be summarised. The chapter will end with a proposal for a 
new trust law statute. 
 
1.7 Research methodology 
Use was made of cases, legislation, journal articles and textbooks. Interviews were 
conducted with practitioners who specialise in trusts and who, more often than not, have to 
address the problems of trust law in practice. A semi-structured questionnaire was 
developed for use in the interviews. The interviews took place on a one-on-one basis. The 
interviews adhered to ethical guidelines developed in respect of research on human 
subjects. 
 
1.8 Ethical statement 
The research adhered to principles of honesty and accountability, to ensure that the 
informed consent of each human subject was obtained and that each human subject 
participated voluntarily. Confidential information provided by the human subjects is 
protected, their dignity and privacy respected, and the findings of the study will be 
communicated to them. In particular, the guidelines developed by the Law Faculty of the 
University of the Western Cape on ethics related to research will be followed. The writer 
obtained ethical clearance from the university to conduct the interviews. 
 
1.9 Summary 
This chapter outlined the debate surrounding the origin of the English use and trust. It 
emerged that regardless of the uncertainty in this regard, each proposed historical 
predecessor of the trust was developed in response to the social, economic and 
jurisprudential challenges of the time. This historical presentation was necessary to explain 
the development of the English use and trust, particularly to show the judicial and legislative 
responsiveness to engaging with newly-emergent challenges in the area of English trust law. 
This responsiveness is also a feature of South African trust law, a matter that will be 
addressed comprehensively from a historical perspective in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRUST 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
2.1 Introduction 
In Braun v Blann and Botha, Joubert JA said: 
“The trust was unknown to Roman-Dutch law … It was also unknown to Roman law. Uses and trusts 
were introduced to England shortly after the Norman conquest. The trust was developed by the 
English Court of Chancery from the Germanic Salman or Treuhand institution rather than from the 
Roman fideicommissum or other juridical institutions of Roman law … Admittedly, many of the 
functions which the fideicommissum, either by itself or in conjunction with other devices of the 
Roman law performed, could have been performed by the trust had the latter been known to the 
Romans, but the fact remains that the fideicommissum and the trust are separate and distinct legal 
institutions … The trust of English law forms an integral part of all common law legal systems.”
124
 
Joubert JA’s statement, made as part of a historical contextualisation of the South African 
trust in Braun’s case, is amplified by Cameron JA’s view in Land and Agricultural Bank of 
South Africa v Parker: 
“It may be said … that the English law trust, and the trust-like institutions of the Roman and Roman-
Dutch law, were designed essentially to protect the weak and to safeguard the interests of those who 
are absent or dead.”
125 
These judicial pronouncements form the backdrop against which the historical development 
of the South African trust will be traced in this chapter. The chapter begins with a brief 
description of the introduction of the English trust to the Cape. Thereafter, the focus will 
shift to the role played by the South African courts and legislature in developing uniquely 
South African trust law principles. Attention will be given also to the adaptation of the trust 
by the South African courts and the approaches they have adopted in seeking to find 
solutions to problematic trust law issues while developing a South African law of trusts. 
 
2.2 The trust in South Africa 
2.2.1 The trust as a historical institution 
According to Hahlo and Kahn,126 there are three periods that stand out as far as the history 
of the South African legal system is concerned. These are: 
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“the 143 years, from 1652 to 1795, during which the Cape stood under the aegis of the Dutch East 
India Company (VOC); the 115 years, from 1795 to 1910, during which, but for a brief interlude from 
1803 to 1806, the Union Jack fluttered from the flagstaff of the Castle in Cape Town and, eventually, 
over the whole of southern Africa; and the period from 1910 onwards, representing the immediate 
past and present”.
127 
When employees of the VOC and other Dutch immigrants settled at the Cape, they 
introduced their legal system to the new settlement.128 By the time the British arrived, 
Roman-Dutch law129 was the legal system that operated at the Cape. The option to replace 
Roman-Dutch law with English law was available to the British government, but it was 
decided, in terms of the Articles of Capitulation of 10 and 18 January 1806, that the existing 
rights and privileges which the Burghers and inhabitants of the Cape enjoyed, would 
continue.130 
The British government also retained Roman-Dutch law as the Cape’s common law, which 
was affirmed in the First and Second Charters of Justice of 1827 and 1832. However, the 
retention of Roman-Dutch law was accompanied by a general movement towards the 
application of English law and English legal institutions.131 Consequently, the law at the 
Cape, and ultimately in the greater South Africa, was transformed into a mixed legal 
system132 “at the intersection of civil law and common law”.133 Thus, modern South African 
law is neither purely Roman-Dutch nor purely English in nature.134 
The trust was one of the institutions that was received into our law from England.135 British 
settlers brought the trust institution with them and used terms such as “trust” and 
“trustee’’ in wills, deeds of transfer, antenuptial contracts and land transfers.136 As a result 
of this usage the trust became a familiar feature of legal and commercial practice at the 
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Cape.137 In a word, the trust that took root at the Cape and which in due course spread 
throughout South Africa, was the trust of English law.138 
As there was no specific legislation regulating trusts, the task of dealing with this new 
institution was left to the courts.139 South African courts soon faced several matters 
involving trusts, and many early decisions rejected English trust law principles, primarily 
because of the distinction - unknown to Roman-Dutch law - that English law draws between 
a legal estate (that vests in a trustee) and an equitable estate (that vests commensurately in 
a trust beneficiary).140 It was only in 1915 that a South African court was called upon to 
confirm whether it could and, indeed, should give legal effect to the trust institution,141 
considering the consistent judicial rejection up to that point of English trust law 
principles.142 
 
2.2.2 The “Romanist reconfiguration”143 
Reconfiguration occurred when South African courts attempted to “civilianise” the trust by 
casting it in a familiar Roman-Dutch guise.144 This took place most pertinently in Estate 
Kemp v McDonald’s Trustee145 in which the court confirmed that the trust as an institution 
could be recognised under South Africa law. In this case, the will under which the trust was 
established was drafted in England and thus contained English terminology. Innes CJ, on 
behalf of the majority, held that, since the testator was domiciled in the Cape at the time of 
his death, the will was to be interpreted according to South African law146 and that a 
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solution to the utilisation of the testamentary trust in casu had to be found in terms of 
South African law.147 The question that followed was how effect could be given to the 
testamentary trust if English trust principles could not be used. To answer this, the court 
invoked the fideicommissum, pronouncing that: 
“a testamentary trust is in the phraseology of our law a fidei-commissum and a testamentary trustee 
may be regarded as covered by the term fiduciary”.148 
This reconfiguration was problematic as the fideicommissum did not allow for simultaneous 
vesting in a fiduciary and fideicommissary. In an attempt to overcome this hurdle, the court 
in Kemp’s case had recourse to the fideicommissum purum which, according to the majority 
of the court, allowed for such simultaneous vesting. With this form of the fidecommissum, 
the fideicommissary acquired a vested right and the fiduciary, who similarly acquired one, 
would merely act as a conduit for transfer of the property to the fideicommissary.149 The 
fideicommissum purum could thus be constituted in a manner that vested legal ownership in 
the fiduciary while the fideicommissary had a commensurate right to the beneficial 
enjoyment of the property.150 Notably, Solomon JA (although part of the majority) was not 
convinced by this reconfiguration. According to him, it was unnecessary to translate the 
English terms of the will into the language of Roman-Dutch law. Furthermore, he was not 
comfortable with the terms “fiduciary” and “fideicommissary” being employed in a wider 
sense than what was commonly used by the South African courts.151 
Estate Kemp represented the then Appellate Division’s first attempt at developing unique 
rules pertaining to trusts. It did not escape criticism. For example, in Greenberg v Estate 
Greenberg,152 the same court disagreed with Estate Kemp when it was decided that there 
would be: 
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“no advantage in continuing to call a trust a fideiommissum and a trustee ‘a fiduciary in the nature of 
an administrative peg’ or ‘a fiduciary under a fideicommissum purum’ or the like”.
153 
Furthermore, relying on the fideicommissum to carry out the requirements of a trust 
stretches the fideicommissum concept beyond its basic and traditional purpose, which was 
to bequeath property to two or more persons successively.154 While the Kemp judgment can 
be lauded for trying to formulate uniquely South African trust law principles, it also 
illustrates the difficulties that may attach to efforts to solve legal problems through 
reconfiguration. Be that as it may, the position taken in Estate Kemp held sway until the 
decision in Braun v Blann and Botha,155 which will be discussed later. 
Reconfiguration was used also in respect of inter vivos trusts. South African courts have held 
on several occasions that an inter vivos trust is created through a stipulatio alteri.156 That is, 
an inter vivos trust comes into existence through a contract between the trust founder and 
trustee which contains a stipulation in favour of a third party, the trust beneficiary, who, 
upon acceptance, acquires an indefeasible right under such trust.157 
Crookes v Watson158 is regarded as the principal authority for the above view.159 The case 
concerned a settlor who created an inter vivos trust by way of a notarial deed to benefit 
primarily his daughter. However, as a result of a considerable decrease in the value of 
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money, the trust fund increased beyond the settlor’s expectations. He thus sought an order 
to amend the trust deed. It was argued by the trustees that it was competent for the trust 
deed to be amended by mutual agreement between the settlor and themselves.160 
The first question which Centlivres CJ (on behalf of the majority) had to answer was whether 
the settlor could amend the trust deed with the consent of his co-trustee and his daughter, 
as the only beneficiary to have accepted a benefit under the trust.161 After considering 
certain clauses in the trust deed, the Chief Justice held that an answer had to be found using 
Roman-Dutch law principles.162 As to the nature of the inter vivos trust, he found that the 
trust in question could be regarded as a contract for the benefit of a third party.163 As to 
whether or not the deed could be amended as indicated, he gave an affirmative answer 
since the ultimate trust beneficiaries had not yet accepted any of the benefits bestowed on 
them.164  
Although the majority found in favour of the creation of the inter vivos trust through a 
stipulatio alteri, Schreiner JA emphasised that the development of our law of trusts should 
not be “hampered by views regarding its association with other branches of our law which 
may not be historically justified and which should not govern such development”.165 If 
reliance is placed on other branches of law, such reliance should provide a satisfactory 
solution to the problem at hand. Schreiner JA also noted that “forcing a legal instrument of 
great potential efficiency and usefulness into a mould that is not properly shaped for it 
should be avoided”.166 He further stressed his objections to treating an inter vivos trust as a 
contract for the benefit of a third person in the legal sense. In the ordinary sense, inter vivos 
trusts are the result of a contract between the settlor and the trustee, which benefits a third 
party. However, in the legal sense a contract for the benefit of a third person “is not simply 
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a contract designed to benefit a third person; it is a contract between two persons that is 
designed to enable a third person to come in as a party to a contract with one of the other 
two”.167 
Schreiner’s JA concerns cannot be ignored, for the following reasons proffered by 
commentators: firstly, the relationship between a beneficiary and a trustee is of a fiduciary 
nature, whereas the relationship between the parties to a stipulatio alteri is not;168 
secondly, the inter vivos trust has nothing in common with the stipulatio alteri,169 and the 
creation of an inter vivos trust through a stipulatio alteri does not account for the creation 
of charitable trusts and trusts for impersonal objects.170 In Doyle v Board of Executors171 the 
court emphasised that equating an inter vivos trust with a stipulatio alteri has limits beyond 
which it cannot be pressed. In Peterson v Claassen172 it was pointed out that the contractual 
basis for establishing trusts does not imply that the relevant relationships are dealt with in 
terms of contractual principles. Similarly, matters involving the office of trustee and the 
fiduciary relationship between the trustee and beneficiary are not governed by contractual 
principles.173 Thus, a distinction must be made between the creation of an inter vivos trust, 
on the one hand, and the nature of the trust itself, on the other hand. The fact that the 
former is regulated by contractual principles does not render the latter a contract by 
nature.174 However, notwithstanding Schreiner JA’s warning and the criticism of Crookes v 
Watson highlighted above, in 2012 the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed in Potgieter v 
Potgieter that:175 
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“*a+ trust deed executed by a founder and trustees of a trust for the benefit of others is akin to a 
contract for the benefit of a third party, also known as a stipulatio alteri.”
176
 
 
2.2.3 Further judicial trends 
In Braun v Blann and Botha,177 Joubert JA declared that it is one of the functions of our law 
to keep pace with the changing conditions of society178 by applying the principles of our law 
to the development of our law of trusts.179 South African courts have been, and currently 
are, the principal framers of South African trust law. The trends discussed below manifest 
their attempts at constructing uniquely South African trust law principles in keeping with 
the changing social demands upon trusts and the practical circumstances in which trusts 
operate in South Africa. 
2.2.3.1  Innovation180 
Judicial innovation may be said to occur when South African trust law is transformed “as a 
result of changing legal, social or economic conditions which requires a renewal of trust law 
principles to ensure the trust’s functionality and ensuring that it remains true to its design as 
an institution of protection”.181  
It is submitted that Braun v Blann and Botha, which called into question the 
abovementioned reliance placed by the majority of the court in Estate Kemp on the 
fideicommissum purum, was the site of judicial innovation in two respects. The case 
involved an appeal in which the appellant sought an order declaring clause 4 of her 
mother’s will, which granted trustees comprehensive discretionary powers, invalid.182 She 
argued that the establishment of a discretionary trust in terms of said clause 4 was invalid as 
South African law did not recognise the bestowal of such discretionary powers on trustees 
who had no beneficial interest in the trust property.183 One of the arguments raised by the 
curator ad litem was that the common law powers of appointment should be extended to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
v Kohlberg 1984 (2) SA 137 (E) 140E; Desai-Chilwan v Ross 2003 (2) SA 644 (C) 647D-E; Mariola v Kaye-
Eddie 1995 (2) SA 728 (W) 731C. 
176
 Potgieter v Potgieter 645E. 
177
 Braun v Blann and Botha 1984 (2) SA 850 (A). 
178
 Braun v Blann and Botha 866I. 
179
 Braun v Blann and Botha 867A. 
180
    Du Toit (2013) 263-268. 
181
 Du Toit (2013) 260. 
182
 Braun v Blann and Botha 855B-C. 
183
 Braun v Blann and Botha 856F-G. 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
trustees as there was, according to the Appellate Division in Estate Kemp, no difference in 
principle between a fideicommissum in terms of which a fiduciary receives a personal 
benefit and one in terms of which he does not.184 
Joubert JA noted, in response to the curator’s contention, that the incidence of the 
fideicommissum purum invoked by the Estate Kemp court became rare in Holland as the 
practice of appointing executors in wills became more common.185 Thus, he found it 
unfortunate that Innes CJ “availed himself of a rather obscure form of the fideicommissum 
in Roman-Dutch law as authority for his proposition”.186  
Joubert JA opined, moreover, that Innes CJ had misinterpreted the authority upon which he 
relied in support of his invocation of the fideicommissum purum.187 On this basis he held: 
“that it is both historically and jurisprudentially wrong to indentify the trust with the fideicommissum 
and to equate a trustee to a fiduciary. In order to avoid confusion these legal concepts should 
technically be applied correctly”.
188 
Hence, the court rejected the submission that there was no difference in principle between 
a fideicommissum which afforded a fiduciary a personal benefit and one which does not.189 
It was held that: “In its strictly technical sense the trust is a legal institution sui generis.”190 
This statement constituted the court’s first attempt at innovation: instead of endeavouring 
to reconfigure the trust in terms of Roman-Dutch law, the court simply stated that it was a 
unique institution. 
The court’s second innovation related to the issue of conferring common law powers of 
appointment on trustees191 to enable them to select income and/or capital beneficiaries 
from a designated group of persons.192 It was here that the court commented on the need 
for the law to keep pace with changing societal conditions.193 Conferring common law 
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powers of appointment on trustees, according to the court, not only would be a salutary 
development, but also would not conflict with any principles of South African law.194 This 
instance of judicial innovation is especially striking because the court provided no basis for 
conferring common law powers of appointment on trustees other than proclaiming that it 
would be a salutary development of South African trust law. 
However, the developments that transpired in Braun v Blann and Botha were not embraced 
unconditionally. In particular, the court’s ruling that a testamentary trust is an institution sui 
generis attracted criticism. It is contended, inter alia, that the juristic basis of the trust 
remains unanswered and that the court’s decision to label the testamentary trust as such 
was a pragmatic a means of keeping pace with changing conditions.195 It should be noted, 
however, that the court’s pragmatic approach does not translate into difficulties in trust 
practice.196 
Further examples of judicial innovation include Gross v Pentz197 in which the erstwhile 
Appellate Division introduced new trust law terminology (that is, the distinction between 
direct actions and representative actions regarding trust matters) in the context of a 
beneficiary’s locus standi; Doyle v Board of Executors198 in which the court held that a 
trustee’s duty to account is in fact an element of such trustee’s fiduciary duty; and MAN 
Truck & Bus (SA) Ltd v Victor199 where a court applied the Turquand rule to trusts for the 
first time.200 Also, in Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker,201 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal suggested that one of the ways in which the Master could ensure that there 
is a separation of control from enjoyment in a trust would be to insist that an independent 
trustee be appointed in instances where the trustees are all beneficiaries and where the 
                                                          
194
 Braun v Blann and Botha 866H-867A. 
195
 Forsyth (1986) SALJ 522.  
196
 Du Toit (2007) 18. It has also been suggested that the case is persuasive authority that a testamentary 
trust is in fact a legatum sub modo: Kernick (2008) 51. Uncertainty regarding the precise nature of the 
testamentary trust also undermines the order, unity and integrity of the trust institution and could be 
resolved by conferring the trust with legal personality: De Waal and Theron (1991) 504; Du Toit (2007) 
20. Whether the trust should be bestowed with legal personality will be discussed in greater detail in 
chapter three. 
197
 Gross v Pentz 1996 (4) SA 617 (A) 625E-G. 
198
 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C). 
199
 MAN Truck & Bus (SA) Ltd v Victor 2001 (2) SA 567 (NC). 
200
 Du Toit (2013) 265-266. 
201
 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) 90A-B. 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
beneficiaries are related to one another – an innovative step to curb the abuse of 
particularly the family business trust. 
2.2.3.2  Alignment202 
Du Toit defines alignment as “reliance *by our courts+ within the trust context on existing 
common law legal principles applicable to other fiduciary constructs to solve trust law 
problems”.203 An example of where this process was utilised is Sackville West v Nourse204 in 
which the court extended the duty of care owed by tutors and curators to trustees making 
trust investments. Also, in Doyle v Board of Executors205 the court applied to a trustee the 
duties of good faith owed by an agent to his principal. 
If one has regard to the definition provided above, it is evident, in light of the expositions 
earlier in this chapter, that the alignment process occurred also in Estate Kemp v 
McDonald’s Trustee, Crookes v Watson and Braun v Blann and Botha. It is submitted, 
however, that alignment should not be limited to terms of the definition cited above. 
Alignment occurs also when our courts rely on other branches of law (not only those areas 
that relate to other persons in a fiduciary position) to find solutions for challenges in our law 
of trusts. For example, in MAN Truck & Bus (SA) Ltd v Victor, the Turquand rule from 
company law was applied to the trust at hand. The Turquand rule was applied also in 
Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk v Nieuwoudt NO.206 However, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
overturned this decision in Nieuwoudt NO v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk,207 leaving the 
question of the applicability of Turquand rule to trusts open. In Land and Agricultural Bank 
of South Africa v Parker,208 the Supreme Court of Appeal noted that the rule may play a 
useful role in suitable cases, but held that the case before it did not provide an opportunity 
to decide the matter.209 However, in Van der Merwe v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC; Van der 
Merwe v Bosman210 the court emphasised its concerns about the applicability of the 
Turquand rule to trusts, as a trust deed is not a public document in the absolute sense. This 
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discussion, therefore, amplifies the point made by Schreiner JA in Crookes that reliance on 
other branches of the law should not merely provide a solution, but should provide one 
which is indeed legally justifiable. 
Furthermore, in the Parker211 case, the court stated that “it may be necessary to extend 
well-established principles to trusts”,212 with the principles in question being those that 
relate to the piercing of the corporate veil in circumstances where: 
“the trustees’ conduct invites the inference that the trust form was a mere cover for the conduct of 
business ‘as before’ and that the assets allegedly vesting in trustees in fact belong to one or more of 
the trustees … Where trustees of a family trust … act in breach of the duties imposed by the trust 
deed, and purport on their sole authority to enter into contracts binding the trust, that may provide 
evidence that the trust form is a veneer that in justice should be pierced in the interests of 
creditors”.213 
The “trust veil” was pierced in Badenhorst v Badenhorst214 where the court included trust 
assets when making a redistribution of assets order in terms of section 7(3) of the Divorce 
Act.215 But for the obstacle created by section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act,216 regarding 
formal regularity of a contract for the alienation of immovable property, the court in Van 
der Merwe v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC; Van der Merwe v Bosman217 was prepared to go 
behind the trust form as a means of holding the trustees bound to a contract from which 
they wished to escape through reliance on deficiencies in, inter alia, their authority to 
conclude the contract. In Rees v Harris,218 the court once again was prepared to penetrate 
the trust form, but the applicant failed to satisfy it that the trust was the alter ego of the 
debtor. However, in First Rand Limited trading as First National Bank v Britz,219 the court did 
pierce the trust form as it was satisfied that the trust was merely the alter ego of the 
trustees. In Van Zyl v Kaye,220 the court stated that the remedy of going behind the trust 
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form is an equitable one, afforded to a third party adversely affected by an unconscionable 
abuse of the trust form,221 provided the circumstances so permit.222   
The judgments referred to in the preceding two paragraphs illustrate how South African law 
has been developed judicially through alignment also with branches of the law other than 
those concerned with fiduciary functionaries in the private law context. This development 
has occurred principally in response to newly-emergent applications of the trust institution, 
and the practical and jurisprudential challenges occasioned thereby. 
2.2.3.3 Constitutionalisation 
South African trust law has been adapted not only to accommodate the rights contained in 
the Bill of Rights constituting Chapter two of the Constitution, but also to give effect to 
constitutional principles generally. However, as the Supreme Court of Appeal in Hofer v 
Kevitt223 noted: 
“Subject to departure from previous decisions that might be influenced by s39(2) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, it is well known this Court is bound by its own 
decisions”.
224 
To the extent that existing common law principles do not infringe provisions in the 
Constitution, the doctrine of stare decisis remains applicable. In Potgieter v Potgieter,225 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal further confirmed that if recourse can be had to existing common 
law principles, a deviation from such principles purely on the grounds of reasonableness and 
fairness offends the principle of legality, which forms part of the rule of law. 
The application of the Constitution is most apparent in respect of charitable trusts, where 
our courts have attempted to balance the common law rules pertaining to freedom of 
testation against constitutional and policy considerations based on equality and non-
discrimination.226 In Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd,227 the court was willing to 
                                                          
221
 Van Zyl v Kaye 460D-E. See also Nel (2014) 81 for an analysis of the term “unconscionability” in the trust 
law context. 
222
 Van Zyl v Kaye 460E. 
223
 Hofer v Kevitt 1998 (1) SA 382 (SCA) 387C. 
224
 Hofer v Kevitt 387C. 
225
 Potgieter v Potgieter 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) 652A. 
226
 See In re Heydenrych Testamentary Trust 2012 (4) SA 103 (WCC); Curators, Emma Smith Educational 
Fund v University of Kwazulu Natal 2010 (6) SA 518 (SCA); Ex Parte BOE Trust Ltd 2009 (6) SA 470 (WCC); 
Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd 2006 (4) SA 205 (C) which will be discussed in greater detail in 
chapter three below. 
227
 Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd 2006 (4) SA 205 (C). 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
accept that the common law right to freedom of testation is protected by section 25 of the 
Constitution.228 However, notwithstanding such constitutional protection, freedom of 
testation has never been absolute and has been subject always to various common law and 
statutory restrictions.229 Certainly, under the common law, freedom of testation can be 
limited on the basis of public policy.230 
The court in Syfrets Trust emphasised that the concept of public policy changes with time, as 
social conditions evolve and basic freedoms develop.231 Although it is not a case which was 
heard under the new constitutional dispensation, the court in Ex Parte President of the 
Conference of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa NO: in Re William Marsh Will Trust 
considered social and economic changes in finding that the words “white destitute children” 
contained in a testamentary trust violated public policy, inter alia, because the number of 
white children in need of the homes established under the trust decreased as the white 
population became more affluent.232 
The court in Syfrets Trust noted that public policy now is rooted in our Constitution and the 
fundamental values that it enshrines.233 Thus, questions regarding public policy had to be 
dealt with in terms of the “public policy of today”234 and not that which was in existence 
when the trust was created. Hence, for the matter at hand, the court sought guidance in the 
“founding constitutional values of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism”.235 The court 
used the equality test laid down in Harksen v Lane236 and, after applying the relevant legal 
principles, held that the disputed provisions limiting trust benefits on the grounds of race, 
gender and religion (the bursary was limited to non-Jewish males who were of “European 
descent”) unfairly discriminated against a class of persons “who have suffered in the past 
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from disadvantage” on because of their race, gender and religion.237 The court emphasised, 
however, that the decision did not mean that the principle of freedom of testation was 
obsolete or could be ignored. Instead, the decision simply enforced a limitation on freedom 
of testation that has existed “since time immemorial”.238 Further, the decision did not mean 
that all clauses in wills or trust deeds that differentiate between groups of people are invalid 
per se.239 
In Curators, Emma Smith Educational Fund v University of Kwazulu-Natal,240 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal pronounced that the constitutional imperative to remove racially restrictive 
clauses in an educational trust that are in conflict with public policy must take precedence 
over freedom of testation. This finding was buttressed by the fundamental values of our 
Constitution and the constitutional injunction to transcend our racially divided past.241 
Notably, the court in Ex Parte BOE Trust Ltd242 emphasised that discriminatory provisions in 
trusts that are aimed at redressing past injustices based on gender and race are legitimate 
and thus do not amount to unfair discrimination. The court took cognisance of the fact that 
the racially restrictive provision in question, which limited the bursary bequest to white 
females was a means by which the testatrix sought to avoid the skills of white graduates 
being lost through emigration.243 Furthermore, the trust was created well into the new 
constitutional dispensation which indicated to the court that the testatrix was aware that 
the disputed provision may not be carried out.244 However, the bursary bequest was 
impossible to implement, not because of the provision itself, but because of the attitude of 
the relevant universities that refused to participate in the selection of bursary recipients.245 
The testatrix had made provision for alternative beneficiaries should it not be possible to 
implement the bequest.246 As courts cannot rewrite wills, effect had to be given to the 
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testatrix’s right of freedom of testation by benefiting the alternative beneficiaries whom she 
had identified.247  
The matter was taken on appeal in In re BOE Trust Ltd.248 In confirming the court a quo’s 
decision, the Supreme Court of Appeal went further by holding that a failure to implement a 
testator’s right to freedom of testation, when it can be done, would infringe the 
fundamental right to dignity.249 Furthermore, the rights to dignity and property demand 
that the wishes of a testator first be established before an enquiry is conducted into 
whether or not there is a rule that prevents a court from giving effect to freedom of 
testation.250 
These cases illustrate the willingness of South African courts to adapt trust principles to 
accommodate social changes, to the extent that such accommodation accords with the 
fundamental values of the Constitution. Although the Syfrets Trust and Emma Smith 
judgments illustrate that, more often than not, the right to equality will take precedence 
over the right to freedom of testation, the appeal case in BOE Trust warns that a failure to 
give effect to a testator’s wishes, when it is possible to do so, will infringe the right to 
dignity. 
Although South African courts have played a pivotal role in developing a uniquely South 
African trust law, frequently through the techniques discussed in this part and in response 
to changed socio-economic, jurisprudential and practical circumstances, not all trust law 
matters fall to be resolved by the courts which, on occasion, have urged the legislature to 
step in and provide guidance or solutions in respect of certain trust issues.251 The next part 
provides a synopsis of the South African legislature’s role in regulating trusts. 
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2.2.4  The role of the legislature 
2.2.4.1 Overview 
 
After the British occupation, legislation enacted at the Cape took the form of proclamations 
and ordinances.252 Roman-Dutch law was retained and the English trust was adapted on a 
piecemeal basis to operate within a predominantly civil law context. Such piecemeal 
adaptation was required as private individuals utilised the trust for diverse purposes, such 
as building churches, running mercantile businesses, setting up joint-stock companies, 
administering club property, marriage settlements and disposing of property by will.253 The 
legal system at the Cape continued to develop with the passage of various ordinances and 
acts,254 but there was initially no specific legislation governing trusts.255 The enactment of 
the post-Union Administration of Estates Act256 in 1913 was historic in this regard. This Act is 
regarded as the first statute to have defined the extent of state control over trusts.257 In an 
effort to keep abreast of changing social and practical realities, the legislature thereafter 
continued to regulate aspects of trusts statutorily. The next section will present a brief 
analysis of the legislative development of the trust prior to the enactment of Trust Property 
Control Act,258 the statute that currently regulates major aspects of South African trust law. 
2.2.4.2 The Administration of Estates Act of 1913 
As mentioned above, this Act was the first piece of legislation which attempted to regulate 
state control over trusts.259 It made provision for administrators to manage any trusts 
created by will after the executor had liquidated the estate and paid estate debts.260 Section 
61 of the Act provided the procedure that had to be followed in the event that a testator 
required in his will that his property be administered by an administrator on behalf of a 
beneficiary. Once the executor had paid the necessary debts and lodged certain documents 
with the Master, he was required to deliver the property to the administrator, who then 
could commence with his task. Also, section 61(3) of the Act provided that section 39, which 
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covered the issue of security, applied to administrators referred to in section 61. These were 
the only sections of the Act which related to trusts, more specifically to testamentary trusts. 
Although the 1913 Administration of Estates Act allowed for the appointment of 
administrators, it did not provide a definition of “administrator”. Honoré notes that the Act 
assumed that testamentary trusts would be administered by administrators by implicitly 
identifying testamentary trustees with administrators, despite the fact that in Roman-Dutch 
law an administrator did not own the property which he administered, whereas the English 
trustee did.261 Indeed, he demonstrates that our courts consistently have equated 
administrators and trustees, whether appointed by will or inter vivos and whether or not 
they owned the trust assets.262  
As the legislature’s first attempt at regulating trusts, the Administration of Estates Act was 
limited in a number of respects. Firstly, it only dealt with testamentary trusts and was silent 
about inter vivos trusts. Secondly, the Master’s powers in respect of executors were 
extensive but (except insofar as security was concerned) did not apply to administrators.263 
For example, the Master was not empowered to appoint an administrator to fill a vacancy 
as he could in respect of executors.264 Also, the Master’s supervisory role in respect of 
administrators appeared to be non-existent. For example, no role was assigned to the 
Master in the event of a beneficiary who felt prejudiced by an administrator’s management 
of a trust. It was evident, therefore, that further legislative development would have to 
occur in due course. 
 
2.2.4.3 The Trust Moneys Protection Act of 1934265 
Trust Moneys Protection Act was enacted to deal with the regulation of inter vivos trusts.266 
It also prescribed the formalities that were to be observed by a trustee appointed in terms 
of either an inter vivos trust or a testamentary trust.267 
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Section 1 of the Trust Moneys Protection Act defined a “trustee” as a person appointed by 
written instrument, whether inter vivos or testamentary, which settled moneys upon him to 
be administered for the benefit, whether in whole or in part, of another person. It will be 
recalled that the Administration of Estates Act, insofar as it related to testamentary trusts, 
made use of the word administrator without defining it. In Ex Parte Collins,268 the court held 
that the definition of trustee in the Trust Moneys Protection Act was wide enough to cover 
administrators, but that its opinion in this regard was not conclusive. 
However, criticism was levelled against the Act in In re Estate Late Hearson269 for failing to 
define “settled moneys”.270 This was, of course, problematic as the Act contained several 
references to such moneys. According to the court, it was not clear whether the Act applied 
to moneys of foreign trusts or to moneys which could be moved outside the country.271 If 
the term referred to movables in general, then the employment of “moneys” was an 
“unhappy choice”.272 There was also uncertainty as to whether the term was to receive a 
narrow or wide interpretation.273 The court in In re Macgillivray’s Will274 questioned 
whether shares in a gold mining company held by the testator fell within the category of 
“moneys”. The court held that it was convinced that the testator had intended for the 
designated shares to fall within such category.275 In Ex Parte Holmes,276 the court decided 
that the term “settled moneys” means moneys which either have been invested or which 
were directed to be invested. Thus, it encompassed all the assets disposed of in terms of the 
instrument, being synonymous with the words “property” and “estate” as used in section 61 
and section 39 of the 1913 Administration of Estates Act.277  
Section 2 of the Trust Moneys Protection Act required trustees who were appointed after 
the commencement of the Act to lodge trust documents and any variations thereof with the 
Master. Section 3 dealt with the issue of security and was similar, but for a few subsections, 
to the corresponding provision of the 1913 Administration of Estates Act. Section 4 
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contained the powers of the Master, one such power being that the Master, if he deemed it 
fit, could investigate the administration of a trust. Section 5 made provision for the safe-
keeping of documentation which related to settled moneys and the circumstances under 
which such documentation could be destroyed. Section 6 stipulated the penalties that 
would apply should a trustee fail to comply with or contravene a provision of the Act, and 
section 7 listed the grounds upon which a trustee could be removed. 
The Trust Moneys Protection Act is regarded as being significant in providing directives for 
the furnishing of security by trustees.278 However, the provisions in the Act relating to 
security were similar to those contained in the 1913 Administration of Estates Act. It is 
apparent also that the Act provided more control over trustees, and bestowed powers on 
the Master which he did not enjoy under the 1913 Act (in respect of administrators). Still, 
the Act was insufficient in certain respects. For example, the Master was not empowered to 
appoint a trustee unless the trust instrument provided that he could do so.279 Furthermore, 
the Act failed to provide definitions of certain terms. 
 
2.2.4.4   Administration of Estates Act of 1965280 
Chapter III of the 1965 Administration of Estates Act would have resulted in tighter control 
over both testamentary and inter vivos trustees281 had it not been repealed by the Trust 
Property Control Act282 before it came into force. 
Section 1 of the 1965 Act defined an “administrator” as any person who was authorised in 
that capacity by virtue of letters of administratorship granted in terms of section 59. Section 
57 specified the instances in which property could not be administered without letters of 
administratorship. In terms of section 58, the Master was empowered to prohibit the 
administration of property without letters of authorisation. Section 59 dealt with the 
process and the circumstances under which a person could acquire letters of authorisation 
and with the duties of the Master in this regard. 
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Section 60 dealt with the process to be followed if an administrator was not appointed or a 
vacancy arose. If more than one person was nominated as a consequence of the section 60 
process, section 61 provided the route which the Master was required to take to resolve the 
matter. Section 62 dealt with instances under which provisions relating to foreign letters of 
executorship would apply to letters of administratorship. The issue of security was governed 
by section 63. The transferring and mortgaging of immovable property by or in favour of 
administrators was regulated by section 64. Section 65 dealt with the issue of accounts by 
administrators and the time frames within which these accounts were to be lodged with the 
Master and all the persons to whom said accounts were to be forwarded. Section 66 
regulated the position regarding movable property to which minors and moneys to which 
absentees or persons under curatorship were entitled. The payment of moneys to minors or 
persons under curatorship domiciled outside of the Republic was governed by section 67. 
Should an administrator make an incorrect distribution, the matter was to be dealt with in 
accordance with section 68. Section 69 made provision for the remuneration to which an 
administrator was entitled. Section 70 provided for the application of certain other sections 
in the Act to administrators. 
According to Shrand, the primary purpose of Chapter III of the 1965 Administration of 
Estates Act was to control a trust after the death of the founder, as he or she would take the 
required steps to exercise control while alive.283 It was considered necessary that an official 
such as the Master supervise the trust.284 Trusts that did not fall under Chapter III would 
continue to be governed by the Trust Moneys Protection Act.285  
A problem that would have arisen with the implementation of Chapter III was the number of 
additional staff required by the Master to fulfil his duties. The necessary funding by the 
state was not forthcoming and hostility towards state intervention had increased.286 
Furthermore, Chapter III clearly would not have governed all types of trusts. If the intention 
of the legislature was to regulate trusts comprehensively, it would have been logical that 
such regulation be dealt with under a single statute. However, the South African Law 
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Reform Commission (SALRC) conducted an investigation on trusts prior to the Chapter 
commencing operation.  Its report is considered below. 
 
2.2.4.5 SALRC Project 9 
In 1987 the SALRC published a Report287 on the law of trusts, which identified certain 
problematic issues. It also contained proposals regarding those areas which ought to be 
addressed by legislation and provided reasons why other issues should not be legislatively 
regulated. It was not the intention of the SALRC to codify the law of trusts. Instead it 
attempted to provide more fully for the control of trust property in order to address some 
of the recurrent problems that existed at the time.288 
The following reasons were given by the SALRC for its choice not codify the law of trusts: the 
trust is a flexible institution, which feature contributes towards its popularity; this branch of 
law was still in the process of developing judicially and practically and a codification would 
hamper such development; the SALRC did not have the personnel to tackle such a “colossal 
task”; and one of the main attractions of the trust is the lack of state control, hence 
statutory regulation should be circumscribed.289 
Against this background, the SALRC made the following principal recommendations:290 
 no codification of the law of trusts would be undertaken and statutory provisions 
which were merely declaratory should be avoided; 
 state control over trusts should be limited; 
 the Trust Moneys Protection Act and Chapter III of the Administration of Estates Act 
are to be repealed; 
 the term “trust” should be defined; 
 no person should act in the capacity of trustee until he or she has been authorised to 
do so in writing by the Master; 
 a trustee who has been exempted from furnishing security could be called upon by the 
Master to provide security if there are sound reasons to do so; 
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 should a vacancy in the office of a trustee arise, the Master should be empowered to 
appoint a trustee and, if necessary for the proper administration of the trust property, 
to appoint a co-trustee; 
 trust property will not form part of a trustee’s personal insolvent estate; 
 the courts’ power to vary trust provisions should be extended to obviate the 
unprofitable investment of trust property and to terminate the trust; 
 the Master or any person who has an interest in the trust property should be able to 
apply to court for an order directing a trustee to perform his duties; 
 the Master should be able, under certain circumstances, to remove a trustee from his 
office; 
 even if the trust instrument does not provide for a trustee’s resignation, it should be 
allowed after the trustee has given notice to the Master and beneficiaries; and 
 a trustee should be allowed to receive the remuneration provided for in the trust 
instrument or a reasonable remuneration. 
In addition, the SALRC recommended that all trust documents should be lodged with the 
Master; any interested party should be allowed to inspect the relevant documents;291 the 
Master should have the power to authorise a foreign trustee to act within South Africa;292 a 
minimum standard of care required of a trustees should be formulated; trustees should be 
compelled to indicate clearly in their accounting the property which was held in trust;293 
issues regarding a trustee’s investment powers and accounting by a trustee should be 
addressed; and provision should be made for aggrieved persons to approach the court 
within a reasonable time.294 
The SALRC also identified a number of aspects that, in its view, did not require legislative 
attention. These were: 
 vesting a trust with legal personality;295 
 limiting the duration of trusts;296 
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 apportioning the costs against capital or income;297 
 regulating inter vivos trusts;298  
 no compulsory notarial execution;299 
 no schedule setting out the standard clauses that trusts should contain;300 
 business trusts;301 
 criminal sanctions were considered undesirable;302 
 no special control measures for charitable trusts;303  
 no questions of interpretation to the Master for his decision.304 
It is evident from the foregoing exposition that the SALRC attempted to strike a balance 
between maintaining the flexibility of the trust, on the one hand, and state intervention to 
regulate aspects pertaining to trusts, on the other hand. It is evident, moreover, that the 
legislative regulation of trusts in South Africa which preceded the SALRC’s investigation into 
trusts in the 1980s, was an evolutionary process, which increased in scope and intensity as 
trust law developed; moreover, it occurred in response to new demands and challenges 
occasioned by the changing legal and practical landscape in which the South African trust 
operated. The SALRC’s investigation and Report resulted in the enactment of the Trust 
Property Control Act. This statute, which currently regulates aspects of South African trust 
law, will be analysed in chapter three. 
 
2.3 Summary 
While South African courts accepted the English trust as an institution, they have 
denounced the application of English trust principles in our law. Our courts, as the principal 
constructors of South African trust law, have adapted, and still are adapting, the trust by 
developing uniquely South African trust law principles. The adaptation of the trust by South 
African courts occurred principally through the processes of reconfiguration, innovation and 
alignment in attempts to keep abreast of social, economic and practical demands. However, 
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as Schreiner JA warned in Crookes v Watson, not all such solutions may be justified: courts 
thus should not attempt to find a solution without having conducted a proper inquiry into 
whether or not the solution in fact is legally justified. 
Courts dealing with trusts have become mindful of the role that the Constitution plays in 
adapting principles pertaining to trusts. However, the Supreme Court of Appeal has 
emphasised that an unnecessary reliance on the Constitution where common law principles 
can provide a remedy could undermine the principle of legality. Furthermore, if there are no 
constitutional issues that arise, courts should follow principles established through the 
doctrine of stare decisis. 
The legislature has played a role, albeit a comparatively limited one, in the development of 
uniquely South Africa trust law principles. The legislature’s role has been to regulate 
particular aspects of South African trust law in response to new demands and challenges on 
the socio-economic, jurisprudential and practical fronts. Indeed, South African courts on 
occasion have urged the legislature to intervene in regard to specific trust law matters.  
Several challenges remain, however. These challenges stem, firstly, from the Trust Property 
Control Act which has been in operation for more than two decades now and which, it is 
submitted, no longer adequately regulates aspects of South African trust law in the light of 
continuing and ever-increasing changes in the socio-economic, jurisprudential and practical 
landscapes in which the South African trust operates; and, secondly, from the SALRC’s 
recommendations that certain aspects of trust law not be regulated by the Trust Property 
Control Act. These matters will be addressed in chapters three and four. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LEGISLATING THE TRUST: THE TRUST PROPERTY CONTROL ACT 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
3.1 Introduction 
“From a comparatively humble and uncertain reception, the trust has developed to such an extent 
that a unique and distinctively South African law of trusts has been formed.  Although this 
development was initially almost exclusively undertaken by the courts, it later became clear that the 
intervention of the Legislature was required in order to clarify some of the uncertainty created by the 
piecemeal (at times fragmented) judicial development which had taken place.  To this end a number 
of statutes of direct (and at times indirect) application to the South African law of trusts were 
promulgated. Although these statutes succeeded, to a large extent, in providing the clarity sought, a 
number of problematic issues continue to exist. In consequence of the South African Law Commission 
findings a Bill was approved and promulgated on 17 June 1988 as the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 
1988 which came into operation on 31 March 1989.”
305
 
 
This quotation encapsulates the study undertaken in chapter two and emphasises the need 
for the legislative involvement in the adaptation and development of the South African 
trust. Chapter three focuses on the Trust Property Control Act (TPCA) and is organised 
around three themes. Firstly, it highlights those aspects of trusts which the SALRC decided 
ought to be regulated in terms of the TPCA. Secondly, it discusses critically the various 
provisions of the TPCA, in relation to the SALRC’s position and with reference to case law 
and academic debate on each provision. Thirdly, those issues to be canvassed in interviews 
with trust practitioners will be identified, as well certain issues which the SALRC chose not 
to regulate or did not consider in its investigation, but that may currently require legislative 
reform. 
The purpose of the TPCA (as per its Preamble) is to regulate the control of trust property 
and to provide for matters connected therewith. Much of the TPCA is aimed at establishing 
firmer control over trustees and their administration of the trust by the Master.306 
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Although the text of the TPCA is not divided into chapters, the analysis that follows groups 
its provisions under specific headings (which headings will be used to structure the Act to be 
proposed later). The following groupings will be used: definition clause; documents deemed 
to be trust instruments; the role of the High Court in respect of trusts and trustees; the role 
of the Master in respect of trusts and trustees; the duties of trustees; and the powers of 
beneficiaries/interested parties. The aim of this analysis is to foreground the contemporary 
problems and challenges that have emerged from recent judgments and scholarship on the 
provisions of the TPCA, and to provide proposals for legislative reform on those aspects 
which the SALRC had recommended for regulation under the TPCA.307 
 
3.2 Section 1: Definitions 
3.2.1 Definition of “trust” 
The SALRC recommended that terms such as “trust”, “trustee”, “trust instrument” and 
“trust property” be defined.308 Section 1 of the TPCA defines a “trust” as an “arrangement 
through which the ownership in property is made over or bequeathed to either a trustee or 
the trust beneficiaries”. In either event, the trustee must administer the trust for the benefit 
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and other institutions; civil procedure and evidence; substantive criminal law; civil law; wills; estates and 
insolvency and constitutional and political legislation) (hereafter SALRC Discussion Paper on Statutory 
Law Review), recommended that, as far as section 24 of the Act is concerned, “Minister of Justice” be 
amended to read “Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.”  However, since May 2014 it 
should read “Minister of Justice and Correctional Services”.   It was also recommended that the 
expressions “he or she”, “his or her” and “him or her” be substituted for the expression “he”, “his” or 
“him” wherever they occur in sections 3(2), 4(1), 5, 6(2)(a) and (b), 6(3), 7(1) and (2), 9(1) and (2), 
11(1)(a), 15, 16(1)-(3), 18, 20(1)-(3) and 22. These recommendations have not been implemented at the 
time of writing but will be taken into account in the drafting of the proposed Act. 
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 SALRC Report (1987) 5-18. See §2.4.4.3 in chapter two regarding the concerns raised in respect of the 
definitions contained in the predecessor of the TPCA. The definitions clause in the TPCA also contains 
definitions of “banking institution”, “building society”, “court”, “master” and “financial institution”.  The 
following was proposed in the SALRC Discussion Paper on Statutory Law Review: that the definition of 
“banking institution” be amended to mean “an institution registered as a bank in terms of the Banks Act, 
1990 (Act 94 of 1990)”; “building societies” be amended to mean “a mutual bank registered in terms of 
the Mutual Banks Act, 1993 (Act 124 of 1993), or a bank registered in terms of the Banks Act, 1990 (Act 
94 of 1990); “court” be amended to mean “a division of the High Court having jurisdiction”; that the 
definition of “master” which currently means “the Master, Deputy Master or Assistant Master of the 
Supreme Court appointed under section 2 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act 66 of 1965), 
who under section 3 of this Act has jurisdiction in respect of the matter concerned” be amended by 
substituting “high court” with “Supreme Court”; and lastly, in respect of the definition of “financial 
institution” that the words “Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001” be substituted 
with “Financial Institutions (Investment of Funds) Act, 1984 (Act 39 of 1984)”.  Legislative proposals that 
will be made in chapter five will take into account the SALRC’s recommendations. 
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of the beneficiaries or for the achievement of the object stated in the trust instrument. This 
definition of a “trust” conforms to the core idea that there should be a functional separation 
between control and enjoyment, as espoused in Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa 
v Parker.309 
The definition distinguishes between an ownership trust and a bewind trust. The former 
trust is one in which ownership vests in the trustee qua trustee, whereas under the latter 
trust the beneficiaries are vested with ownership.310 There is, however, still uncertainty as 
to the exact difference between a trust in the wide sense311 and a bewind trust. This is a 
consequence of the fact that with trusts in the narrow sense ownership of the trust assets 
vests in the trustees, whereas with trusts in the wide sense and bewind trusts, trustees 
merely have control and not ownership of the assets.312 
The inclusion of the bewind arrangement in the definition of “trust” stems from Honoré’s 
viewpoint that a trustee’s “control” over trust property, rather than his ownership of trust 
property, is the definitive feature of a trust.313 This viewpoint has been attacked extra-
curially by Joubert,314 who argues that several judgments confirm that a trustee is the owner 
of the trust assets.315 He posits that if a trustee need not be the owner of trust assets then 
there is in truth no difference between a trustee in the narrow sense and one in the wide 
sense. Also, if there are indeed two types of trustees in the narrow sense, namely, one that 
is the owner of trust assets and one that is not the owner of trust assets, then the difference 
between a trustee who does not own trust assets and a trustee in the wide sense is not 
                                                          
309
 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) 87B-C. 
310
 See Bafokeng Tribe v Impala Platinum 1999 (3) SA 517 (BH) 542C; Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service v Dyefin Textiles (Pty) Ltd 2002 (4) SA 606 (N) 611F; Cameron et al (2002) 8; Du Toit (2007) 4. 
311
 These are trusts where the trustee is entrusted with the affairs of another without being vested with 
ownership of the trust property. See Conze v Masterbond Participation Trust Managers (Pty) Ltd 1996 (3) 
SA 786 (C) 794D-E; Du Toit (2007) 2; Olivier (1997) 768.  See also SALRC Report 8 where the bewind trust 
was to be one where assets are handed over to beneficiaries but are controlled by administrators or 
trustees. 
312
 De Waal (2000) 561; Olivier (1997) 771. See Conze v Masterbond Participation Trust Managers (Pty) Ltd 
at 794F where the question was whether the defendant was a trustee in terms of the TPCA. For this to 
be the case, ownership in the property had to pass over to the defendant.  Thus, the question was 
whether the defendant was a trustee of an ownership trust. The court found it unnecessary to consider 
the bewind trust which vests ownership in the beneficiaries, subject to control of the trustee.  
313
 Honoré made this argument in the earlier editions of his work on trusts.  See Cameron et al (2002) 7. 
314
 Joubert (1969) 124-146. See also Gretton (2000) 603 who states that although the bewind functions as a 
trust, it is not a trust for the simple reason that the location of ownership is the reverse of the trust. 
315
 For example, Estate Kemp v McDonald’s Trustee 1915 AD 491 503-504. See also Braun v Blann and Botha 
1984 (2) SA 850 (A) 859G; Mariola v Kaye-Eddie 1995 (2) SA 728 (W) 731C-D; Yarram Trading CC t/a 
Tijuana Spur v Absa Bank Ltd 2007 (2) SA 570 (SCA) 576H; Theron v Loubser 2014 (3) SA 323 (SCA) 327D.  
 
 
 
 
46 
 
apparent. He thus argues that if Honoré sought to compare a trust in the narrow sense with 
the bewind, he ought to have done so in a manner that does not distort the law which 
recognises that a trustee in the narrow sense is the owner of trust assets. However, Honoré 
considers that Joubert’s main criticism relates to his usage of term “bewind-trust”, which 
criticism, according to Honoré, is not only trivial, but, moreover, has no basis.316 Although 
the SALRC acknowledged Joubert’s views, it nevertheless recommended that the definition 
of “trust” includes the bewind.317 
Although the definition of “trust” turns on the passage of ownership, the TPCA does not 
provide a definition of “owner”. The court in Braun v Blann and Botha318 stated that even 
though a trustee becomes the “owner” of trust property in an ownership trust, he has no 
beneficial interest therein. Apparently, the idea of ownership as used in section 1 of the 
TPCA merely relates to whether control of the trust assets has been transferred to a trustee 
for administrative purposes. In other words, “ownership” is merely the form that “control” 
of trust assets takes in order to facilitate administration of the trust.319 What this implies – 
in line with Honoré’s aforementioned stance – is that “control” over trust property, as 
opposed to “ownership” of the property, is the definitive feature of the trust.320 This is 
confirmed in relation to the bewind trust, where “ownership” is vested in the beneficiaries, 
with emphasis being placed on a trustee controlling and administering the trust.  Also, as 
Cameron et al point out, where ownership lies does not determine the power of trustees, 
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 Honoré (1969) 126-130.  
317
 SALRC Report (1987) 8. 
318
 Braun v Blann and Botha 859G; See also Estate Kemp v McDonald’s Trustee 503-504; Mariola v Kaye-
Eddie 731C-D; Theron v Loubser 327D; Yarram Trading CC t/a Tijuana Spur v Absa Bank Ltd 576H; Jowell 
v Bramwell-Jones 1998 (1) SA 836 (W) 889A. 
319
 Cameron et al (2002) 7; Olivier (1997) 768-769. 
320
 De Waal (2000) 561-562; Du Toit (2007) 5. See Blue Square Advisory Services (Pty) Ltd v Mandingoane 
(01082/2011) [2011] ZAGPJHC 53 (13 June 2011) [29] where the court stated that “*a+t its heart, 
whether described as an institution, an arrangement or a relationship, a trust is a legal relationship 
governing ownership or control of assets and their enjoyment”. See further Conze v Masterbond 
Participation Trust Managers (Pty) Ltd 793B-795B where the court had to determine whether the trust in 
question fell within the ambit of the TPCA. In order for the defendant to qualify as a trustee ownership 
in the property had to be made over by the trust instrument. The court found that the defendant merely 
acted as an agent despite being referred to as a “trustee” in the trust deed, as there was no evidence 
that the transfer of funds occurred from the defendant as agent to the defendant as trustee. The court 
held that the defendant was no more than a trustee in the wide sense and that no property passed over 
to the defendant. The rights of the defendant as mortgagee did not constitute “ownership” of property 
as envisaged by the TPCA. Furthermore, all the rights exercised by the defendant in terms of the trust 
deed were exercised on behalf of the debenture-holders who remained “owners” of the rights. For a 
critique of the Conze judgment see See Olivier (1997) 770. 
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for example, to alienate trust property;321 instead, this power is dependent on the terms of 
the trust instrument. Thus, if one approaches the definition from this perspective, the 
absence of a definition of “owner” in the TPCA is not problematic. 
The Income Tax Act (ITA) contains an interesting definition of “trust”.322 It is defined as “any 
trust fund consisting of cash or other assets which are administered and controlled by a 
person acting in a fiduciary capacity; where such person is appointed under a deed of trust 
or by agreement or under the will of a deceased person”. If one considers the viewpoint of 
Honoré that control, as opposed to ownership, is the definitive feature of a trust, then the 
definition contained in the ITA is instructive as a trustee’s “control” over the trust is 
emphasised. Although the ITA’s definition does not distinguish between an ownership trust 
and a bewind trust, it does acknowledge the fiduciary relationship that arises when a person 
controls a trust. This is a matter on which the TPCA is silent. Hence, it will be submitted later 
in this chapter that the TPCA should acknowledge that a trustee stands in a fiduciary 
relationship towards trust beneficiaries,323 not only because it is a core element of a trust324 
but also because international instruments such as the American Restatement (Third) on 
Trusts325 as well as Book X of the European Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)326 
expressly acknowledge the fiduciary nature of trusteeship. 
Furthermore, the definition in the ITA conveys the notion of a trust as a segregated fund 
consisting of cash or other assets. In view of the directive stipulated in section 12 of the 
TPCA on the separateness of trust property from a trustee’s private property,327 it is 
submitted that the segregation of the trust estate from a trustee’s personal estate ought to 
be made explicit statutorily,328 which is the trend in international trust instruments. Thus, 
for example, Article 2(a) of the Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their 
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 Cameron et al (2002) 9. 
322
 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
323
 See §3.2.4 below. 
324
 See chapter one above. 
325
 See American Restatement (Third) on Trusts (2003) §2: “A trust … is a fiduciary relationship with respect 
to property, arising from a manifestation of intention to create that relationship and subjecting the 
person who holds title to the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of … one or more persons, 
at least one of whom is not the sole trustee”. 
326
   Von Bar and Clive (2009) Book X’s Comments – in particular Comment 5680 – declares that the trust is a 
legal relationship characterised by an intense degree of good faith on the trustee’s part. 
327
 This section is analysed in §3.6.6 below. 
328
 This separation between a trustee’s personal estate and the trust estate is regarded as a core element of 
a trust. See De Waal (2000) 559-563; De Waal (2014) 236. 
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Recognition, also known as the Hague Convention on Trusts,329 identifies as a characteristic 
of a trust that the assets constitute a separate fund and are not part of a trustee’s personal 
estate. Similarly, Article X-1:201 of Book X of the DCFR recognises the trust as a fund in its 
definition of a “trust”.330 
Given the explicit directive on the separation between a trustee’s personal estate and the 
trust estate in section 12 of the TPCA, it is proposed that the Act’s definition of “trust” be 
amended to acknowledge this separation unequivocally, as follows:331 
“trust means [any trust fund which vests in]- 
(a) the trustee, in whole or in part, to be administered or disposed of according to the provisions of 
the trust instrument for the benefit of the person or class of persons designated in the trust 
instrument or for the achievement of the object stated in the trust instrument; or 
(b) the beneficiaries designated in the trust instrument, which property is placed under the control 
of another person, the trustee, to be administered or disposed of according to the provisions of 
the trust instrument for the benefit of the person or class of persons designated in the trust 
instrument or for the achievement of the object stated in the trust instrument, 
but does not include the case where the property of another is to be administered by any person as 
executor, tutor or curator in terms of the provisions of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act 
No. 66 of 1965)”.
332
 
 
3.2.2 Definition of “trust instrument” 
“Trust instrument” is defined in section 1 of the TPCA as a “written agreement or 
testamentary writing333 or a court order according to which a trust was created”. The 
instruments mentioned in the definition are the most common modes for the creation of 
trusts.334 Although the TPCA’s reference to a “testamentary writing” to date has not posed 
any difficulties, it is proposed for the sake of clarity that “testamentary writing” in the 
definition be replaced with the term “will”, the latter being one of the modes through which 
                                                          
329
 This convention was adopted on 1 July 1985. 
330
 The DCFR defines “trust” as “a legal relationship in which a trustee is obliged to administer or dispose of 
one or more assets (the trust fund) in accordance with the terms governing the relationship (trust terms) 
to benefit a beneficiary or advance a specific purpose”. 
331
  Since certain issues pertaining to this definition were addressed after interviews in which this proposal 
was made, the submission is reconsidered in chapter five.  
332
  The functionaries listed in this paragraph are not the only trustees in the wide sense, which brings into        
question whether the provision should remain limited to these functionaries. However, since this issue 
was not addressed during interviews, the matter will be explored further in chapter five.  
333
 In Liebenberg v MGK Bedryfsmaatskappy (Pty) Ltd 2003 (2) SA 224 (SCA) 227E it was noted that this term 
refers to a trust created in a will. However, neither the TPCA nor the Wills Act 7 of 1953 contains a 
definition of “testamentary writing”. The Wills Act does include a testamentary writing in its definition of 
a “will” and the court in Ex Parte Estate Davies 1957 (3) SA 471 (N) 474A set out certain requirements for 
a valid testamentary writing.  
334
 Du Toit (2007) 7. 
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a trust can be created.335 Regarding inter vivos trusts, courts often equate the inter vivos 
trust with the stipulatio alteri, thereby intimating that an inter vivos trust is no more than a 
contract.336  This view is incorrect since there are several identifiable differences between a 
stipulatio alteri and an inter vivos trust.337 For example, De Waal points out that the 
fiduciary office of a trustee is not a contractual issue and, therefore, cannot be regulated by 
contractual principles.338 Du Toit argues in this regard that a distinction must be made 
between the creation of the inter vivos trust and the trust itself.339 To be sure, the definition 
of “trust instrument” in the TPCA should be read with this distinction in mind. However, it is 
submitted that the definition of “trust instrument” in the Act need not reflect this 
distinction expressly as the definition does not cause any practical difficulties. Hence, the 
definition should remain as is, subject to the amendment proposed in respect of 
“testamentary writing”. 
 
3.2.3 Definition of “trust property” or “property” 
“Trust property” or “property” in terms of section 1 of the TPCA “means movable or 
immovable property, and includes contingent interests in property, which in accordance 
with the provisions of a trust instrument are to be administered or disposed of by a 
trustee”. In other words, trust property encompasses any asset that can be held in 
ownership and that can be converted into money if liquidated.340 In addition, all proprietary 
rights, including immaterial property rights, can be the subject-matter of a trust.341 
The TPCA’s current definition of “trust property” or “property” differs from that proposed 
by the SALRC. The SALRC’s proposal was that “trust property” be defined simply as 
“property which in terms of a trust instrument is to be administered by a trustee”.342 It is 
unclear why the legislature opted to define trust property as either movable or immovable 
                                                          
335
  The references to “testamentary writing” in section 3(1)(a) of the TPCA will also be replaced with the term   
“will”.  
336
 See, for example, Hofer v Kevitt 1998 (1) SA 382 (SCA) 386E; Joubert v van Rensburg 2001 (1) SA 753 (W) 
768B. 
337
 See, for example, the concerns raised by Schreiner JA in Crookes v Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (A). 
338
 De Waal (1998) 329-330. See also Du Toit (2007) 19. 
339
 Du Toit (2007) 19. 
340
 Du Toit (2007) 7; Olivier (1990) 5. 
341
 Cameron et al (2002) 146; Du Toit (2007) 7. 
342
    SALRC (1987) 109. 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
when the term “property” has a wide signification.343 The reason for the legislature’s 
inclusion of “contingent interests in property” in the current definition is also unclear. The 
notion of a contingent interest is understood generally to refer to the situation where a 
trust beneficiary’s personal right to claim either income and/or capital is not immediate, but 
rather conditional upon the occurrence of an uncertain future event.344 The notion thus 
relates to contingent beneficiaries who have no vested rights to the future income and/or 
capital of the trust.345 It is, therefore, not entirely clear what the legislature contemplated 
by including “contingent interest in property” in the definition of trust property. It could, 
conceivably, refer to limited interests in property such as, for example, a usufructuary’s 
interest under a usufruct or a fiduciary’s interest under a fideicommissum.346 However, such 
specification appears unnecessary in light of the wide signification of the term “property”. In 
order to obviate any uncertainty, it is submitted that the SALRC’s initial proposal on defining 
“trust property” for purposes of the Act is uncomplicated and unproblematic, and that the 
definition of “trust property” be amended in accordance with this proposal. 
 
3.2.4  Definition of “trustee” 
The TPCA defines “trustee” as meaning “any person (including the founder of a trust)347 who 
acts as trustee by virtue of authorisation under section 6 and includes any person whose 
appointment as trustee is already of force and effect at the commencement of this Act”. It is 
important to note, however, that a person becomes a trustee once he accepts the 
appointment of the office of trustee,348 which generally derives from the trust instrument 
and not the Master’s authorisation.349 Form J417, shown below, must be completed by the 
accepting trustee and handed to the Master.350 
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 Cameron et al (2002) 242. 
344
 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 872F-H; Du Toit (2007) 121. 
345
 Gross v Pentz 1996 (4) 617 (A) 628H-I. 
346
    Du Toit (2007) 7. 
347
   The trust founder falls within the meaning of “any person”, thus rendering the reference to trust founder 
redundant. The reference will therefore be struck out of the proposed definition of trustee. 
348
 Marais v Naude 1987 (3) SA 739 (A) 756F; Cameron et al (2002) 216; Du Toit (2007) 73; Olivier (1990) 55. 
349
 See Metequity v NWN Properties 1998 (2) SA 554 (T) 557G; Cameron et al (2002) 179. See also Van der 
Merwe v Van der Merwe 2000 (2) SA 519 (C) 522G-H and Hanekom v Voight 2016 (1) SA 416 (WCC) 421I-
422A where the court acknowledges the distinction between appointment and authorisation. After 
appointment and acceptance of trusteeship, a trustee can act in that capacity only on receiving written 
authorisation from the Master in the form of a letter of authority in terms of section 6(1) of the TPCA. 
350
 Available at www.doj.gov.za/master/m_forms/acceptance_%20trusteeship.pdf [accessed on 6 March 
2015]. 
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The above form, although entitled “Acceptance of Trusteeship by Trustee”, indicates that 
the person completing it in essence is applying for authorisation to act in the capacity of 
trustee in accordance with section 6(1) of the TPCA. The form, in its current version, does 
not acknowledge that a person becomes a trustee once he accepts the appointment of the 
office of trusteeship. It is submitted, therefore, that the form be amended to distinguish 
pertinently between the acceptance of trusteeship on the one hand, and the application for 
authorisation to act as trustee on the other hand. 
Upon acceptance of the appointment to office, a trustee stands in a fiduciary relationship 
towards the trust beneficiaries.351 The SALRC recommended that a “trustee” be defined as 
“a person appointed by or in terms of a trust instrument or a court order or by the Master in 
terms of section 8 to administer trust property in accordance with the provisions of a trust 
instrument.”352 It is not apparent why the legislature included a definition of trustee that 
focuses on authorisation by the Master as opposed to acceptance by the trustee of 
trusteeship. 
The current definition of “trustee” also creates further anomalies. For example, Pace and 
Van der Westhuizen observe that when a trustee concludes the trust contract with the 
founder under an inter vivos trust he is already acting as trustee, but does so without 
authorisation. For them, therefore, the current definition of “trustee” requires urgent 
legislative attention.353  However, the anomalies created by the current definition go further 
than this. For example, in MacKenzie v Basha the court stated that a trustee is required to 
obtain control over trust property as soon as possible after assuming the office of trustee.354 
On the face of it, the current definition prohibits a trustee, despite having been appointed 
as such and having accepted the appointment, from doing so until authorised thereto by the 
Master. The current definition therefore has a restrictive effect on the commencement of 
trust administration. 
                                                          
351
 See Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C) 813A-B where the court confirmed that it is the office 
of trusteeship that gives rise to a trustee’s fiduciary duty towards beneficiaries. See further Du Toit 
(2007) 471; De Waal (1998) 331. 
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 SALRC Report (1987) 108-109. Section 8 of the proposed Bill by the SALRC relates to the Master’s 
authorisation and the issue of security. 
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 Pace and van der Westhuizen (2015) B6 [6.2.1]. 
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 MacKenzie v Basha 1950 (1) SA 615 (N) 618. See also Du Toit (2007) 86; Olivier (1990) 68. 
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By comparison, no executor exists until letters of executorship have been issued, as it is the 
letters of executorship itself which create the office of executorship.355 Thus, strictly 
speaking, an executor cannot commence any activities in respect of the deceased estate 
until he has received his letters of executorship. However, in order to receive letters of 
executorship certain preliminary tasks need to be completed which, in practice, usually are 
performed by an executor.356 This assists an executor, upon receiving letters of 
executorship, to submit a liquidation and distribution account at the earliest opportunity.357   
The current definition is also not a proper reflection of the law in that it fails to acknowledge 
the fiduciary relationship that arises as soon as acceptance of the appointment of 
trusteeship takes place. In Harris v Rees the court stated that a trustee can act in the 
interests of the trust even if his appointment has not been confirmed by the Master.358 This 
is so because a trustee acts in a fiduciary capacity and therefore has a duty to protect the 
interests of the trust and its beneficiaries.359 If acceptance of the appointment constitutes 
accession to the office of trusteeship, it is recommended that the current definition be 
amended to reflect this fact, whilst also acknowledging the fiduciary relationship that comes 
into existence commensurately.  An amended definition might read as follows: 
“’trustee’ means any person (including the founder of a trust) who [accepts the appointment of 
trusteeship to control and administer the trust fund in a fiduciary capacity] and includes any person 
whose acceptance of appointment as trustee is already of force and effect at the commencement of 
this Act”.
360
 
 
3.3 Section 2: Documents deemed to be trust instruments 
Section 2 of the TPCA provides that: 
“If a document represents the reduction to writing of an oral agreement by which a trust was created 
or varied, such document shall for purposes of this Act be deemed to be a trust instrument”. 
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 Metequity Ltd v NWN Properties Ltd 557D-E. 
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 De Waal and Schoeman-Malan (2015) 240. 
357
 De Waal and Schoeman-Malan (2015) 241. In terms of section 35(1) of the Administration of Estates Act, 
the executor is required to submit the account within 6 months after letters of executorship have been 
issued, unless an extension has been granted. 
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 Harris v Rees 2011 (2) SA 294 (GSJ) 298A-B. 
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 Harris v Rees 298E-F. The judgment conflicts with several decisions which confirm that a trustee cannot 
act until authorised in terms of section 6(1). The matter is analysed in §3.5.2.1 below. 
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 Although the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 contains an interesting definition of trustee, it is too broad in 
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An unsigned deed of trust that confirms a verbal agreement thus would fall within the ambit 
of section 2 of the TPCA. However, if the oral trust agreement is not reduced to writing, the 
trust will not be regulated by the TPCA361 and instead would be governed by the common 
law.362  
The term “agreement” in section 2 appears to relate to oral inter vivos trusts which are later 
reduced to writing, while the definition of “trust instrument” in section 1 includes trusts 
created through testamentary writings as well.  It must be kept in mind that testamentary 
trust beneficiaries can agree not only to waive any vested rights they have in terms of a will 
and dispose of their rights inter partes,363 but can agree also, prior to vesting, to a re-
distribution of benefits after vesting takes place.364 These agreements are referred to 
usually as family agreements, since they are concluded most often in family settings. A 
family agreement of this sort will be valid only if all the beneficiaries acquire vested rights, 
are of appropriate age, have capacity to enter into the agreement and are party to the 
agreement.365 
The question that arises is whether oral family agreements that are later reduced to writing, 
insofar as they affect the devolution of benefits under testamentary trusts, also are 
governed by section 2. Although family agreements concluded inter partes are possible, 
they cannot determine how and when devolution is to take place,366 as this would alter a 
testator’s will.367 According to Olivier, courts rarely will confirm such agreements368 
because, according to Du Toit, all actual or potential beneficiaries are rarely party to 
them.369 Oral family agreements that are reduced to writing evidently have to be confirmed 
by the High Court. It appears, therefore, that section 2 does not apply to such agreements 
and it is proposed the section be amended to reflect this position, as follows: 
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 Deedat v Master 1995 (2) SA 377 (A) 384I; Groeschke v Trustee, Groeschke Family Trust 2013 (3) SA 254 
(GSJ) 258B-C. 
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 Du Toit (2007) 8. 
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 Bydawell v Chapman 1953 (3) SA 514 (A) 523G-H; Hoeksma v Hoeksma 1990 (2) SA 893 (A) 897I-898A. 
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 Ex Parte Trustees Estate Loewenthal 1939 WLD 81.  
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 Levin v Gutkin, Fisher & Schneier 1997 (3) SA 267 (W) 283F; 291B. If there are minor or unborn 
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“If a document represents the reduction to writing of an oral agreement [,other than oral family 
agreements,] by which a trust was created or varied, such document shall for purposes of this Act be 
deemed to be a trust instrument”. 
In order to avoid possible concerns regarding what constitutes a family agreement, it is 
further submitted that a definition of “family agreement” be contained in the proposed Act.     
 
3.4 The TPCA and the High Court 
3.4.1 Section 13: Variation of trust provisions 
The SALRC recommended that the courts not be vested with wide powers in respect of the 
variation of trust provisions and that the rights of the founder, trustee and beneficiaries at 
common law to vary a trust instrument remain unchanged.370  It was suggested further that 
the common law power of the courts to vary trust provisions be extended.371 
Section 13 of the TPCA empowers the courts to vary a trust provision if the provision brings 
about consequences which the founder did not contemplate or foresee and if the provision 
hampers the achievement of the objects of the founder, or prejudices the interests of the 
beneficiaries, or is in conflict with the public interest. 
Section 13 does not replace the High Court’s common law power of amendment. Instead it 
supplements it372 by broadening that power to include the power to terminate trusts.373 In 
Conze v Masterbond Participation Trust Managers (Pty) Ltd, the court held that section 13 
cannot be relied on to fill lacunae in a trust deed.374 Also, in the absence of an application 
brought in terms of section 13, a court cannot read a term into the trust deed.375 
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Section 13 contains both a subjective criterion (the founder’s lack of foresight or 
contemplation) and an objective criterion (the hampering of the trust object, or prejudice to 
the interests of beneficiaries, or conflict with the public interest) that must be satisfied 
before an application in terms of section 13 will be successful.376 
The first reported judgment on section 13 was Ex Parte President of the Conference of the 
Methodist Church of Southern Africa NO: in re William Marsh Will Trust.377 In this case, the 
testator executed a will in 1899, creating a trust in terms of which homes for destitute white 
children had to be established. The administration of the homes was taken over by the 
Methodist Church of Southern Africa in the 1970s and, upon a decline in the number of 
white children admitted to the homes, the President of the Conference of the Methodist 
Church brought an application under section 13 of the TPCA to have the word “white” 
removed from the testator’s will. Removal of the restriction would open the homes to 
children from all racial groups. The court was satisfied that both the subjective and objective 
criteria mentioned above were met in that the founder neither contemplated nor foresaw 
that his beneficence would be hampered by a shortage of eligible persons, and because the 
trust provision conflicted with the public interest.378 
Section 13 since has attained a constitutional dimension insofar as it has been used to 
remove unfairly discriminatory limitations on benefitting from testamentary charitable 
trusts in particular.379 Du Toit remarks that the courts, when section 13 has been invoked for 
the aforementioned purpose, appear to interpret the section’s subjective criterion as 
requiring an unforeseen change in circumstances subsequent to the execution of the will in 
question, whereas it in fact requires that a trust provision occasions unforeseen 
consequences.380  He argues further that, since the courts seemingly interpret the subjective 
criteria incorrectly, a better approach would be to rely on the common law power of courts 
to vary trust provisions,381 a power which is being developed by our courts as they 
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implement the Constitution.382 Van der Westhuizen and Slabbert deliver even sterner 
criticism when they argue that, if a testamentary charitable trust provision can be 
implemented, it should remain intact, with regard being had to the time period and the 
circumstances in which the trust was created.383 
Curators, Emma Smith Educational Fund v University of Kwazulu-Natal illustrates some of 
the foregoing concerns. It dealt with an appeal against, inter alia, the court of first instance’s 
striking-out of racial limitations from an educational fund established under a testamentary 
trust.384 In relation to section 13, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the racially 
restrictive nature of the trust prevented the realisation of the testator’s intentions and that 
“*t+his is due to dramatically changed circumstances from the time that the will was 
made”.385 The court’s emphasis on changed circumstances underlines Du Toit’s criticism, 
whereas Van der Westhuizen and Slabbert would likely have wanted the testator’s will to 
remain unaltered because the court admitted that amounts had been paid from the trust, 
albeit lower than what the trust could afford.386 The Supreme Court of Appeal furthermore 
appears to have placed far greater emphasis on the fact that the racial restrictions 
contravened the public interest (as part of section 13’s objective criterion) and, it is 
submitted, paid inadequate attention to the section’s subjective criterion in dismissing the 
appeal on this point against the lower court’s judgment. 
Ex Parte BOE Trust Ltd confirms the fallacious reasoning in the Emma Smith case.387 BOE 
Trust concerned an application, inter alia, to have the word “white” removed from the 
provisions of a trust incorporating a bursary bequest.  The four universities that were 
nominated to participate in the selection of bursary holders refused to do so because of the 
racial restriction. The trustees therefore sought to have the word “white” removed.  The 
court noted that a finding that a provision in a will or trust instrument is contrary to public 
policy per se does not give it the power to vary the provision as it deems fit.388  In order for a 
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court to intervene, it must form an opinion that the provision has brought about 
consequences that the founder of the trust did not contemplate or foresee. In the absence 
of such opinion, a court is not empowered to depart from the directions of the founder 
other than by striking down a severable provision or the whole bequest as “it is the 
jurisdictional fact upon which the power to vary (or terminate or grant any other order) 
rests”.389 
The court acknowledged that a shift in public policy had occurred since the creation of the 
trust, but noted that the testatrix’s will was executed eight years into the new constitutional 
dispensation.390 Thus, it could not be said that the testatrix was unaware of the changes that 
took place after 1994. Also, no argument was made that circumstances unforeseen by the 
testatrix had an effect on the implementation of the bursary bequest.391 Instead, the 
implementation of the bursary bequest was rendered impossible because of the belief of 
the relevant universities that the bequest was contrary to public policy.392 Furthermore, the 
testatrix indeed foresaw that her bequest might become impossible and thus provided for 
an alternative distribution of the trust income.393 The right to freedom of testation requires 
that effect be given to the wishes of a testator. Only in the absence of the relevant 
jurisdictional fact is a court empowered to declare a provision in the trust instrument void 
for breaching public policy.394 The application was dismissed. 
The matter was taken on appeal in In re BOE Trust Ltd.395 In confirming the court a quo’s 
decision, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that a failure to give effect to a testator’s right 
to freedom of testation, when it is possible to do so, would infringe the constitutionally-
guaranteed rights to property and human dignity.396 The rights to dignity and property 
demand that the wishes of a testator first be established before an enquiry is conducted 
into whether or not there is a rule that prevents a court from giving effect to freedom of 
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testation.397 However, the Supreme Court of Appeal did not mention section 13 when 
discussing the constitutional rights at stake. 
It is evident from the above discussion that many of the problems associated with section 
13 of the TPCA do not stem from the provision itself, but rather from the court’s 
interpretation and application of the criteria which it stipulates. Courts have relied upon 
constitutional changes to hold that circumstances have arisen which the founder did not 
contemplate or foresee; whereas they should be ascertaining whether the provision itself 
has brought about circumstances which the founder did not contemplate or foresee. An 
unfortunate consequence of this misinterpretation is that freedom of testation, more often 
than not, may be superseded by the other rights in question. 
It is submitted that courts should follow the approach adopted by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in In re BOE Trust Ltd. This approach requires that a court begin by establishing the 
wishes of the testator, thereby giving effect to the rights to dignity and property. Thereafter, 
an enquiry must be conducted to determine whether or not there is a rule that prevents the 
court from giving effect to freedom of testation,398 by taking into account the time period 
and the circumstances in which the trust was created.399 For the courts to utilise this 
approach effectively, it is suggested that section 13 be amended to avoid the criticism 
alluded to above.  An amended section 13 might read as follows: 
“If a trust instrument contains any provision which: 
a) hampers the achievement of the objects of the founder; or 
b) prejudices the interests of beneficiaries; or 
c) is in conflict with the public interest  
[due to a change in circumstances, which in the opinion of the court the founder of a trust did not 
contemplate or foresee], the court may, on application of the trustee or any person who in the 
opinion of the court has a sufficient interest in the trust property, delete or vary any such provision or 
make in respect thereof any order which such court deems just, including an order whereby particular 
trust property is substituted for particular other property, or an order terminating the trust”. 
The foregoing proposed amendment could be challenged as being merely declaratory of the 
common law. However, section 13 of the TPCA confers wider powers on courts than the 
common law to amend trust provisions.400 Furthermore, the proposed amendment will be 
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in line with how the Supreme Court of Appeal in Emma Smith ostensibly interpreted the 
section’s subjective criterion.401 Also, the amendment will enable courts to develop 
constitutional principles in respect of section 13 along lines similar to the development 
currently taking place in respect of the common law power of courts to vary trust 
instruments.402 
 
3.4.2 Section 20(1): Removal of trustees 
The SALRC recommended in its Report that the High Court be given a general power to 
remove a trustee from office.403 Section 20(1) of the TPCA governs the removal of trustees 
by the courts on application by the Master or any person having an interest in the trust 
property. 
In The Master v Deedat the court held that section 20(1) merely confers locus standi on the 
Master to bring an application for the removal of a trustee.404 In Ras v Van der Meulen, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that only a beneficiary is entitled to bring an application to 
remove a trustee.405 It is submitted that such an interpretation of the provision is too 
restrictive. Third parties often contract with trusts and, based on recent case law, it is 
evident that third parties often suffer financial loss as a consequence of trustees’ failing to 
abide by their common law and statutory duties406 to such an extent that a warning has 
been issued to everyone dealing with trusts.407 In Kidbrooke Place Management Association 
v Walton, the court found that the judgment in Ras v Van der Meulen did not entail that a 
person who has a sufficient interest in the trust property, but who is not a beneficiary, 
cannot rely on section 20(1).408 According to the court in Kidbrooke, such an interpretation 
would be in conflict with section 20(1) which clearly states that “any person having an 
                                                          
401
    A similar interpretation was ostensibly followed in In re Heydenrych Testamentary Trust 2012 (4) SA 103   
(WCC). 
402
 See Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd 2006 (4) SA 205 (C) and chapter two. The proposed 
amendment’s viability in respect of inter vivos trusts was not tested during interviews. This aspect will 
therefore be addressed in chapter five. 
403
 SALRC Report (1987) 60. 
404
 The Master v Deedat 2000 (3) SA 1076 (N) 1082G-H. 
405
 Ras v Van der Meulen 2011 (4) SA 17 (SCA) 20C-D. See also Boezacht v Niegaardt (1726/11) [2012] 
ZAECPEHC 73 (9 October 2012) [19]; Burger v Ismail (8399/2013) [2013] ZAWCHC 190 (6 December 
2013) [8]-[9]. 
406
 See chapter four below. 
407
 See Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (EDMS) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) 495A.  See also Van der Merwe v 
Hydraberg Hydraulics CC; Van der Merwe v Bosman 2010 (5) SA 555 (WCC) 69I-570A. 
408
 Kidbrooke Place Management Association v Walton 2015 (4) SA 112 (WCC) 118F-G. 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
interest in the trust property” could apply for the removal of a trustee. It is submitted that 
the court’s reasoning in this regard is sound and, therefore, that section 20(1) does not 
appear to present any practical difficulties. It is recommended, consequently, that the 
provision stands unchanged. 
 
3.4.3 Section 19: Omissions by a trustee 
With regard to a trustee failing to comply with a demand from the Master for an account409 
or information or not complying with any duty imposed upon him by the trust instrument or 
by law, the SALRC suggested that the Master or any person with an interest in the trust 
property be allowed to apply to court for an order directing the trustee to comply with such 
demand or perform such duty.410 This suggestion was enacted as section 19 of the TPCA, 
which provides as follows: 
“If any trustee fails to comply with a request by the Master in terms of section 16 or to perform any 
duty imposed upon him by the trust instrument or by law, the Master or any person having an 
interest in the trust property may apply to the court for an order directing the trustee to comply with 
such request or to perform such duty”. 
In Thabantsho Beneficiaries Association v Rammupudu II, where the respondents failed to 
comply with the Master’s request for an account in terms of section 16(1), the court held, 
that the applicant, who represented persons with an interest in the affairs of the trust as 
being part of the beneficiaries, could bring the application in terms of section 19.411 
One may question the practical relevance of section 19, as it may be assumed that the 
Master, who plays a supervisory role over trustees would have locus standi to approach the 
High Court for the relevant order. Yet, it is evident from the SALRC’s Report that section 19 
should have been limited to the Master and beneficiaries.412 However, based on the 
Kidbrooke decision, the phrase “any person having an interest in the trust property” is not 
limited to trust beneficiaries.  Attributing such a wider scope to section 19 appears not to 
occasion any significant difficulties and it is recommended, therefore, that the provision 
should remain intact. 
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3.5 The TPCA and the Master 
3.5.1 Section 3: Jurisdiction 
The SALRC noted that in respect of testamentary trusts, the Master designated under the 
Administration of Estates Act already would be in possession of the trust instrument and, 
thus, would have jurisdiction.413 Although the criterion proposed for trusts other than 
testamentary trusts, namely that the Master “in whose area the greater portion of the trust 
property is to be administered” would have jurisdiction, was criticised,414 no satisfactory 
alternative was recommended and the SALRC recommended that this criterion, derived 
from Trust Moneys Protection Act 34 of 1934, thus was to be retained.415 
Section 3 of the TPCA sets out the jurisdiction of the Master in the following terms: 
“(1)(a) In respect of trust property which is to be administered or disposed of in terms of a 
testamentary writing, jurisdiction shall lie with the Master in whose office the testamentary 
writing or a copy thereof is registered and accepted, and in any other case, with the Master 
in whose area of appointment in terms of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act 66 of 
1965), the greater or greatest portion of the trust property is situated: Provided that a 
Master who has exercised jurisdiction shall continue to have jurisdiction notwithstanding 
any change in the situation of the greater or greatest portion of the trust property. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) a Master who would otherwise have no 
jurisdiction in respect of a trust property may, on written application by any person having 
an interest in that trust property, and with the consent of the Master who has such 
jurisdiction, assume jurisdiction of that trust property. 
(2) No act performed by a Master in the bona fide belief that he has jurisdiction shall be invalid 
merely on the ground that it should have been performed by another Master. 
(3) If more than one Master has in such belief exercised jurisdiction in respect of the same 
trust property, that property shall, without prejudice to the validity of any act already 
performed by or under the authority of any other Master, as soon as it becomes known to 
the Masters concerned, be administered or disposed of under the supervision of the 
Master who first exercised such jurisdiction, and any authorisation or appointment of a 
trustee made by any other Master in respect of that property, shall thereupon be cancelled 
by such other Master.” 
A particular problem associated with trusts is that there is no central register for them. This, 
in turn, makes it hard to ascertain at which Master’s office the trust instrument has been 
lodged.416 Section 3 complicates matters in that more than one Master potentially could 
have jurisdiction over the same trust. One way to alleviate these difficulties would be to 
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create a public register for trusts. This proposal was raised during interviews and will be 
discussed further in chapter five below. 
3.5.2 Section 6: Authorisation of a trustee, security and corporations as trustees 
At the time of the SALRC’s investigation, a trustee was appointed in terms of the trust deed 
and did not require letters of authorisation. The SALRC recommended that the position 
regarding the appointment of a trustee be retained. However, to alleviate uncertainty about 
the authority of an appointee to act as trustee, the SALRC also recommended that the 
Master should indicate in writing that such appointee has the necessary authority so to act.  
Furthermore, no trustee would be allowed to act as such unless he furnished security or was 
exempted from furnishing security, and the Master may issue letters of authority only after 
the issue of security has been resolved.417 
3.5.2.1  Section 6(1): Authorisation 
Section 6(1) of the TPCA reads as follows: 
“Any person whose appointment as trustee in terms of a trust instrument, section 7 or a court order 
comes into force after the commencement of this Act, shall act in that capacity only if authorised 
thereto in writing by the Master.” 
The inclusion of the reference to a court order in section 6(1) is superfluous because 
section 6(1) refers to “trust instrument” and the definition of “trust instrument” in section 
1 of the Act includes a court order. It is proposed, therefore, that the words “court order” 
be deleted from the section. While section 6(1) was added, firstly, to serve the interests of 
the beneficiaries by reinforcing the requirement of security and, secondly, to inform 
outsiders through written proof of the incumbency of the office of trustee,418 there is a 
vast difference between the proposal that was made by the SALRC and the content of the 
section. The recommendation made by the SALRC contained a proviso, which appeared in 
section 8(1) of the Trust Property Control Bill, to the effect that: 
“No person whose appointment as trustee comes into effect after the commencement of this Act 
shall act in that capacity until he has been authorised thereto in writing by the Master: Provided that 
the Master may, pending the furnishing of security by the trustee, authorise him in writing to perform 
specified acts with regard to the trust property”.419 
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It is unclear why section 6(1) of the TPCA does not contain a similar proviso. The current 
wording of section 6(1) has generated the most case law and attracted the most scholarly 
commentary by far, with the most contentious issue being the (in)validity of acts 
performed by unauthorised trustees. As mentioned in the discussion on the definition of 
“trustee”, a person becomes a trustee as soon as he accepts his appointment. However, a 
trustee cannot act in that capacity until he acquires authorisation from the Master in terms 
of section 6(1), which, in turn, is dependent on the furnishing of security.420 
Litigation in respect of section 6(1) has focused on an unauthorised trustee’s contractual 
capacity and such a trustee’s capacity to litigate. These issues are discussed briefly below. 
 
3.5.2.1.1 Contractual capacity 
The first case to deal with a contract concluded by unauthorised trustees was Simplex (Pty) 
Ltd v Van der Merwe,421 in which the court stated, inter alia, that the lack of a criminal 
sanction imposed by section 6(1) in the event of non-compliance with the subsection 
indicates that the legislature felt it unnecessary to punish a party for an act which has no 
legal consequences.422 The court opined, therefore, that any act performed by a trustee 
prior to receiving authorisation was invalid and could not be ratified.423  
However, in Kropman v Nysschen, which involved a dispute regarding a cession agreement, 
the court reached a different conclusion. It held that, other than the TPCA providing in 
section 20 that the Master may remove a person as trustee, no criminal sanctions are 
imposed on anyone for breaching section 6(1). Further, the TPCA does not provide that non-
compliance with section 6(1) voids the act in question.424 Relying on Reichel v Warnich,425 
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the court held that since the appointed trustees received the assets for the benefit of the 
trust, the act could be approved and ratified.426 
Kropman v Nysschen attracted criticism from both academics427 and courts.428 Also, many 
decided cases involving contracts support the view that a contractual act performed by an 
unauthorised trustee is invalid and cannot be ratified ex post facto.429 However, given the 
divergent views430 taken by the High courts, the matter needed to be clarified by the SCA. 
 
3.5.2.1.2 Capacity to litigate 
Whereas many of the decided cases on the conclusion of contracts leaned towards the 
Simplex (Pty) Ltd v Van der Merwe approach, in Watt v Sea Plant Products Bpk the court 
held that the subsection’s prohibitory phrase “shall act in that capacity only if authorised 
thereto” refers to the incapacity of a trustee to acquire rights or incur liabilities on behalf of 
the trust prior to authorisation.431 The court opined, however, that section 6(1) of the TPCA 
does not regulate matters pertaining to locus standi,432 which is an access mechanism 
controlled by the courts and which is not dependent on authority to act.433 Thus, according 
to the court, the question that requires answering is whether, at the time of issuing 
summons, a trustee’s “interest” in the trust is too remote. So, while an appointed but 
unauthorised trustee cannot act without authorisation from the Master, such trustee has an 
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interest in the administration of the trust, which affords him locus standi while awaiting the 
Master’s authorisation.434 
There was evidently a need for clarification by the SCA, which came about in Lupacchini v 
Minister of Safety and Security.435 However, prior to this decision and as a means of 
remedying the uncertainty emanating from the divergent views of the High Courts, Smith 
proposed that courts utilise a purposive approach when interpreting section 6(1) in order to 
give effect to the dual purpose behind the section.436 Such an interpretation, he argued, 
provides a basis upon which ratification of an invalid act would be possible, as the 
conclusion of the transaction would not contravene the peremptory437 statutory provision, 
thereby circumventing the harsh consequences that would ensue if blanket invalidity is 
imposed on all acts performed by unauthorised trustees.438 Bothma, however, challenges 
Smith’s proposal, contending that acts performed by an unauthorised trustee cannot be 
ratified,439 because the two interests which section 6(1) serves to protect are irreconcilable 
and, thus, the section cannot protect both simultaneously.440 Smith, in a later article, agrees 
with Bothma’s argument that the two interests cannot exist simultaneously, but maintains 
that the dual purpose approach of section 6(1) can be served by ratification, which relates 
to the original transaction.441 So, while a third party’s interest dissipates after the 
agreement has been concluded, it existed when the original contract was concluded, making 
ratification possible, provided that consensus exists among all the parties concerned.442 
Smith’s arguments evidently are directed at providing a remedy in instances where a trustee 
contravenes the peremptory clause in section 6(1). 
Lupacchini v Minister of Safety and Security involved the locus standi of trustees, one of 
whom was unauthorised, to sue on behalf of a trust. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that 
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the court in the Watt case posed the wrong question in its engagement with unauthorised 
trustees’ locus standi; the correct question443 to be asked and answered is whether the 
trustees were capable of suing or being sued at all.444  The court confirmed that the lack of a 
criminal sanction implied that the legislature intended for the acts of an unauthorised 
trustee to be invalid,445 otherwise the prohibition would have no consequences at all.446 
Also, according to the Supreme Court of Appeal, to interpret section 6(1) as nullifying 
certain acts and not others would result in anomalies447 and give rise to the very situation 
which the legislature intended to prevent.448 The Supreme Court of Appeal thus imposed 
blanket invalidity in respect of any action or duty that a trustee attempts to fulfil while 
awaiting authorisation. In an attempt to clarify section 6(1) further, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal held in Lynn v Coreejes that authorisation by the Master is a sine qua non for a 
trustee to act on behalf of a trust.449 This is evidenced by the word “only” contained in the 
section, which the court said is indicative of the invalidity that ensues if there were non-
compliance with the provision.450 
It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Appeal decisions discussed above not only failed 
to acknowledge the impact that blanket invalidity has in practice, but also failed to consider 
the relationship between section 6(1) and the fiduciary duty which follows as soon as a 
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person accepts an appointment as trustee.451 While Smith raises engaging arguments 
regarding the dual purpose approach which would allow for ratification, it is submitted that 
it makes practical sense to amend section 6(1) to obviate any need for ratification by 
incorporating, firstly, a proviso similar to that contained in the SALRC’s recommendation; 
and, secondly, a provision on retroactivity similar to section 57 of Chapter III of the 
Administration of Estates Act which, had the Chapter been enacted, would have stated: 
“If written application for any letters of administratorship granted under subsection (1), was made 
within fourteen days after the death of the testator or donor, or the date of any order made under 
section fifty-eight, as the case may be, such letters of administratorship shall, for the purposes of 
section fifty-seven, or of the prohibition contained in such order, as the case may be, be deemed to 
have been granted immediately after the death of the testator or donor, or on the date of such 
order”. 
Thus, it is submitted that an amended section 6(1) ought to read as follows: 
“(1)(a) Any person whose appointment as trustee in terms of a trust instrument [or] section 7
452
 
comes into force after the commencement of this Act, shall act in that capacity only if authorised 
thereto in writing by the Master. 
[(b) Pending the issuing of letters of authorisation, a trustee, whether required to furnish security 
or not, can apply in writing to the Master for interim authorisation to perform specific acts with 
regard to the administration of trust property. 
(c) Notwithstanding an application for interim authorisation brought in terms of paragraph (b), if a 
written application for any letters of authorisation was made within fourteen days after the death 
of the testator or within fourteen days after the creation of an inter vivos trust, such letters of 
authorisation shall be deemed to have been granted immediately after the death of the testator or, 
in the case of an inter vivos trust, from the date on which the application for letters of authorisation 
was made].453 
This amendment not only will separate the issue of security from authorisation, but will also 
give effect to the rule that trusteeship commences upon acceptance. It also implicitly 
acknowledges the fact that a trustee takes on a fiduciary position as soon as he accepts 
trusteeship by allowing the Master to grant interim authorisation to enable a trustee to 
commence basic trust administration. The need for this proviso is strengthened by 
provisions such as section 5 which refers to “appointed” as opposed to “authorized” to 
furnish the Master with an address for the service upon him for notices. However, based on 
the current state of affairs regarding section 6(1), a trustee by law, is incapable of doing so. 
The amendment will give effect also to the dual purpose of section 6(1) to protect the 
interests of both the beneficiaries and the public: firstly, a trustee will be allowed to 
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commence trust administration for the benefit of the beneficiaries; secondly, the right of 
the public to know that the appointed trustee has authorisation is upheld. Whether the 
proposed amendment is practicable was tested in the interviews with trust practitioners, 
and these outcomes are analysed in chapter five below.   
3.5.2.2  Sections 6(2) and 6(3): Security 
The SALRC recommended that a trustee should furnish security to the satisfaction of the 
Master and that the Master’s determination would have to be made within the boundaries 
of reasonableness.454 It was suggested also that the Master should have discretion to 
dispense with security by a trustee if, in his opinion, there were sound reasons to do so, 
regardless of whether or not security was dispensed with by the trust deed.455 These 
recommendations were incorporated into sections 6(2) and 6(3) of the TPCA. 
According to section 6(2): 
“The Master does not grant authority to the trustee in terms of this section unless- 
(a) he has furnished security to the satisfaction of the Master for the due and faithful performance 
of his  duties as trustee; or 
(b) he has been exempted from furnishing security by a court order or by the Master under 
subsection (3)(a) or, subject to the provisions of subsection (3)(d), in terms of a trust 
instrument: 
Provided that where the furnishing of security is required, the Master may, pending the 
furnishing of security, authorise the trustee in writing to perform specified acts with regard to 
the trust property.” 
Section 6(3) provides that: 
“The Master may, if in his opinion there are sound reasons to do so- 
(a) whether or not security is required by the trust instrument (except a court order), dispense with 
security by a trustee; 
(b) reduce or cancel any security furnished; 
(c) order a trustee to furnish additional security; 
(d) order a trustee who has been exempted from furnishing security in terms of a trust instrument 
(except a court order) to furnish security.” 
The two subsections indicate that the Master’s furnishing letters of authorisation is 
conditional, either on the furnishing of security by a trustee or on the trustee being 
exempted from furnishing security.456 Section 6(2) would have to be amended by deleting 
the proviso if section 6(1) is amended in accordance with the proposal suggested in 
§3.5.2.1.2 above. Furthermore, retaining the proviso under this subsection will be 
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superfluous in that the proposed amendment regarding authorisation will afford a trustee 
the right to commence basic trust administration, which is indeed what section 6(2) 
provides for pending the matter of security. Further issues of a practical nature regarding 
the furnishing of security were canvassed in interviews with trust practitioners, and are 
addressed in chapter five below. 
3.5.2.3  Section 6(4): Corporations as trustees 
Section 6(4) regulates the position in respect of corporations that have been appointed as 
trustees.  It provides that : 
“If any authorisation is given in terms of this section to a trustee which is a corporation, such 
authorisation shall, subject to the provisions of the trust instrument,
457
 be given in the name of a 
nominee of the corporation for whose actions as trustee the corporation is legally liable, and any 
substitution for such nominee of some other person shall be endorsed on the said authorisation.” 
In Metequity Ltd v NWN Properties Ltd, the defendants argued that, as letters of authority 
were not issued to the plaintiffs (two companies who were joint trustees of the trust in 
question) but to their nominee, the plaintiffs had no locus standi to institute an action to 
recover money.458 In other words, so the argument went, only the nominee and not the 
corporations could take action.459 The court stated that all companies act through their 
directors and officials460 and that the use of the words “to a trustee which is a corporation” 
in section 6(4) indicates that the trustee is the corporation itself, even though 
authorisation to act is given in the name of the nominee.461 Also, the phrase “in the name 
of a nominee” is indicative of the authorisation being given to the trustee (corporation) 
but in the name of a nominee.462 The court opined that nowhere in the subsection is it 
stated that the nominee is in fact the trustee; instead, the TPCA merely provides that a 
trustee that is a corporation shall act in that capacity through a certain nominee.463 
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Although these uncertainties pertaining to section 6(4) appear to be clarified by the 
decision in Metequity Ltd v NWN Properties Ltd, the formulation “a nominee of the 
corporation for whose actions as trustee the corporation is legally liable” leaves the 
impression that there is some form of dual trusteeship between the corporation and the 
nominee.464 The court in the Metequity case rejected this view on the basis that too much 
is read into the words “as trustee” in the clause “for whose actions as trustee the 
corporation is legally liable” which, according to the court, deals with the vicarious liability 
of the corporation for acts of the nominee performing the duties of a trustee on behalf of 
the corporation.465 Thus, the provision simply states that the trustee, who is in fact the 
corporation, can act in that capacity through a nominee.466 
Be that as it may, it is suggested that section 6(4) be amended as follows to give linguistic 
effect to the Metequity Ltd v NWN Properties Ltd judgment: 
“If any authorisation is given in terms of this section to a trustee which is a corporation, such 
authorisation shall, subject to the provisions of the trust instrument, be given in the name of a 
nominee of the corporation for whose actions as trustee the corporation [as trustee] is legally liable, 
and any substitution for such nominee of some other person shall be endorsed on the said 
authorisation.” 
 
3.5.3 Section 7: Appointment of trustees by Master 
The SALRC recommended that the Master, after consulting with those interested parties he 
deemed necessary to consult, be empowered to fill a vacancy in the office of trustee. The 
Master would be required to consider all the circumstances, including the wishes of the 
beneficiaries, when making the appointment. What is more, the Master would have 
authority also to appoint an additional trustee if he were satisfied that it was necessary for 
the proper administration of the trust.467 Section 7 of the TPCA constitutes a response to 
these recommendations.  It provides that: 
“(1) If the office of trustee cannot be filled or becomes vacant, the Master shall, in the absence of 
any provision in the trust instrument, after consultation with so many interested parties as he 
may deem necessary, appoint any person as trustee. 
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(2) When the Master considers it desirable, he may, notwithstanding the provisions of the trust 
instrument, appoint as co-trustee of any serving trustee any person whom he deems fit.” 
 
Section 7(1) regulates the circumstance in which the Master is compelled to appoint 
trustees whereas section 7(2) confers a discretion upon the Master in appointing co-
trustees.468 
In Moore v Mrs Du Toit, Assistant Master of the High Court for the Province of Kwazulu-
Natal the applicants sought an order setting aside the appointment made by the Master in 
terms of section 7(2) on the ground that he was obliged to give them an opportunity to 
make representations in accordance with the audi alteram partem maxim prior to making 
the appointment.469 It was submitted further that the two subsections were to be 
interpreted together, thus obligating the Master, as he is by section 7(1), also to consult 
“with so many interested parties as he may deem necessary” before exercising his 
discretion under section 7(2).470 The court disagreed, holding that the subsections dealt with 
different situations.  The court pointed out that, in terms of section 7(1), the Master can 
appoint a trustee only in the “absence of any provision in the trust instrument” if the “office 
of trustee cannot be filled or becomes vacant”; whereas section 7(2) allows the Master to 
appoint a co-trustee to any serving trustee “notwithstanding the provisions of the trust 
instrument”.471 
The court had to decide whether the TPCA implicitly excluded the right of an individual to be 
heard before the Master exercised his discretion in terms of section 7(2).  This exclusion, the 
court decided, had to be established by implication as there was no express right to be 
heard in terms of the TPCA.472 Even if a statute expressly excludes the right to be heard, a 
person nevertheless may establish a legitimate expectation to a hearing.473 However, the 
court held that section 7(2) implicitly excludes an obligation upon the Master to afford 
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interested parties a hearing before exercising his discretion. The court acknowledged that 
the appointment of a co-trustee could affect the interests of beneficiaries or possibly 
constitute an adverse reflection on the serving trustee, and that it would be proper for the 
Master to consult with interested parties before appointing a co-trustee, but held that the 
Master was not obliged to do so.474 It is submitted that the court’s reasoning is sound as an 
aggrieved party can approach the court for a remedy under section 23 of the TPCA.475 It is 
submitted, consequently, that section 7 in its current format is satisfactory and, therefore, 
not in need of amendment.476 
 
3.5.4 Section 8: Foreign trustees 
The SALRC recommended that the Master be empowered to authorise a foreign trustee to 
act in the Republic so as to avoid costly court applications. Furthermore, it was proposed 
that the Master may request security if the fact that the trustee is not resident in the 
Republic justifies the furnishing of security.477 Section 8 of the TPCA deals with this 
recommendation in the following terms: 
“When a person who was appointed outside the Republic as trustee has to administer or dispose of 
trust property in the Republic, the provisions of this Act shall apply to such trustees in respect of such 
trust property and the Master may authorise such trustee under section 6 to act as trustee in respect 
of that property.” 
It is apparent that foreign trustees are treated differently from domestic trustees as regards 
both letters of authorisation and the furnishing of security. Section 8 is permissive in its use 
of the word “may”, which indicates that the Master’s authorisation is not a prerequisite for 
a person to act as a foreign trustee. It appears thus that the provision was inserted for 
convenience, as it would have been practical for foreign trustees to obtain written authority 
to administer trust assets.478 
As yet, there is no case law on section 8, suggesting that the provision does not cause 
practical concerns. However, several questions may be posed. For example, does the TPCA 
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apply to a foreign trustee if the Master does not issue a letter of authorisation? If the 
Master chooses to not authorise a foreign trustee, will the foreign trustee lack capacity to 
act on behalf of the trust in the light of the judgment in Lupacchini v Minister of Safety and 
Security? Also, is a foreign trustee, by virtue of the reference to section 6 of the TPCA, 
subject to the duty to provide security? These questions were tested during interviews and 
will be pursued further in chapter five. 
3.5.5 Section 16: Trustee accounting to Master 
The SALRC recommended that, should the Master require it, an account should be lodged 
with him by the trustee for his administration and disposal of trust property.479 Section 16 of 
the TPCA regulates the Master’s power in this regard: 
“(1) A trustee shall, at the written request of the Master, account to the Master to his satisfaction 
and in accordance with the Master’s requirements for his administration and disposal of 
trust property and shall, at the written request of the Master, deliver to the Master any 
book, record, account or document relating to his administration or disposal of the trust 
property and shall to the best of his ability answer honestly and truthfully any question put 
to him by the Master in connection with the administration and disposal of the trust 
property. 
(2) The Master may, if he deems it necessary, cause an investigation to be carried out by some 
fit and proper person appointed by him into the trustee’s administration and disposal of 
trust property. 
(3) The Master shall make such order as he deems fit in connection with the costs of an 
investigation referred to in subsection (2).” 
In both Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol480 and Ras v Van der Meulen481 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that the Master has wide powers under section 16(1) to call upon 
trustees at any time to account to him regarding their administration of trust property.  In 
the latter case, the Supreme Court of Appeal also stated that section 16(2) empowers the 
Master to carry out an investigation into trust administration if he deems it necessary. This 
is a discretion which vests solely in the Master.482 
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By way of comparison, section 152 of the Insolvency Act also empowers the Master to call 
upon a trustee to provide any book or document pertaining to the insolvent estate.483 
However, the notice in section 152(2) of the Act serves as a means of summoning the 
person to appear before, inter alia, the Master at a stipulated place, date and time to 
provide the Master with the relevant information. Section 16(1)of the TPCA  does not 
appear to have the same effect as section 152(2) of the Insolvency Act, in that the former 
provision merely requires the trustee “to deliver” the documents to the Master after he has 
requested it, whereas the latter requires the trustee to appear personally before the Master 
with the requested documentation. This begs the question as to whether section 16(1) of 
the TPCA requires that the documents be delivered to the Master by the trustee personally 
or whether delivery by post will suffice. It is submitted that section 16(1) should be 
amended to the effect that a trustee should appear personally before the Master in order 
for said trustee “to the best of his ability answer honestly and truthfully any question put to 
him by the Master in connection with the administration and disposal of the trust property”. 
This can only be achieved if a trustee personally appears before the Master (with the 
relevant documentation if requested) which, it is submitted, will enable matters to be 
resolved more swiftly than it would through correspondence between the Master and a 
trustee.   
 
3.5.6 Section 22: Remuneration of trustee 
The SALRC proposed that a trustee be entitled to such remuneration as may be provided for 
in the trust instrument. Where the trust instrument omits to specify remuneration, a trustee 
should be allowed a reasonable remuneration. If such reasonable remuneration is a matter 
of dispute, it would be determined by the Master.484 In line with this recommendation, 
section 22 of the TPCA stipulates that: 
“A trustee shall in respect of the execution of his official duties be entitled to such remuneration as 
provided for in the trust instrument or, where no such provision is made, to a reasonable 
remuneration, which shall in the event of a dispute be fixed by the Master.” 
Section 22 does not empower the Master to reduce or increase the amount of 
remuneration granted in terms of the trust instrument. The Master’s role becomes relevant 
only if the trust instrument is silent on the issue of remuneration and a dispute regarding 
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what constitutes a reasonable remuneration arises. In both instances, the court has a 
discretion to make decisions regarding remuneration485 and plays a supervisory role over 
the Master’s decisions regarding remuneration.486 
The provision raises several questions: firstly, who decides on a trustee’s remuneration, if 
the trust instrument is silent? Secondly, will the Master only play a role if an agreement 
cannot be reached and a dispute arises as to what a reasonable remuneration is? The 
provision does not assist in determining what a reasonable remuneration may be, and 
leaves this decision with the Master. 
By way of comparison, section 51(1)(b) of the Administration of Estates Act487 provides that 
if a will is silent on the issue of remuneration, an executor will receive out of the assets of 
the estate a remuneration that will be assessed according to a prescribed tariff.488 Section 
51(3)(b) goes further and empowers the Master to disallow remuneration, wholly or in part, 
if an executor fails to discharge his duties or discharges them in an unsatisfactory manner.  
Section 63(1) of the Insolvency Act489 states, inter alia, that a trustee is entitled to a 
reasonable remuneration which is to be taxed in accordance with the prescribed tariff 
contained in the Act.490 The section goes on to provide that the Master, for good cause, may 
reduce, increase, or disallow remuneration, in whole or in part, if there is any failure or 
delay on the part of a trustee in discharging his duties or any improper performance of his 
duties. Both the Administration of Estates Act and the Insolvency Act allow the Master to 
consider a trustee’s discharge of his duties as a criterion for making his decisions regarding 
remuneration. Furthermore, there is a prescribed tariff for executors and a tariff that can be 
used for taxing a reasonable remuneration of trustees of insolvent estates. 
It is submitted that, where a trust instrument is silent on the issue of remuneration, the 
Master be empowered to determine what constitutes a reasonable remuneration. Also, 
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provision should be made, following the wording used in the Administration of Estates Act 
and the Insolvency Act, for the Master to reduce or disallow remuneration if a trustee fails 
to discharge his duties. Such a provision would serve as a form of punishment against errant 
trustees in their administration of a trust.  Parties can approach the court in terms of section 
23 of the TPCA if they feel aggrieved by the Master’s decision. The interviews were used to 
ascertain from the Master’s office what guidelines, if any, are used to determine the 
reasonableness of remuneration and whether trustees under the TPCA should be subjected 
to a prescribed tariff, as are executors when the will is silent. The results are reported in 
chapter five below.  
 
3.5.7 Section 20(2): Removal of trustee 
The SALRC recommended that the Master should have the power to remove a trustee in 
certain circumscribed circumstances.491 This recommendation found its way into section 
20(2) of the TPCA, which provides that: 
“A trustee may at any time be removed from his office by the Master- 
(a) if he has been convicted in the Republic or elsewhere of any offence of which dishonesty is an 
element or of any other offence for which he has been sentenced to imprisonment without the 
option of a fine; or 
(b) if he fails to give security or additional security, as the case may be, to the satisfaction of the 
Master within two months after having been requested thereto or within such further period 
as is allowed by the Master; or 
(c) if his estate is sequestrated or liquidated or placed under judicial management; or 
(d) if he has been declared by a competent court to be mentally ill or incapable of managing his 
own affairs or he is by virtue of the Mental Health Act, 1973 (Act No 18 of 1973),
492
 detained as 
a patient in an institution or as a State patient; or 
(e) if he fails to perform satisfactorily any duty imposed upon him by or under this Act or to 
comply with any lawful request of the Master.” 
 
Section 20(3) goes on to stipulate that: 
“If a trustee authorised to act under section 6(1) is removed from his office or resigns, he shall 
without delay return his written authority to the Master.” 
In Ganie v Ganie493 the court had to determine the validity of the Master’s decision to 
remove the first applicant as a trustee in terms of section 20(2) of the TPCA. The court held 
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that the Master’s removal of the applicant as trustee was not valid because the applicant 
had not been granted an opportunity to deal with the complaints or charges that were 
lodged against him; because the Master had not ensured that the applicant was given 
proper and effective notice of the precise grounds for his proposed removal; because the 
applicant was not given notice of the Master’s intention to remove him; because the Master 
failed to provide the applicant with a proper and effective opportunity to state his case; and 
because no steps were taken to ensure that the applicant was afforded procedural fairness 
regarding his removal.494 
Although section 20(2) does not require the Master to provide the said notices, the court 
relied on the view of Cameron et al that, in order for the Master to remove a trustee, the 
trustee should be given proper notice and be informed of the precise grounds for the 
proposed removal.495 This, they say, is necessary as the removal would constitute an 
impairment of the trustee’s good name and character as well as deprive him of his right to 
remuneration.496 
Since a trustee’s good name and character are at stake, and taking into account the 
requirements of procedural fairness and the audi alteram partem principle, it is submitted 
that it would be appropriate to amend section 20(2) paragraph (e) through the inclusion of a 
prescript requiring of the Master to afford a trustee an opportunity to respond to any 
allegation in respect of his administration of the trust that has been made against him as a 
precursor to his possible removal from office.  The other paragraphs of the section need not 
be amended since there would be orders confirming, for example, that the trustee has been 
declared insolvent, or the Master would have proof that the trustee has failed to provide 
security.  However, with a proposed removal based on section 20(2) paragraph (e), a trustee 
may well be able to disprove allegations of maladministration on his part, and thus should 
be afforded an opportunity to rebut claims against him. 
The approach taken by the legislature in the Administration of the Estates Act to the 
removal of an executor is instructive here. Section 54(2) of the Act states that, before the 
Master may remove an executor from office, the Master must send the executor a notice by 
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registered post informing him of the reasons for the removal, and that the executor is 
entitled to apply to court within 30 days from the date of the notice for an order restraining 
the Master from removing the him from office. It is submitted that, in light of the arguments 
above regarding procedural fairness, a trustee ought to receive comparable treatment. 
However, to avoid the costs attached to bringing such a restraint application, it is submitted 
that section 20(2) paragraph (e) of the TPCA be amended to include the Master sending the 
trustee a notice by registered post informing him of the grounds for removal and a date on 
which the trustee can appear before the Master to answer the allegations against him. 
A further concern regarding section 20(2) TPCA is whether the time frame of two months 
specified in section 20(2) paragraph (b) regarding the provision of security by a trustee, is 
adequate. Should it not be extended, given that neither section 6(2) nor section 6(3), which 
are the main provisions dealing with security, stipulates a time frame within which a trustee 
ought to give security?497 Section 20(3), in turn, raises the question whether trustees indeed 
comply with the subsection’s directive by returning their letters of authorisation without 
delay. Also, what is meant by “without delay”? Is there a certain time frame that the Master 
affords a trustee? If not, should a time frame not be included? What recourse does the 
Master have if a trustee does not comply with section 20(3)?  Would imposing a criminal 
sanction not assist in this regard? By comparison, section 102(1)(i)(v) of the Administration 
of Estates Act provides that if an executor fails to comply with, inter alia, section 54(5),498 
such executor shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months. These questions were canvassed 
during interviews, and the various responses are analysed in chapter five. 
 
3.6 The duties of trustees 
3.6.1 Section 4: Lodgement 
The SALRC recommended that a procedure to enable persons with an interest in a trust to 
inspect the trust document be included in the legislation.499 Also, if there was reason to 
believe that a trust was not being administered properly the relevant authorities should be 
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 Compare, for example, section 23(3) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 which states that an 
executor should find security within the period specified in the written notice. 
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in a position to take remedial action. Thus, the SALRC recommended that all trust 
instruments and amendments to trust instruments be lodged with the Master.500 
Accordingly, section 4 of the TPCA provides as follows: 
“(1) Except where the Master is already in possession of the trust instrument in question or an 
amendment thereof,
501
 a trustee whose appointment
502
 comes into force after the 
commencement of this Act shall, before he assumes control of the trust property, upon 
payment of the prescribed fee, lodge with the Master the trust instrument in terms of which 
the trust property is to be administered or disposed of by him, or a copy thereof certified as a 
true copy by a notary or other person approved by the Master. 
(2) When a trust instrument which has been lodged with the Master is varied, the trustee shall 
lodge the amendment or a copy thereof so certified with the Master”. 
In Groeschke v Trustee Groeschke Family Trust,503 the court emphasised that section 4(2) 
does not stipulate that a failure to lodge an amendment of a trust deed would render the 
amendment invalid. Instead, all that section 4(2) requires is for a trustee to lodge the 
amended document.504 No time frame for the lodgement of the document or the form that 
the document should take or the content of the document is stipulated. Nor is the 
lodgement of a complete, amended deed of trust required after an amendment has taken 
place. However, what is imperative is that the document amending the trust deed is 
lodged.505 The court also stated that, despite the peremptory nature of section 4, non-
compliance with the section will not result in the suspension or the invalidation of the 
trust.506 
Considering that time frames have been imposed in sections 5 and 20(2)(b) of the TPCA, the 
interviews were used to examine the question whether a time frame for trustees to lodge 
                                                          
500
 SALRC Report (1987) 18-19. 
501
 The Master already will be in possession of a trust deed where, for example, a new or additional trustee 
is appointed (Du Toit (2007) 84); or in cases where trust deeds were lodged by trustees in terms of 
section 2 of the Trust Moneys Protection Act 34 of 1934 (Cameron et al (2002) 265); or where the trust 
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required by the Administration of Estates Act. 
502
 The use of the words “a trustee whose appointment” in section 4(1), as opposed to a trustee who has 
been authorised, raises the question as to whether a trustee who lodges a copy of the trust deed will not 
be acting in contravention of the Lupacchini judgment in which the Supreme Court of Appeal held that 
an unauthorised trustee has no capacity to act whatsoever.  However, the amendments of section 6(1) 
proposed above would allow for an appointed but unauthorised trustee to lodge a trust instrument 
since interim authorisation to commence trust administration would be possible. 
503
 Groeschke v Trustee Groeschke Family Trust 2013 (3) SA 254 (GSJ).  See also Mahomed v Trustees of 
Mohammedan (2443/2007) [2008] ZANWHC 20 (3 July 2008) [33] where the court held that the 
respondents failed in their statutory duty by not lodging the trust deed with the Master. 
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trust deeds ought to be incorporated.507 An attempt was also made to ascertain how soon 
appointed but unauthorised trustees lodge the trust document and whether the Master 
allows lodgement in the light of the Lupacchini judgment. These matters are re-examined in 
chapter five. 
 
3.6.2 Section 5: Notification of address 
The SALRC recommended that, since the Master does not have regular contact with a 
trustee in the ordinary course of events, a trustee should furnish the Master with an address 
where he may be contacted by the Master or the beneficiaries.508 In this connection, section 
5 of the TPCA states that: 
“A person whose appointment as trustee comes into effect after the commencement of this Act, shall 
furnish the Master with an address for the service upon him of notices and process and shall, in case 
of change of address, within 14 days notify the Master by registered post of the new address”. 
A trustee failing to comply with this duty does not affect the commencement of trust 
administration but could render the execution of trust administration difficult.509 Section 5 
provides that the address may be used for the service of process, which likely implies that it 
may be used for the service of legal documents. However, to provide legal certainty, it is 
submitted that the provision be amended to indicate that the designated address will serve 
as a domicilium address.510 The interviews were used to ascertain whether trustees indeed 
comply with this duty and whether a criminal sanction ought to be imposed if a trustee fails 
to comply with the fourteen-day period. The outcome of these inquiries is provided in 
chapter five. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
507
 See, by way of comparison, section 27(1)(a) of the Administration of Estates Act which places a duty on 
an executor who has been requested by the Master to provide an inventory, or is required to furnish 
security in terms of section 23, to lodge with the Master an inventory in the prescribed form pertaining 
to the estimated value of all property in the deceased estate, within thirty days after letters of 
executorship have been granted or within such further period as the Master may allow. 
508
 SALRC Report (1987) 64. 
509
 Du Toit (2007) 36. 
510
 See Bonugli v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd
 
2012 (5) SA 202 (SCA) where the Supreme Court of 
Appeal relied, inter alia, on section 5 to argue that the court a quo had jurisdiction to hear the matter. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal did not elaborate on this argument, as it found that the appellants 
submitted to the High Court’s jurisdiction and thus that court had authority to hear the matter. 
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3.6.3 Section 9: Statutory duty of care 
The SALRC suggested that the standard of care required of a trustee be elaborated.511 The 
suggested standard requires that a trustee, in the discharge of his duties and the exercise of 
his powers, demonstrate the care, diligence and skill which reasonably can be expected of a 
person who manages the affairs of another. This would be the minimum standard of care 
expected of a trustee. However, a higher standard could be required by the trust 
instruments or another Act.512 The SALRC acknowledged it could be contended that the law 
should not interfere with a founder’s choice to include an indemnity clause as reprieve for a 
trustee who fails to meet this standard of care, diligence and skill.513  It was noted also that 
the law does not hold a trustee liable for a mere error of judgment and that it would be 
unfair if a trustee’s liability were limited by such a clause to acts of bad faith or gross 
negligence.514 It was also not clear whether such clauses indeed safeguard trustees given 
that reliable statistics on the matter were not available. It was felt, furthermore, that a 
trustee would not admit that he failed to exercise the necessary care.515 Thus, it was 
recommended that any provision in a trust instrument which purported to exempt a trustee 
from or indemnify him against liability for his failure to exercise the necessary care, 
diligence and skill would be void.516 
These recommendations were incorporated into section 9 of the TPCA, in the following 
terms: 
“(1)  A trustee shall in the performance of his duties and the exercise of his powers act with the care, 
diligence and skill which can reasonably be expected of a person who manages the affairs of 
another. 
(2) Any provision contained in a trust instrument shall be void in so far as it would have the effect of 
exempting a trustee from or indemnifying him against liability for breach of trust where he fails 
to show the degree of care, diligence and skill as required in subsection (1).” 
Section 9(1) sets out the minimum standard of care expected of a trustee. Other than this 
requirement, no content to the duty of care is provided.517 Nevertheless, the duty is said to 
                                                          
511
 SALRC (1987) Report 32. 
512
 SALRC Report (1987) 32-33.  See for example Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 (1) SA 836 (W) in which the 
court stated that a higher standard of care was expected from professional trustees. 
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be one of the most important components of a trustee’s fiduciary obligations518 and derives 
from the essential notion that a trustee’s control over trust property must be functionally 
separate from the beneficiaries’ enjoyment of trust benefits.519 Non-compliance with this 
duty could result in a claim for breach of trust. Thus, the duty establishes the basis for the 
various remedies awarded to trust beneficiaries and third parties against a trustee.520 
Section 9(2) was inserted into the TPCA on Wunsh’s recommendations. However, the author 
is critical of the subsection, arguing that people accepted appointments as trustees in the 
past because of exemption clauses contained in trust deeds. Since the TPCA has 
retrospective effect, the same people might not have accepted the appointment had they 
known that the exemption clause would become inoperative.521 Cameron et al also contend 
that covering trustees against liability by insurance is not adequate as trustees who are lay 
persons might find matters pertaining to insurance complicated and the procurement of 
adequate insurance may be too costly.522 Olivier, however, argues that a trustee should 
accept the burden of his office or simply refuse the appointment.523 It is arguable, 
furthermore, that exemption clauses do not instil confidence in the office of trustee; 
moreover, that the TPCA does no more than confirm the common law position on point.524 
It is not apparent how section 9(1) and (2) impact on trust administration where there is an 
element of risk involved, for example, when a trustee is required to invest trust money.  
What is more, in Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol,525 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
noted that, in order for the purpose of a trust to be achieved, one has to accept that the 
inflation factor necessitates an element of risk when investing trust funds. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal thus held that there is no justification for a hard-and-fast rule requiring that 
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 Du Toit (2007) 91. 
519
 See Land and Agricultural Development Bank of SA v Parker 87B-C; Sher (2005) 65. Note, however, that 
Kernick (2007) 27 questions the correctness of the SCA’s position in Land and Agricultural Development 
Bank of SA v Parker. 
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 Du Toit (2007) 91; Olivier (1990) 79. 
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trust funds be invested in so-called “trustee investments”526 and that section 9 does not 
impose any such limitation on the investment of trust funds.527 The court cautioned, 
nevertheless, that a trustee acting with care and diligence must keep in mind the element of 
risk in investing trust moneys and, therefore, must avoid investments of a speculative 
nature.528 
Balden and Rautenbach argue that, while the Supreme Court of Appeal in Administrators, 
Estate Richards moved away from the conservative approach as far as trust investments are 
concerned, no guidelines on trustee investment were provided.529 Thus, they recommend 
that the TPCA follow in the footsteps of the English Trustee Act of 2000 by including 
provisions relating to trustee investments.530 Whether implementing provisions relating to 
trustee investments will assist in practice, were be tested during interviews and are 
reported on in chapter five. 
 
3.6.4 Section 10: Trust account 
As there is a common law duty on a trustee to keep trust property separate from his own 
assets, the SALRC recommended, inter alia, that a trustee must deposit money received in 
his capacity as trustee into a trust account in the name of the trust. Also, any account or 
investment with a financial institution must be identified as a trust account or trust 
investment.531 
Section 10 of the TPCA is a response to this recommendation and provides that: 
“Whenever a person receives money in his capacity as trustee, he shall deposit such money in a 
separate trust account at a banking institution or building society”.532 
The section does not specify the type of account to be used nor whether the account should 
be opened in the name of the trust or the trustee,533 which differs from the 
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 See, for example, Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516. 
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 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 558C-D. 
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 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 558H. See Williams (2001) 314 who states that it nevertheless 
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 Balden and Rautenbach (2005) 111. 
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recommendation made by the SALRC. In Olivier v Firstrand Bank Ltd, the court did observe 
that, in practice, banks and building societies permit accounts to be opened in the name of 
the trust or in the name of the trustees for the time being.534 However, in order to provide 
legal certainty it is proposed that section 10 be amended to stipulate that the account 
should be opened in the name of the trust, as per the recommendation of the SALRC.535 
By comparison, section 28 of the Administration of Estates Act contains provisions relating 
to an executor’s duty to open a bank account in the name of the estate. It also empowers 
the Master to request information from an executor regarding the bank and the branch at 
which the account was opened, and to direct the manager of the branch to prevent an 
executor, except with the permission of the Master, from withdrawing money from the 
account. An executor, who wishes to transfer the account to another bank, also requires the 
Master’s permission. A failure on the part of an executor to comply with the requirements 
of section 28 will result in the executor being guilty of an offence and liable, on conviction, 
to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding six months.536 
It is submitted that the inclusion into the TPCA of a provision similar to section 28 of the 
Administration of Estates Act would assist on two counts. Firstly, it would empower the 
Master to fulfil a supervisory role over a trustee’s handling of trust funds, thereby placing 
the Master in a better position to call for an investigation in terms of section 16(2). 
Secondly, the penalty clause attached to a failure to comply with this duty may serve as a 
deterrent, in that trustees run the risk of being imprisoned for their non-compliance. These 
submissions, which were tested during interviews, will be addressed in chapter five. 
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 Olivier v Firstrand Bank Ltd [2011] JOL 27019 (GNP) 12 [21], which noted the work of Cameron et al 
(2002) 306 in this regard.  See also Du Toit (2007) 90; Pace and Van der Westhuizen (2015) B15 [15.2.5]; 
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3.6.5 Section 11: Registration and identification of trust property 
Despite a trustee having a duty at common law to keep trust property separate from his 
own assets,537 the SALRC recommended compelling a trustee to take practical steps to 
segregate trust property from his personal property. As the SALRC did not recommend that 
the trust be bestowed with legal personality, it was suggested that trust property be 
registered in the name of the trustees.538 While acknowledging that requiring the 
registration and identification of trust property would not ensure that all trustees comply, 
the SALRC considered that it nevertheless would assist interested parties “to see to it more 
effectively that a trustee complies with the requirements”.539 
Section 11 of the TPCA deals with this matter, providing that: 
“Subject to the provisions of the Financial Institutions (Investment of Funds) Act, 1984 (Act 39 of 
1984), section 40 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act 66 of 1965), and the provisions of the 
trust instrument concerned, a trustee shall- 
(a) indicate clearly in his bookkeeping the property which he holds in his capacity as a trustee; 
(b) if applicable, register trust property or keep it registered in such manner as to make it clear from 
the  registration that it is trust property; 
(c) make any account or investment at a financial institution identifiable as a trust account or trust 
instrument; 
(d) in the case of trust property other than property referred to in paragraphs (b) or (c), make such 
property identifiable as trust property in the best possible manner.”
540
 
This provision incorporates the common law principle that trust property does not form part 
of a trustee’s personal estate and, thus, that a trustee is under a duty to hold trust property 
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 See, for example, Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C). 
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 SALRC Report (1987) 39-40. It should be noted that several developments occurred as a consequence of 
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in such a manner as to render it identifiable as trust property.541 Compliance with this duty 
not only facilitates trust administration, but also allows a trustee to perform effectively his 
duty to account for trust administration.542 Moreover, a trustee’s actions relating to his 
bookkeeping, registration of trust property, investments and accounts must be conducted in 
such a manner that the assets of the trust are always identifiable as trust property.543 
However, a trustee’s non-compliance with this provision will not preclude the relevant 
property from falling outside the trustee’s personal estate, provided that it can be identified 
as trust property in some or other way.544 To assist in this regard, it is submitted that a 
statutory duty compelling trustees to submit trust accounts to annual audits be 
incorporated in the TPCA, with a failure to do so resulting in criminal sanctions. Annual 
audits, it is submitted, will enable an auditor to identify whether a trustee indeed complies 
with this duty and will serve as a deterrent against trustees intermingling trust property 
with their personal property because of the consequent penalty that could ensue.  
 
3.6.6 Section 12: Separation of trust property 
The SALRC noted that there was no consensus about whether the sequestration of a trustee 
resulted in trust property vesting in a trustee’s insolvent estate. Thus, the position had to be 
clarified by legislation. However, the legislative provisions had to preserve a balance 
between the interests of trust beneficiaries and the personal creditors of a trustee.545 The 
SALRC’s recommendation was that trust property shall not be attached in respect of any 
debt of a trustee in his personal capacity and shall not form part of a trustee’s personal 
insolvent estate.546 
Section 12 of the TPCA, which gives effect to this recommendation, states that: 
“Trust property shall not form part of the personal estate of the trustee except in so far as he as trust 
beneficiary is entitled to the trust property.” 
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Section 12 confirms the core element that a trustee holds two estates, that is, a private 
estate and the trust estate, as well as the principle that trust is a segregated fund in that a 
trustee’s private estate is separate from the trust estate.547 In Yarram Trading CC t/a Tijuana 
Spur v Absa Bank Ltd it was noted that situations where a trustee combines trust property 
with his private property still require attention.548 However, it has been accepted that, even 
if there is no proper separation between a trustee’s personal estate and the trust property, 
the private creditors of a trustee cannot direct their claims against the trust estate.549  
Again, a statutory duty to submit annual audits would assist for the reasons mentioned 
under 3.6.5 above. Whether a related provision that caters for situations where a trustee 
mixes trust property with his personal property should be incorporated into the TPCA were 
tested during interviews, and will be attended to in chapter five. 
 
3.6.7 Section 17: Preservation of documents 
The SALRC felt that documents pertaining to trust administration rarely will be relevant five 
years after the termination of a trust. It also considered that only documents pertaining to 
trust investments, control, administration, alienation or distribution of trust property would 
need to be preserved.550 
Accordingly, in terms of section 17 of the TPCA: 
“A trustee shall not without the written consent of the Master destroy any document
551
 which serves 
as proof of the investment, safe custody, control, administration, alienation or distribution of trust 
property before the expiry of a period of five years from the termination of a trust.” 
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No case law on section 17 was found, which suggests that the provision does not cause 
practical difficulties and therefore in no need of amendment. 
 
3.6.8 Section 21: Resignation by trustee 
At common law, unless provision was made in the trust instrument, a trustee was not 
allowed to resign, unless he had good reason to do so and acquired the consent of the 
court.552 The SALRC recommended that, in instances where a trustee wishes to resign, a 
trustee must give notice of his intention to the Master and the trust beneficiaries.553 
Section 21 of the TPCA reads: 
“Whether or not the trust instrument provides for the trustee's resignation, the trustee may resign by 
notice in writing to the Master and the ascertained beneficiaries who have legal capacity, or to the 
tutors or curators of the beneficiaries of the trust under tutorship or curatorship.” 
In Soekoe v Le Roux the court held that when a trustee resigns he is not legally relieved of 
his duties554 and remains accountable to his fellow trustees until replaced by the Master.555 
In Meijer v Firstrand Bank Limited (Formerly known as First National Bank of Southern 
Africa) in re Firstrand Bank Limited (Formerly known as First National Bank of Southern 
Africa) v Meijer, the court stated that section 21 grants trustees a general power of 
resignation, subject to the conditions stipulated in the section, and does not require the 
Master or the court’s permission.556 However, the court noted that the TPCA is silent on 
when resignation by a trustee takes effect.557 To avoid the hardships that would follow if the 
judgment in Soekoe was followed, the court suggested that proof of a written resignation 
                                                          
552
 See Meijer v Firstrand Bank Limited (Formerly known as First National Bank of Southern Africa) in re 
Firstrand Bank Limited (Formerly known as First National Bank of Southern Africa) v Meijer [2013] JOL 
30560 (WCC) 6 [7]; Cameron et al (2002) 227. 
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 SALRC Report (1987) 71-72. 
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 Soekoe v Le Roux (898/2007) [2007] ZAFSHC 135 (29 November 2007). See also van der Merwe 
Hydraberg Hydraulics CC; van der Merwe v Bosman 2010 (5) SA 555 (WCC) 563B-E. 
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 Soekoe v Le Roux [50]. 
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 Meijer v Firstrand Bank Limited (Formerly known as First National Bank of Southern Africa) in re Firstrand 
Bank Limited (Formerly known as First National Bank of Southern Africa) v Meijer 6 [7]. 
 See also Weiss v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd; in re: Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Fourie 
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Bank Limited (Formerly known as First National Bank of Southern Africa) v Meijer 10 [11]. 
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letter being sent to the Master coupled with an acknowledgment of receipt thereof by the 
Master’s office would suffice.558 
It is submitted the court’s suggestion in Meijer is sound as it would be unreasonable for a 
trustee to remain in office until the Master has removed his name from the letters of 
authorisation. However, it is not known how long it takes for a Master to remove a trustee 
upon receiving notification of said trustee’s resignation. This question, posed during 
interviews, is addressed later. 
 
3.7 The rights of beneficiaries/“interested parties” 
3.7.1 Section 14: Variation of trust instruments 
In terms of the common law, beneficiaries of full age and capacity can vary or terminate the 
trust if they are entitled immediately to the corpus of the trust.559 As far as minor or unborn 
beneficiaries are concerned, the court would have to consent on their behalf.560 In terms of 
section 14 of the TPCA: 
“Whenever a trust beneficiary under tutorship or curatorship becomes entitled to a benefit in terms 
of a trust instrument, the tutor or curator of such a beneficiary may on behalf of the beneficiary agree 
to the amendment of the provisions of a trust instrument, provided such amendment is to the benefit 
of the beneficiary.” 
De Waal notes that section 14’s most problematic requirement is that the variation should 
be “to the benefit of” the trust beneficiaries.561 He notes that the decision of the court a quo 
in Hofer v Kevitt562 placed emphasis on the problems that arise from using the “in the 
interest of” test regarding the variation of trusts, which the court said does not refer only to 
a financial benefit.  He contends that the same practical problems could arise in respect of 
section 14.563 It is submitted that, should there be a dispute as to whether or not the 
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 Meijer v Firstrand Bank Limited (Formerly known as First National Bank of Southern Africa) in re Firstrand 
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amendment is “to the benefit of” the beneficiary, the courts are best suited to resolve the 
matter. The provision therefore should remain as is. 
 
3.7.2 Section 15: Report of irregularities 
The SALRC recommended that provision be made to govern irregularities pertaining to trust 
administration.564 To this end, section 15 of the TPCA provides that: 
“If an irregularity in connection with the administration of a trust comes to the notice of a person who 
audits the accounts of a trust, such person shall, if in his opinion it is a material irregularity, report it in 
writing to the trustee, and if such irregularity is not rectified to the satisfaction of such person within 
one month as from the date upon which it was reported to the trustee, that person shall report it in 
writing to the Master”. 
The efficacy of this provision is questionable since audits of trust accounts are not 
compulsory statutorily. It is doubtful that trustees who are involved in maladministration 
would make use of an auditor. Furthermore, copies of trust accounts need not be lodged 
with the Master’s office. It is submitted that this matter strengthens the proposal that a 
provision compelling trustees to submit trust accounts to annual audits be incorporated into 
the TPCA. The efficacy of section 15 was tested in interviews to ascertain how often 
irregularities are reported by auditors to the Master. The results of this inquiry are dealt 
with in chapter five. 
 
3.7.3 Section 18: Copies of documents 
The SALRC acknowledged that interested persons cannot safeguard their interests in a trust 
without having access to the relevant trust deed.565 However, it was of the opinion that 
persons other than a trustee should not have unlimited access to documents pertaining to 
trust property of inter vivos trusts.566 Thus, it was recommended that any person other than 
a trustee would be entitled to copies of trust documents only if, in the opinion of the 
Master, such person has a sufficient interest in the trust.567 
Section 18 of the TPCA gives expression to the SALRC’s recommendation in the following 
terms: 
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“Subject to the provisions of section 5(2) of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No. 66 of 
1965), regarding the documents in connection with the estate of a deceased person,
568
 the Master 
shall upon written request and payment of the prescribed fee furnish a certified copy of any 
document under his control relating to trust property to a trustee, his surety or his representative or 
any other person who in the opinion of the Master has sufficient interest in such document.” 
The TPCA does not define persons who have a “sufficient interest” in a trust document.569 
However, the obvious persons would be actual and potential trust beneficiaries as well as 
trust creditors.570 In Jowell v Bramwell-Jones the court stated that even a professional 
advisor to a trustee has a right of access to the trust deed.571 According to Cameron et al, 
the requirement of “sufficient interest” has to be construed to exclude those persons who 
would not be entitled to access under the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 
2000.572 The authors maintain, however, that the TPCA’s notion of “interest” is flexible and 
the Master’s power to judge the sufficiency of any claimed interest implies that a narrowly 
technical or legalistic approach was not envisaged.573 If such person feels aggrieved by the 
Master’s refusal to grant access to the trust deed, reliance can be placed on section 23 of 
the TPCA, which is considered briefly below.574 The provision, therefore, should remain 
intact, subject to the responses gathered in respect of a central register for trusts being 
established during the interviews, which is addressed further in chapter five. 
 
3.7.4 Section 23: Access to court 
The recommendation made by the SALRC with regard to recourse to the court was modelled 
on section 48 of the former Companies Act,575 the wording of which indicated that no 
appeal was intended, but a review was possible. Furthermore, no time limit would be set, 
but the application had to be lodged within a reasonable time.576 
Accordingly, Section 23 of the TPCA provides that: 
“Any person who feels aggrieved by an authorisation, appointment or removal of a trustee by the 
Master or by any decision, order or direction of the Master made or issued under this Act, may apply 
                                                          
568
 Section 5(2) of the Administration of Estates Act entitles any person to inspect a will that was lodged 
with the Master and obtain a copy thereof by paying the prescribed fee. However, inspecting and/or 
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to the court for relief, and the court shall have the power to consider the merits of any such matter, 
to take evidence and to make any order it deems fit.” 
An application in terms of section 23 does not have to be a formal one in accordance with 
the Uniform Rules of Court577 and affords an aggrieved person the opportunity of having any 
decision of the Master re-heard de novo.578 The provision acknowledges that the Master 
may err in his decisions. It is thus imperative that the courts assist aggrieved parties in this 
regard.  The provision therefore does not require amendment. 
 
3.8 Summary 
It is evident from the above analysis is that almost every provision contained in the TPCA 
requires some form of amendment, either because it is outdated or can do with 
improvement. It is evident also from the exposition that many improvements can be 
effected by relying on cognate provisions contained in legislation regulating other fiduciary 
functionaries. The recommended amendments emerging from the analysis were tested 
during interviews with persons who deal with trusts regularly on a practical level. A 
questionnaire for purposes of the interviews was developed. The questions are however 
inserted in the main text in chapter five. Thus, the questionnaire is not replicated. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ASPECTS OF TRUST LAW NOT GOVERNED BY THE TRUST PROPERTY CONTROL ACT 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4.1 Introduction 
Whereas the Trust Property Control Act is relatively comprehensive, it is not all 
encompassing. There are a number of matters which resort properly within the ambit of 
trust law but which are not governed by the TPCA. This chapter will focus on certain areas of 
trust law which the SALRC either recommended should not be controlled statutorily or 
which it did not consider in its investigation. To begin with, the chapter will identify and 
provide an analysis, brief at times, of those areas which the SALRC felt should not be 
regulated under the TPCA. The chapter will present also an exposition of certain areas of 
trust law which the SALRC omitted from its investigation but which since have given rise to 
academic debate and/or practical concerns. In order to develop adequate and 
comprehensive legislative recommendations (where apposite) in respect of the issues that 
will be addressed, interviews with specialist trust law practitioners were conducted. A 
questionnaire for purposes of the interviews was developed. The questions are however 
inserted in the main text in chapter five. Thus, the questionnaire is not replicated. 
 
4.2 Matters which the SALRC did not want regulated by the TPCA 
4.2.1 Legal personality 
The Appellate Division had rejected the bestowal of legal personality upon the trust in 
1986.579 The SALRC recommended that the Appellate Division’s position should stand, 
firstly, because far-reaching legislative amendments would be required to invest the trust 
with legal personality and, secondly, because it was felt that the law of trusts should not be 
changed drastically at that point in time. The SALRC opined, furthermore, that the trust’s 
lack of legal personality did not give rise to many problems in practice.580 
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It has subsequently been confirmed judicially on several occasions that a trust is not a legal 
person,581 unless permitted by legislation.582 However, the trust’s non-personality has given 
rise to academic debate, prompting certain scholars to argue for the bestowal of legal 
personality.583 For example, De Waal notes that if a sole trustee vacates the office of 
trusteeship, he thereby relinquishes ownership in the trust property.584 Thus, in such an 
instance it is uncertain in whom ownership of the trust property vests given that a trustee is 
vested with two estates.585 Investing a trust with legal personality, it is contended, would 
eliminate this difficulty.586 
Notwithstanding the academic debate surrounding this issue, it is submitted that legal 
personality should not be bestowed on the trust. This submission is based on the following 
reasons: firstly, legal personality would diminish the flexibility of the trust institution as it 
would require increased statutory regulation;587 secondly, most theoretical and practical 
difficulties are resolved by virtue of the fact that the trustee is vested with the trust’s assets 
and liabilities in an official capacity;588 and thirdly, it is the lack of legal personality is that 
distinguishes the trust from other institutions such as companies and close corporations.589 
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 See, for example, Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) 260F in which the court stated that 
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In this light, it is submitted that any revised statutory regulation of the trust in South Africa 
should not provide generally for the bestowal of legal personality on the trust institution. 
 
4.2.2 Duration of trusts 
The SALRC acknowledged that trusts of a long duration may cause inconvenience, expense 
and distress to beneficiaries. Also, the SALRC was of the opinion that, although empowering 
the courts to vary trust provisions would not solve all problems, such a power of 
amendment would provide relief where circumstances arose which were not contemplated 
by the founder. Thus, for example, a court would have the power to vary a trust provision 
which, by reason of its duration, is in conflict with the public interest or prejudices the 
interests of beneficiaries.590 The SALRC also opined that provisions limiting the duration of 
trusts would solve some problems at times, but simultaneously would complicate the law of 
trusts and impair the flexibility of the trust institution. Thus, on the strength of these 
reasons, as well as the limited support for such a proposal, the SALRC recommended that 
the duration of trusts not be limited by legislation.591 
The SALRC’s rejection of a rule against perpetuities has not prevented academics from 
arguing that economic considerations justify the imposition of a limitation on a trust 
founder’s freedom to establish trusts that are to remain operative indefinitely.592  
Furthermore, many applications to court are brought to amend long-term trusts so as to 
combat negative economic effects brought about by changing circumstances.593 Du Toit 
contends that there is no principled reason why the duration of trusts cannot be restricted 
along lines similar to the duration of fideicommissa imposed by section 6 of the Immovable 
Property (Removal or Modification of Restrictions) Act.594 However, the restriction should 
not be limited to trusts over immovable property, but should extend to all trusts.595 
It is submitted that the academic arguments are valid, especially if one considers the cost 
implications of the alternative identified by the SALRC of bringing an application to court 
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 See, for example, Ex Parte Sidelsky 1983 (4) SA 598 (C); Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1996 (4) 
SA 253 (C). 
594
 In terms of section 6 of the Immovable Property (Removal or Modification of Restrictions) Act 94 of 
1965, fideicommissa over immovable property are limited to two successive sets of fideicommissaries. 
595
 Du Toit (2007) 142. 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
under section 13 of the TPCA either to amend a trust provision or to terminate a trust. The 
SALRC appears to have taken its position in order to safeguard a founder’s desire to have 
the trust remain operative in perpetuity. However, this desire will be overridden if a court 
grants a section 13 application to terminate the trust. 
A difficulty with relying on a provision similar to section 6 of the Immovable Property 
(Removal or Modification of Restrictions) Act concerns the justification for limiting 
charitable trusts to two successive sets of beneficiaries. Many charitable trusts provide, for 
example, bursaries to university students. It is submitted that there is no cause to limit a 
founder’s desire to have an affluent charitable trust continue in perpetuity in order to 
provide these bursaries. Thus, if a provision limiting the duration of trusts is to be included 
in the TPCA, such provision should not apply to charitable trusts. These submissions were 
tested in interviews and the responses are evaluated in chapter five. 
 
4.2.3 Apportionment of costs and income 
The problem of whether costs such as premiums for security bonds, remuneration of 
trustees and accountants, and insurance premiums should be paid out of capital or income 
has been encountered frequently.596 Section 3(2) of the Trust Moneys Protection Act of 
1934597 and sections 63(3), 65(3) and 69(3) of the Administration of Estates Act598 contained 
provisions in respect of the apportionment of the costs of finding security, auditors or 
accountants and remuneration for trustees.599 However, practical guidelines as to which 
payments should be debited against trust capital and which against trust income existed 
(and still exist), and the SALRC felt that inflexible rules in this regard are not desirable.600 
A trustee who feels that it would be just and equitable to depart from the usual rules should 
have a discretion to make a fair apportionment, and beneficiaries who feel aggrieved could 
approach the court. The same would apply to cases which fall outside the established 
guidelines. The SALRC therefore suggested that a provision on the apportionment of costs 
should not be legislated, other than the clause dealing with the costs that ensue as a 
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consequence of the Master calling for an investigation following a call for a trustee to 
account.601 
It is submitted that the SALRC’s rejection of inflexible rules pertaining to the apportionment 
of costs and income is sound. Expenses to keep the trust operative generally are met from 
the trust income, while expenses pertaining directly to the trust property are charged to the 
trust capital. Directives contained in trust deeds also provide assistance and are decisive in 
this regard.602 So, for example, a trust deed may stipulate whether expenses may be 
charged to the capital or the income of the trust, or may provide trustees with a discretion 
to allocate expenses. If a trustee is bestowed a discretion, such trustee should ensure that 
expenses are paid equitably between the income and capital.603 As noted by the SALRC, an 
aggrieved beneficiary may approach the court. Also, a statutory apportionment provision 
would mean that a founder would not have a choice to decide how and from where the 
expenses should be paid or to confer a discretion to this end on the trustees. There is also 
no guarantee that such a provision would ensure that the expenses will be apportioned 
equitably between the income and capital. 
Thus, as proposed by the SALRC, no provision relating to the apportionment of costs and 
income of the trust should be incorporated into the TPCA. 
 
4.2.4 Contract for the benefit of a third party 
The SALRC observed that the Appellate Division’s construction that an inter vivos trust 
operates as a contract for the benefit of a third party had evoked considerable criticism, 
particularly insofar as the trust is revocable until the beneficiaries have accepted the 
benefits under the trust. What is more, this construction provides no satisfactory 
explanation for the charitable trust.604 
However, the SALRC also noted that there appeared to be little support for changing the 
current position, in terms of which the usual rules of the law of contract apply to aspects of 
the inter vivos trust operating as a contract for the benefit of a third party. It is submitted, 
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therefore, that, although the construction of the inter vivos trust in accordance with the 
contract for the benefit of a third party is not satisfactory in all respects, the SALRC’s stance 
not to change the law of trusts drastically is comprehensible, as is its recommendation that 
the constitution of an inter vivos should not be prescribed legislatively, and that the right of 
the founder, trustee and the beneficiaries to vary an inter vivos trust in terms of the 
common law should be retained in its present form.605 
The essentialia of the inter vivos trust have been confirmed authoritatively on several 
occasions.606 It is not certain how confirming them statutorily would assist with the current 
debate in respect of inter vivos trusts. Thus, it is submitted that, for the time being, this 
debate as well as judicial development on point should proceed, and, consequently, that a 
provision on the construction of an inter vivos trust not be included in the TPCA at this time. 
 
4.2.5 Who may serve as a trustee? 
The SALRC felt that it was not desirable to regulate by statute which persons would be 
disqualified to act as trustees.607 As to limiting trustees to certain professions, it was said 
that the choice of a person as trustee is influenced by many factors, with expertise being 
only one of them. An intimate knowledge of the founder’s wishes and family, and the 
founder’s special trust in a particular person are other pertinent factors. Expertise is limited 
to certain professions and being member of a profession does not guarantee expertise or 
reliability. Thus, the SALRC recommended that the administration of trusts should not be 
limited to certain professions.608 
While the TPCA does not include provisions on the disqualification of trustees, certain 
persons by law cannot act in the capacity of trustee. These include any person who lacks 
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legal capacity, for example, mentally incapacitated persons;609 persons who act as witnesses 
to a will, sign a will on behalf of a testator or write a will or any part thereof;610 as well as 
those persons who are prohibited from acting as trustee in terms of legislation.611 Persons 
with limited legal capacity, such as minors, can act as trustees.612 However, since minors 
have limited capacity to act,613 their administration of the trust may be hampered in that 
they will require some form of assistance from their guardians to enter into contracts. 
Indeed, given the constraints on their capacity, it is highly unlikely that the Master will 
confirm the appointment of a minor as trustee.614 In light of these settled principles, it is 
submitted that the TPCA need not include a provision stipulating expressly which persons 
are disqualified from acting as trustee. 
As far as limiting trusteeship to certain professions goes, the SALRC’s arguments appear 
sound. Founders should not be limited to appointing as trustees persons in specific 
professions. Also, the remuneration to be paid if trusteeship were limited to certain 
professions likely would be higher than for lay trustees.615 Hence, it is submitted that a 
provision limiting trusteeship to certain professions not be included in the TPCA. 
 
4.2.6 Notarial execution of trust deeds 
One commentator expressed the view that many trust deeds are drawn by persons who do 
not have legal training, which practice resulted in a host of problems.616 However, the SALRC 
felt that the alternative, namely, notarial execution of trust deeds would result in extra costs 
and in principle would encroach on effective competition. In any event, a founder may use 
the services of a notary if he or she so chooses. Since there were not sufficient grounds to 
make notarial execution compulsory, the proposal to this effect was rejected.617 
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It is submitted that the arguments raised by the SALRC on the cost implications of notarial 
execution are valid. However, a testamentary trust must comply with the formalities 
prescribed by the Wills Act,618 whereas an inter vivos trust appears generally to be free of 
formalities.  This could be explained by the fact that the mode of creating an inter vivos trust 
is the stipulatio alteri, the rules of which are governed by common law contractual 
principles. 
The interviews were used to assess whether the requirements for the creation of an inter 
vivos trust should be governed by the TPCA or whether the notarial execution of the inter 
vivos trust should be made compulsory under the TPCA. This matter is explored further in 
chapter five. 
 
4.2.7 Standard clauses for trust deeds 
It was suggested by a commentator that the proposed legislation include a schedule, as in 
Table A in the First Schedule to the erstwhile Companies Act 46 of 1926, setting out clauses 
for trust deeds which could be adapted by the parties as they deemed fit.619 However, the 
advantages of including such a schedule were not apparent to the SALRC. It was said also 
that such a schedule would discourage diligence on the part of drafters who should strive to 
give effect to the particular wishes of the founder in the trust deeds. Moreover, conflict 
between the provisions of the schedule and a particular trust deed was inevitable, and 
including standard clauses by statute could increase this conflict. Thus, the proposal was 
declined.620 
It is submitted that the arguments raised by the SALRC on point are rational. It indeed is not 
apparent how a schedule containing standard clauses would assist in the drafting of trust 
instruments, particularly in light thereof that this task is often undertaken by professional 
drafters. Furthermore, such a schedule may inhibit a founder’s right to include any provision 
he deems necessary in a trust deed. As long as the provisions stipulated by the founder are 
not impossible, vague or uncertain, contra bonos mores or illegal, it is recommended that 
                                                          
618
      Section 2(1)(a) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953. 
619
      SALRC Report (1987) 91. 
620
      SALRC Report (1987) 92. 
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founders should not be limited in this respect. Hence, a provision which stipulates standard 
clauses for trust deeds ought not to be inserted into the TPCA. 
 
4.2.8 Trading/business trusts 
At the time of the SALRC’s investigation, the Standing Advisory Committee was considering 
issues pertaining to business trusts.621 Hence it was proposed that the investigation 
provisionally be left to the latter Committee.622 
The SALRC acknowledged that trusts may be abused, resulting in prejudice to creditors and 
beneficiaries. However, the SALRC conceded that, if the trust form may be abused, so may 
the company form. It felt that, although the legislature could create structures to protect 
creditors, it would be impossible to safeguard them against every form of prejudice. 
According to the SALRC, creditors thus should attempt to protect their own interests as 
well.623 Also, no evidence was placed before the SALRC indicating the extent to which 
business trusts were abused so as to justify the passage of far-reaching legislation to govern 
such trusts. Even defining a business trust in an appropriate manner624 would have been 
difficult as well.625 As certain trusts already were governed by legislation at the time,626 it 
was recommended that the position remain unchanged.627 
                                                          
621
 It must be noted that there is some debate about the definition of a business trust.  According to Pace 
and Van der Westhuizen
 
(2015) B4 [4.2], whether or not a trust is a business trust is relevant only to the 
classification of the trust; that is, whether the trust is a private trust or a public trust. A business trust, 
therefore, has no, and is not susceptible to, a specific meaning. Certain external factors and the 
surrounding circumstances will have to be used to determine whether the trust in question indeed is a 
business trust. However, these external factors and surrounding circumstances may not be sufficient in 
themselves. They merely may be indicative of the purpose for which the trust was created. Thus, a 
business trust is not a separate type of trust.  Instead, the terms “business trust” or “trading trust” relate 
to the use or application possibilities of a trust. Nevertheless, most scholars contend that the principal 
purpose of a business trust is to carry on business for profit to distribute amongst the beneficiaries. See 
Cameron et al (2002) 91; Du Toit (2007) 182; Wunsh (1986) 561; Olivier (1990) 115. 
         Definitions of “business trust” can be found in statutes. Section 1 of the Second-Hand Goods Act 6 of 
2009, for example, defines it as “a trust created for the purposes of making a profit through the 
combination of capital contributed by the beneficiaries of the trust and through the administration or 
management of the capital by trustees or a person acting on behalf of those trustees, for the benefit of 
the beneficiaries”. This definition appears to be in line with the abovementioned submissions made by 
scholars. Furthermore, the difficulty in recognising whether one is dealing with a business trust or not, 
was highlighted in Cupido v Kings Lodge Hotel 1999 (4) SA 257 (E) 264C-I, where it was noted that in 
many respects there are very little practical differences between a common business enterprise or 
corporation and a business trust, which makes it difficult to determine whether a person is dealing with 
a trust, a corporate body or a private individual. 
622
    SALRC Report (1987) 92. 
623
    SALRC Report (1987) 94. 
624
   That is, defining it in such a manner where additional protection would be necessary, on the one hand, 
but could not be evaded too easily, on the other hand. See SALRC Report (1987) 94. 
625
    SALRC Report (1987) 94. 
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4.2.8.1  Regulation of business trusts 
Whereas there were no statistics available at the time of the SALRC’s investigation regarding 
the use of business trusts, it is evident from more recent case law that an abuse of the 
business trust form has increased over time. For example, in Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies 
(EDMS) Bpk, Harms JA stated that the deed of trust was a typical example of the so-called 
“newer type of trust”628 where, for estate planning purposes or to evade the limitations 
imposed by company law, a founder creates a trust “while everything remains as before”.629 
In light of this judicially-acknowledged increase in the misuse of the trust for business 
purposes, the views of scholars in favour of greater regulation assume significance. For 
example, Theron is of the view that business trusts should be regulated, but that the Master 
should not be burdened with supervising the regulation.630  She argues that, although the 
TPCA should remain applicable to the business trust, the functions of the Master should be 
fulfilled by the Registrar of Corporations.631 Wunsh also considers that many issues 
pertaining to business trusts could be remedied by regulating them statutorily.632  When 
Wunsh made these recommendations, the TPCA was not in effect, but he noted that the 
proposed legislation would govern many of the issues he considered problematic, for 
example, provisions requiring that trust assets be identified and excluded from the personal 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
626
     For example, the then Unit Trusts Control Act 54 of 1981. 
627
     SALRC Report (1987) 95. 
628
  Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (EDMS) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) 493D. See also Van der Merwe v 
Hydraberg Hydraulics CC; Van der Merwe v Bosman 2010 (5) SA 555 (WCC). It is submitted that the 
description of “newer type of trust” is misleading.  It would imply that this novelty goes beyond what is 
provided for in the definition of the TPCA, in which a trust is defined as either an ownership trust or a 
bewind trust.  The idea of everything remaining as before implies that control of the trust assets have 
not been handed over to the trustees, or that the trustees’ control is not functionally separate from the 
beneficiaries’ interests, resulting in questions such as whether the trust is a sham; and, if the founder is 
also a trustee of the trust in question, whether the trust functions merely as the alter ego of the 
founder/trustee? These questions relate to the issue of the abuse of the trust form. Whether this is, in 
fact, so will depend on the trust deed and the facts of the particular case.  Be that as it may, it is 
submitted, that the abuse of the trust form does not result in a so-called “newer type of trust”. 
629
 Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (EDMS) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) 493D-494E. 
630
 Theron (1991) 289. 
631
 Theron (1991) 290.  In terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission now oversees matters pertaining to companies. 
632
 Wunsh (1986) 581-582. By including provisions that, inter alia, require the names of the trustees to be 
published (it is submitted that a central register for trusts could assist in this regard); control the use of 
the names for trusts (I agree with Theron (1991) 285-286; 291 that a business trust need not reserve a 
name; it is, after all, a trust, and not a company and thus not subject to the restrictions regarding the 
name of a company); empower a court to declare a trustee liable for the obligations of the trust where 
the business of a trust has been carried out recklessly, fraudulently or with gross negligence (this matter 
is analysed later in this chapter); authorise a court to pierce the corporate veil (this matter is analysed 
later in this chapter); and disqualify persons from acting as trustee (this matter is analysed later in this 
chapter). 
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estate of the trustees; making provision for an auditor to report any irregularities; and 
provisions requiring trustees to furnish security.633 Theron acknowledges that a business 
trust is still a trust, but that the supervision thereof should be conducted by 
persons/institutions that have knowledge of companies, for example, the Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission.634  
It is submitted that Theron is correct to postulate that a business trust is simply a trust – it is 
not in any way different from the trust defined in the TPCA. The distinguishing feature, 
however, lies in the purpose for which the trust is created, namely, to make a profit,635 but 
that does not detract from the fact that it remains a trust. In other words, the requirements 
for creating a valid trust apply, and both the trust itself and the trustees who administer it 
will be governed by the TPCA. Also, the TPCA contains a definition of a trust which 
emphasises who has ownership and not the purpose for which the trust was created.636 It is 
in this light important to note that case law reveals that it is not the business trust itself that 
has given rise to the current problems associated therewith, but rather the trustees’ 
conduct in administering such trusts. Linked to this is the lack of remedies afforded to third 
parties by the TPCA to counter the effects of the abuse of the trust form generally.  It is 
submitted, therefore, that it is necessary to incorporate provisions safeguarding the 
interests of third parties who contract with trusts. However, these provisions should not be 
restricted to business trusts but should be available in regard to all ownership and bewind 
trusts falling under the ambit of the TPCA. 
There are also concerns related to the recommendation that an institution such as the 
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission supervise business trusts, while the 
trustees are subject to the TPCA under the supervision of the Master. The principal 
objection is certainly that, while this Commission has knowledge pertaining to companies, it 
does not have knowledge regarding the administration of trusts. It is submitted, therefore, 
that there is no justification for Theron’s proposal if it is premised simply on the 
consideration that the purpose of a business trust is to make a profit. It is true that many of 
                                                          
633
 Wunsh (1986) 581. 
634
 Theron (1991) 289-291. This Commission has taken over the role of the Registrar of Companies. In terms 
of section 189(1)(a) of the Companies Act, the Minister must appoint a Commissioner for the 
Commission. 
635
 Theron (1991) 278. 
636
 See section 1 of the TPCA. 
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the practical problems associated with business trusts relate to the nature of trusts in a 
commercial environment, requiring the trustees to play an active role in the day-to-day 
running of the business.637 However, it is not apparent how the Commissioner playing a 
supervisory role will make a significant difference.638 Based on the above analysis, it is 
submitted that business trusts should not be regulated in terms of the proposed Act. 
Instead, the proposed Act should safeguard third parties by incorporating remedies 
specifically afforded to them. 
 
4.2.8.2  Third party interests 
If, as was argued under the previous section, the purpose of regulating trusts – which 
encompass also business trusts – is to safeguard outsiders, it is submitted that the TPCA be 
amended by inserting provisions safeguarding third party interests, while the Master retains 
his supervisory role. Typical examples of such provisions are statutory provision for 
compulsory annual audits of trust accounts (as proposed in chapter three), and statutory 
liability for trustees whose actions prejudice creditors. In essence, two submissions are 
being made. Firstly, the concerns raised in respect of business trusts apply to other trusts as 
well, since it is not the trusts themselves but rather trustee conduct that has given rise to 
the current problems associated with the abuse of the trust form. Secondly, the proposals 
made here in respect of business trusts should apply to all trusts, as abuse of the trust form 
is not restricted to business trusts. 
Abuse of the trust form will occur, as explained in Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa 
v Parker, where there is a lack of separation between enjoyment and control, which the 
court identified to be the core idea of a trust.639 So, while a trustee can be a trust 
beneficiary, a sole trustee cannot be the sole trust beneficiary as this would result in an 
identity of interests which conflicts with the core idea of a trust. Thus, no trust can come 
                                                          
637
 De Waal and Du Plessis (2014) 357-358. 
638
 By the same token one could argue that charitable trusts should be regulated by a Charity Commission, 
as in England, simply because the trust is created for a charitable purpose and the Charity Commission 
would be equipped better to deal with issues pertaining to charitable bequests. If Theron’s proposal is 
accepted, it would result in several Commissions dealing with a trust which, it is submitted, will 
complicate matters further. 
639
 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
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into existence.640 The core idea of a trust was breached in Land and Agricultural Bank of 
South Africa v Parker because the Parkers not only were trustees of the trust, but also were 
the principal beneficiaries. Thus, in their capacities as trustees they had no interest in 
guaranteeing that the transactions with the appellant bank as third party were concluded 
validly641 and as beneficiaries they would unscrupulously deny the trust’s liability towards 
the appellant.642 And while outsiders such as the appellant in the Parker case are expected 
to protect their own interests,643 the principal duty to ensure that trustees comply with all 
formal requirements regarding transactions with outsiders and do not act beyond the scope 
of their authority lies with the trustees themselves.644 However, in cases where the facts 
correspond with those in Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker, non-
compliance with this duty occurs more often than not,645 which prompted the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Parker’s case to insist on intervention not only by the courts but by the 
Master as well.646  The Supreme Court of Appeal proposed the following remedies in respect 
of third parties: reliance on the Turquand rule; reliance on estoppel; going behind the trust 
form; and the appointment of an independent outsider trustee by the Master. 
Beneficiaries of a trust have an action for breach of trust against a trustee if they can show 
that they sustained patrimonial loss as a consequence of a trustee’s conduct.647 However, a 
third party does not have an action for breach of trust because a third party is not a party to 
the fiduciary relationship between a trustee and beneficiary. Furthermore, the remedy, 
namely a removal request which is available in the TPCA for third parties (as well) evidently 
does not assist. Hence, our courts seek remedies in other branches of law, as in the Parker 
                                                          
640
 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 86D-F.  De Waal (2012) 1095 contends that the term 
“abuse” should be explained with reference to the basic principles of trust administration, namely, that 
a trustee must exercise an independent judgment; a trustee must give effect to the trust deed (properly 
interpreted); and a trustee, in the performance of his duties and the exercise of his powers, must act 
with care; diligence and skill. See also Cameron et al (2002) 262. 
641
 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 88G. 
642
 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 88G-H. 
643
 See also Investec Bank Ltd v Adriaanse 2014 (1) SA 84 (GNP) 88B-C, where the court stated that outsiders 
should ensure that they themselves comply with the trust provisions and should not act in flagrant 
violation thereof. 
644
 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 89F. See also Investec Bank Ltd v Adriaanse 88D, 
where the court stated that it is trite that trustees have the primary responsibility to act in accordance 
with the trust deed and that one should guard against the unintended consequence of developing a 
qualitatively higher standard of diligence and care for outsiders dealing with the trust than the trustees 
themselves. 
645
 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 89F-G. 
646
 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 89G-90F. 
647
 See Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 (1) SA 836 (W); Du Toit (2007) 137. 
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case. This is currently the most contentious issue in relation not only to business trusts but 
also other trusts where trustees have abused the trust form.648 Thus, it is submitted that 
legislative remedies that third parties may invoke be incorporated in the proposed Act as 
opposed to regulating business trusts. 
 
4.2.9 Penalty clauses 
While it is customary to punish failure to comply with statutory provisions which are 
generally of an administrative nature, the SALRC felt that it would be undesirable to apply 
criminal sanctions in an area where civil remedies and administrative procedures already 
exist. In order to avoid unnecessary criminalisation of conduct, the proposed TPCA would, 
therefore, not contain penalty clauses.649 
Notwithstanding the SALRC’s opposition to penalty clauses, it is submitted that criminal 
sanctions should, for the reasons that follow, be inserted now in the TPCA.  Firstly, at the 
time of the SALRC’s investigation, the current problems faced by courts relating to abuse of 
the trust form were not as common. Secondly, the SALRC’s reasoning regarding remedies is 
no longer justified since our courts now are seeking remedies in other branches of law to 
assist third parties in instances where trustees abuse the trust form. Thirdly, there is no 
reason why penalty clauses, similar to those contained in legislation regulating other 
fiduciary functionaries cannot be included in the TPCA. It is submitted further that the 
inclusion of penalty clauses has become a necessity, not only as a means of illustrating to 
trustees the importance of fulfilling their statutory duties, but also to serve as a warning 
that attempting to escape liability using trite principles of trust law is serious enough to 
warrant a criminal sanction.650 
Thus, it is suggested that penalty clauses similar to those contained in the Insolvency Act651 
and the Administration of Estates Act should be incorporated into the TPCA. For example, 
section 102(1)(ii) of the Administration of Estates Act makes it an offence for an executor to 
                                                          
648
 These remedies will be analysed in §4.3.1.1-4.3.1.4 and 4.3.2.2.  
649
 SALRC Report (1987) 95. 
650
 Case law reveals that trustees often rely on their non-compliance with the joint-action rule to escape 
liability. See Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA); Nieuwoudt v 
Vrystaat Mielies (EDMS) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA); Van der Merwe v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC; Van der 
Merwe v Bosman 2010 (5) SA 555 (WCC). 
651
 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
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liquidate and distribute a deceased estate without letters of executorship. The offending 
executor is liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding twelve 
months. Similarly, section 144 of the Insolvency Act criminalises, inter alia, failure of a 
trustee to submit an account to the Master or pay a sum of money to the Master. The 
sanction is a fine not exceeding R500,00. Section 216 of the Companies Act652 also contains 
a penalty clause which stipulates that: 
“Any person convicted of an offence in terms of this Act, is liable- 
(a) in the case of a contravention of … to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 
years, or to both a fine and imprisonment; or  
(b) in any  case, to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months, or to both a fine 
and imprisonment”. 
 
These provisions are indicative that the TPCA is excessively lenient insofar as it imposes no 
penalties on defaulting trustees.  It is submitted, in light of the flagrant disregard by trustees 
of the basic principles of trust administration, as is evident from recent case law on point, 
that it has become necessary to include penalty clauses in the TPCA, especially given the 
abuse of the trust form that has become increasingly prevalent since the SALRC’s 
investigation. This issue will be further addressed in chapter five. 
 
4.2.10 Hague Convention 
The SALRC did not consider the policy question of whether South Africa’s accession to the 
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition was desirable. 
However, from a legal viewpoint, the SALRC did not have objections to the accession.653 
Accession to the Convention is a matter beyond the scope of the thesis. It is nevertheless 
submitted that considering the basic provisions stated in the Convention, ratification would 
not cause any difficulties within the South African context.   
 
4.2.11 State control over charitable trusts 
For the SALRC, the proposed statute would ipso jure govern charitable trusts, since it 
provides for property to be administered “for the achievement of the object stated in the 
trust instrument”, and invests the Master with authority to call for an investigation or 
accounts or to apply for an order directing a trustee to perform his duties.  The SALRC thus 
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    Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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    SALRC Report (1987) 97. 
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recommended that the legislation not contain specific measures pertaining to charitable 
trusts.654 
Charitable trusts usually are created with the achievement of an impersonal object in mind, 
so that a founder need not appoint ascertained or ascertainable beneficiaries. With such 
trusts, the object is to benefit the general public or a defined section of the community. In 
other words, the object of the trust is to give charity and not to benefit individual 
beneficiaries.655 
Although the constitution of a “charitable purpose” cannot be demarcated exhaustively, a 
disposition for charitable purposes must exhibit some element of public benefit.656 The 
concept of public benefit was clarified in Ex Parte Henderson, where it was said that public 
benefit does not necessarily mean conferring a benefit on the community at large.657 The 
element of public benefit will be present in a bequest if it is aimed at advancing the interests 
of a section or group in the community, provided that the section or group is sufficiently 
large or representative.658 
Charitable trusts have attracted much judicial attention in recent years, as exclusionary 
provisions contained in particularly charitable testamentary trusts were challenged on 
constitutional and policy grounds. These challenges required the courts to strike a balance 
between freedom of testation on the one hand, and the other constitutional rights alleged 
to be at stake on the other hand. It is evident from the earlier analysis of this issue659 that 
the problems regarding the courts’ engagement with this matter did not relate to the trusts 
themselves, but rather to the court’s interpretation of section 13 of the TPCA where this 
section was invoked to effect variations to the trust instruments in issue. Therefore, it was 
proposed that section 13 be amended to assist courts in developing constitutional principles 
relating to charitable bequests that are of a potentially discriminatory nature. It thus is 
submitted, as the SALRC recommended, that no special provisions governing charitable 
trusts should be incorporated into the TPCA. 
                                                          
654
 SALRC Report (1987) 97-98. 
655
 Cameron et al (2007) 161; Du Toit (2007) 190; Olivier (1990) 131-132. 
656
 De Waal and Schoeman-Malan (2015) 184; Du toit (2007) 190.  
657
 Ex Parte Henderson 1971 (4) SA 549 (D). 
658
 Ex Parte Henderson 554A-B. 
659
 See §3.4.1 in chapter three.  
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4.2.12 Taxes 
An investigation into the tax implications of trusts was not conducted by the SALRC because 
the matter received constant attention from the relevant department and because no 
comment on the issue was received.660 
Several statutes regulate tax matters in respect of trusts. For example, the Income Tax Act 
incorporates a trust in its definition of a “person”, thereby making a trust subject to the 
provisions of the Act.661 Also, a trust founder who acts as a trustee under an inter vivos trust 
may incur estate duty liability in terms of section 3(3)(d) and 3(5)(b)(ii) of the Estate Duty 
Act if the founder retains the right, for example, to revoke or amend the provisions of the 
trust.662 Furthermore, the definition of “property” in section 1 of the Transfer Duty Act 
includes in a contingent right to, inter alia, any residential property held in a discretionary 
trust.663 Since matters pertaining to tax in respect of trusts are regulated already by various 
pieces of legislation, it is submitted, in concurrence with the SALRC’s earlier stance, that the 
TPCA need not include provisions regarding the taxation of trusts. 
 
4.2.13 Interpretation of trusts 
A commentator proposed to the SALRC that provision be made for a person who has an 
interest in a trust to submit any difficulty of interpretation to the Master for his decision.664 
The SALRC felt that there was some merit in the proposal, but considered that its 
implementation would place a heavy burden on the Master, and thus that there was not 
sufficient justification for such a provision.665 
By way of comparison, section 96(3) of the Administration of Estates Act makes provision 
for instances where there is a difference of opinion between the Master and an executor 
regarding a question of law in which a minor is interested.666 However, section 96(3) is not 
utilised often because differences on questions of law usually are dealt with under section 
35(9) of the Act. The latter section empowers the Master, after consideration of an 
                                                          
660
    SALRC Report (1987) 98. 
661
   Section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, as amended by section 2(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act 129 of 
1991. 
662
    Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955. 
663
    Transfer Duty Act 40 of 1949. 
664
    SALRC Report (1987) 98. 
665
    SALRC Report (1987) 99. 
666
    SALRC Report (1987) 98. 
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objection against a liquidation and distribution account or, if apart from any objection, he is 
of the opinion that the account is incorrect and should be amended, to direct the executor 
to revise the account.667 
It is suggested that to insert into the TPCA a provision similar to section 35(9) of the 
Administration of Estates Act ought not to be problematic. Certainly, it would save the trust 
the costs of approaching a court for clarification.668 Also, since the Master already fulfils this 
duty in respect of executors if and when required, there appears to be no good reason why 
the same cannot apply to trustees. This recommendation was tested during the interviews, 
and the outcome is addressed in chapter five. 
 
4.2.14 Existing statutory provisions 
Several reasons were provided by the SALRC as to why provisions of the Administration of 
Estates Act should not be included in the proposed trust legislation: firstly, not all acts of 
trustees should be subject to the control and supervision of the Master; secondly, if the 
common law or ordinary procedure is available, it is not desirable to make specific 
provisions applicable to trusts; and, thirdly, statutory provisions which are merely 
declaratory should be avoided if no problem exists.669 
There are several provisions in the Administration of Estates Act, the Insolvency Act and the 
Companies Act which, it is argued, could assist in improving current provisions in the TPCA 
or in better regulating trustees in their administration of a trust. The Master already 
regulates executors and trustees of insolvent estates, so he should be well equipped to 
perform the same supervisory role in respect of trustees under the TPCA, especially if the 
provisions that will be included are similar to those contained in the statutes listed above. 
This question was probed further during the interviews and the result is analysed in chapter 
five.  
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      SALRC Report (1987) 98-99. 
668
      See, for example, Hoosen v Deedat 1999 (4) SA 425 (SCA) which involved a dispute regarding the    
           interpretation of the trust deed, the costs of the litigation having being paid out of the trust fund. 
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   SALRC Report (1987) 99. The only provision taken from the Administration of Estates Act that would be    
           included in the Bill related to the appointment of a corporation as trustee. 
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4.3 Matters which the SALRC did not consider in its investigation 
4.3.1 Third party remedies 
4.3.1.1 Turquand rule 
The Turquand rule (indoor management rule) was established to mitigate the effect of the 
doctrine of constructive notice.670 In terms of the common law, the Turquand rule provides 
that a person dealing with a company in good faith can assume that all the internal 
formalities671 and procedures of the company have duly been performed.672 Therefore, a 
third party can assume that there has been compliance with the internal formalities and 
procedures of the company for the purpose of, for example, concluding a contract with the 
third party.673 However, only those acts that are permitted by the memorandum and articles 
of association of a company are covered by the rule.674   
The Turquand rule was applied to trusts for the first time in Man Truck & Bus (SA) Ltd v 
Victor.675 In Vrystaat Mielies (EDMS) Bpk v Nieuwoudt,676 the court stated that although a 
trust is not a legal person, there was no reason why the rule could not be applied to the 
matter at hand, as to hold otherwise would amount to a breach of the good faith that 
should exist between contracting parties.677 Thus, the application of the Turquand rule was 
regarded as a necessity.678 
However, on appeal the applicability of the rule to trusts was left open.679 It was noted by 
Farlam JA (on behalf of the majority) that the rule could not be used as the trust deed’s 
clause in question only applied to the signing of documents for “official purposes” and to 
                                                          
670
 See Cassim et al (2011) 169; McLennan (2006) 330. In terms of the doctrine of constructive notice, a 
person who deals with a company is deemed to be aware of the contents of the company’s public 
documents. In this regard, see Cassim et al (2011) 168; Jooste (2005) 67. The doctrine has been 
abolished since by section 19(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
671
 Internal formalities are those dealing with the quorum requirements and notice period for shareholder 
or board meetings; the voting procedures at the said meetings; the limitation on the authority of 
persons representing the company; and the obtaining of consent by or the delegation of authority to 
directors or other officials for the purpose of concluding a contract on behalf a company. See Cassim et 
al (2011) 169; Cilliers et al (2000) 191; McLennan (1979) 346. 
672
 Jooste (2005) 67; McLennan (1979) 345.  
673
 Cassim et al (2011) 169. 
674
   Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (EDMS) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) 494B-C. 
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 Man Truck & Bus (SA) Ltd v Victor 2001 (2) SA 562 (NC). Du Toit (2013) 265-266 regards this decision as 
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not the type of contract signed by the first appellant.680 No specification of the type of 
documents which would fall within the “official purposes” category was provided,681 
thereby rendering this finding questionable and creating the impression that Farlam JA 
indirectly denounced the application of the rule to trusts.  
Harms JA, in a concurring judgment, highlighted certain problems associated with trusts, 
one of them being that there is no central register for trusts or trustees as there is for 
companies and close corporations.682 A member of the public would have to determine 
firstly where the trust deed was lodged. Thereafter, an application to the Master for 
permission to inspect the trust deed would have to be made, which the Master, in 
exercising his discretion, could refuse. Consequently, the underlying principle of the 
Turquand rule would be difficult to apply to trusts.683 Furthermore, third parties cannot 
simply assume that a trustee has the necessary authority.684 
Be that as it may, it is submitted that the Turquand rule could find application if a trust deed 
allows for delegation.685 Outsiders dealing with trusts have no means of ascertaining 
whether delegation by resolution took place, as resolutions need not be lodged with the 
Master.686 The application of the rule in this instance would be a means of avoiding the 
                                                          
680
 Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (EDMS) Bpk 492A-B and 492D. The clause in question (clause 23.4) read: 
“Die trustees kan een of meer van hulle magtig om alle dokumente vir amptelike doeleindes wat vir die 
administrasie van die trust ter uitvoering van enige transaksies wat met die trust se sake verband hou, 
nodig is, namens die trustees te teken.” 
681
 Beukes (2004) 269 argues that it is not apparent why the signing of an agreement that falls within the 
business sphere of a trust and which is signed on behalf of a trust cannot be regarded as the signing of a 
document for official purposes.  Thus, she contends that the clause indeed formed the basis for the 
application of the Turquand rule since it provided for the potential authority of one of the trustees to 
bind the trust. 
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 Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (EDMS) Bpk 493H. See also Van der Merwe v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC; Van 
der Merwe v Bosman 2010 (5) SA 555 (WCC) 566B-C. 
683
 Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (EDMS) Bpk 494B-C. See also Van der Merwe v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC; 
Van der Merwe v Bosman 566C-D. 
684
 Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (EDMS) Bpk 494G. This is in line with the decision in Wolpert v Uitzigt 
Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 (2) SA (W) 264B-C, where it was stated that a third party cannot assume that 
the person professing to act indeed had the necessary authority, especially if the act is outside the usual 
scope of authority.  In such instance, a third party would have to enquire further to ensure that the 
official has actual authority or elicit facts which would estop the company from denying such authority. 
685
 McLennan (2006) 331 considers that delegation is not simply about whether it is possible in terms of the 
trust deed, but rather whether actual delegation took place or the established facts preclude a company 
from denying that it took place.  
686
 See McLennan (1979) 346, where the author observes that an inspection of the company’s public 
documents will not enlighten a third party as to whether or not delegation in fact took place.  
Oosthuizen (1977) 210-219 also shows that the rule is not dependent on the legal personality of the 
association or the applicability of the doctrine of constructive notice and thus argues that the rule can 
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consequences that would ensue if the trustees rely on non-compliance with the joint-action 
rule in order for the trust to escape liability.687 
De Waal and Du Plessis propose that a provision such as that contained in section 7 of the 
Trusts (Scotland) Act of 1921 would assist in combating the current difficulties where an 
abuse of the trust form has occurred.688 Section 7 provides that: 
“Any deed bearing to be granted by the trustees under any trust, and in fact executed by a quorum of 
such trustees in favour of any person other than a beneficiary or a co-trustee under the trust where 
such person has dealt onerously and in good faith shall not be void or challengeable on the ground 
that any trustee or trustees under the trust was or were not consulted in the matter, or was or were 
not present at any meetings of trustees where same was considered, or did not consent or concur in 
the granting of the deed, or on the ground of any other omission or irregularity of procedure on the 
part of the trustees or any of them in relation to the granting of the deed”. 
The authors contend that this provision has the same effect as the Turquand rule689 and 
certainly would safeguard third parties. 
In Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (EDMS) Bpk, Harms JA stated that whether trustees have 
acted in a particular manner is not a matter of internal management, but rather one 
determining the scope of their authority.690 Third parties therefore cannot assume that 
trustees have the necessary authority. Although a provision similar to section 7 of the Trusts 
(Scotland) Act would run contrary to this view and would also be in conflict with the joint-
action rule, which requires that trustees act jointly unless the trust deed stipulates 
otherwise,691 it is nevertheless submitted that the frequency with which trustees use 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
apply to institutions that are not bestowed with legal personality and to which the doctrine of 
constructive notice does not apply. 
687
 See Du Toit (2004) 150-161. According to Claasen (2004) 25, a third party could invoke the rule if he 
transacts with the board of trustees or the managing trustee, if there is one.  The rule, according to the 
author, would not assist in the instance where a third party deals with an ordinary trustee.  In such a 
situation, a third party would have to inquire further. 
688
 De Waal and Du Plessis (2014) 359. 
689
 De Waal and Du Plessis (2014) 359. 
690
 Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (EDMS) Bpk 494E. 
691
  See Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 493E; Smit v van der Werke 1984 (1) SA 164 (T) 174B-D; 
Cooper v The Master 1996 (1) SA 962 (N) 967H; Thorpe v Trittenwein 2007 (2) SA 172 (SCA) 176H; 
Lupacchini v Minister of Safety and Security 2010 (6) SA 547 (SCA) 459D; K O Investment Trust v Appleton 
Securities (Pty) Ltd (59/256/03) [2007] ZAGPHC 28 (17 April 2007) [14][15]; AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v 
Hugo (2088/10, 2089/10) [2010] ZAECGHC 78 (16 September 2010) [34]; Northview Shopping Centre 
(Pty) Ltd v Revelas Properties Johannesburg CC 2010 (3) SA 630 (SCA) 634D-E, with reference to Thorpe v 
Trittenheim; Steyn v Blockpave (Pty) Ltd 2011 (3) SA 528 (FB) 530B-C; O’Shea v Van Zyl 2012 (1) SA 90 
(SCA) 97B; Pascoal v Wurdemann 2012 (2) SA 422 (GSJ); Bonugli v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 
2012 (5) SA 202 (SCA) 207F; Meijer v Firstrand Bank Limited (Formerly Known as First National Bank of 
Southern Africa) in re Firstrand Bank Limited (Formerly Known as First National Bank of Southern Africa) 
v Meijer [2013] JOL 30560 (WCC) [11].  See also Olivier v Firstrand Bank Ltd [2011] JOL 27019 (GNP) 11 
*20+: “Hence, an outside person dealing with trustees should assume that contractual powers have to be 
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deficiencies in authorisation as well as their lack of compliance with the joint-action rule to 
escape liability evident from case law on point, necessitates the incorporation of a similar 
provision into the TPCA. It is submitted that such a provision will safeguard the interests of 
third-party contractants with trustees; moreover, reliance on the Turquand rule (as with 
many of the other remedies to be will be analysed below) would become unnecessary. It is 
proposed, therefore, that, as recommended by De Waal and Du Plessis, a provision akin to 
section 7 of the Trusts (Scotland) Act be included in the TPCA. 
 
4.3.1.2 Ostensible authority (estoppel) 
In Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (EDMS) Bpk, Harms JA considered that the ordinary 
principles of agency could apply to trusts where a trustee expressly or by implication 
authorised someone to act on his behalf.692 In such instance, a third party could rely on a 
trustee acting on the ostensible authority of the other trustees. However, whether the 
trustee had ostensible authority is a matter of fact and not one of law.693 
As to whether ostensible authority exists, the requirements laid down in NBS Bank Ltd v 
Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd would have to be met:694 there must be a representation by 
words or conduct; the representation was made by the principal and not the agent that he 
had authority to act as he did; the representation must be of such a form that the principal 
reasonably should have expected that outsiders would act on it; there was reliance by a 
third party on the representation; the reliance on the representation was reasonable and 
there was consequent prejudice to the third party.695 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
exercised by all the trustees acting together unless the trust instrument specifically authorises action by 
a lesser number of trustees.” 
         This rule applies also to litigation. See Goolam Ally Family Trust t/a Textile, Curtaining and Trimming v 
Textile, Curtaining and Trimming (Pty) Ltd 1989 (4) SA 985 (C) 988D; Mariola v Kaye-Eddie 1995 (2) SA 
728 (W) 731D; Pentz v Gross 1996 (2) SA 518 (C) 525F 525F-G; Deutschmann v Commissioner for South 
African Revenue Services; Shelton v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2000 (2) SA 106 
(E) 119F; Glen Elgin Trust v Titus [2001] 2 All SA 86 (LCC) 94 [14]; Tijmstra v Blunt-Mackenzie 2002 (1) SA 
459 (T) 468G-I; Desai-Chilwan v Ross 2003 (2) SA 644 (C) 647E; Coetzee v Peet Smith Trust 2003 (5) SA 
674 (T) 678G; Mallinson v Slaters [2011] ZAECGHC 29 (1 July 2011) [12]; Dales v Herd (8598/11) [2013] 
ZAKZDHC 54 (5 September 2013) [16]. 
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Also, a third party must heed the additional statements made by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Glofinco v Absa Bank Ltd relating to limitations on ostensible authority.696 The 
principles pertaining to ostensible authority are well established in the common law and 
thus incorporating the requirements mentioned above into the TPCA under the rubric of 
protecting third party interests is not necessary. 
 
4.3.1.3 Going behind the trust form 
Since a trust is not a legal person697 there is no “veil” to “pierce”.698  Notwithstanding the 
use of the words “veil” and “veneer” in the trust law context, our courts have confirmed on 
several occasions that the trust does not enjoy separate legal personality.  Be that as it may, 
it has become evident that trustees hide behind the trust form in order to escape liability 
when they have abused that form. It is submitted that the more appropriate term for the 
apposite remedy in this instance would be “going behind the trust form”.699 The apparent 
difficulty with the application of such a remedy to trusts is that a trust is not invested with 
juristic personality. However, the focus should not be on juristic personality, but on the 
remedy itself which is afforded to a third party in instances where an abuse of the trust 
form has occurred. In the same way as directors hide behind the corporate veil when they 
have abused the company form, so trustees hide their abuse behind the trust form. 
However, courts should steer away from referring to “veil” so as to avoid implying that a 
trust enjoys juristic personality when awarding the remedy.700 In RP v DP, the court stated 
that what is in fact “pierced” in the abused trust context is the veil which separates the trust 
assets from the personal assets of the trustee, where, for example, the trust is a sham or the 
alter ego of the founder/trustee.701 Also, since a trust does not enjoy legal personality, 
preserving the same is not possible in the context of trusts. Instead, courts should strive 
towards giving effect to and upholding the sanctity of the separation between trust 
                                                          
696
  Glofinco v Absa Bank Ltd t/a United Bank 2002 (6) SA 470 (SCA) 479F-483E. For example, a third party 
need not concern himself with an internal limitation.  However, where there is an implicit limitation, the 
question is whether the transaction is of an “ordinary kind” and whether the third party realised that the 
transaction was not of an “ordinary kind”. 
697
 See §4.2.1 above. 
698
 See RP v DP 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP) 248E. 
699
 See De Waal (2012) 1085.  
700
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property and the personal estate of the trustee.702 Thus, where a trustee abuses the trust 
form and the court “pierces the trust veil”, the court in essence is enquiring into the 
segregation of the trust assets from the personal assets of the trustee/founder. Therefore, 
the words “piercing the veil” merely entail the court’s looking behind the transactions as a 
means of ascertaining whether or not the severance of the trust assets were simulated to 
hide the personal assets of the trustee.703 In Van der Merwe v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC; Van 
der Merwe v Bosman704 the court stated that an abuse of the trust form should not be 
countenanced lightly, especially where the facade of a trust is used to protect the trustees 
against fraud; dishonesty and unscrupulous defences against bona fide third parties. In such 
instance, utilising the remedy would be equitable. In this case the trustees denied liability 
under a contract for the sale of land that they purportedly concluded on behalf of a trust – 
the trustees argued that only two of the three-trustee complement signed the contract and, 
therefore, that the trust had not been properly represented in the transaction; moreover, 
that the trust did not grant written authority to only two trustees to execute the contract as 
required by the Alienation of Land Act.705 The court emphasised that it would be 
unconscionable to allow the trustees to escape liability706 and that, had it been possible, it 
would have disregarded the trust form in this case.707 However, due to the formalities which 
apply to contracts in respect of the alienation of land that requires trustees as co-principals 
to act jointly, or alternatively, on the joint written authority of all the trustees708 this was 
not possible on the facts before the court.709  
In company law, if an abuse of the company form has occurred, the corporate veil may be 
pierced to impose personal liability upon the abuser. Initially, however, the circumstances 
under which a court would pierce the corporate veil was a controversial issue.710 For 
example, in Lategan v Boyes it was said that courts will disregard the corporate veil if fraud 
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is present,711 whereas in Botha v Van Niekerk the court required proof that an 
unconscionable injustice was suffered before it would pierce the corporate veil.712 The 
Appellate Division in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd held that a 
flexible approach, that allows the facts of each case to determine whether piercing of the 
corporate veil is needed, should be adopted instead of the rigid test of unconscionable 
injustice.713 Section 20(9) of the Companies Act now also empowers a court statutorily to 
pierce the corporate veil. The court in Ex Parte Gore considered the issue of piercing the 
corporate veil under section 20(9).714 Of particular relevance is the court’s explanation of 
the term “unconscionable abuse” as used in section 20(9). According to the court, an 
unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of a company is broad enough to 
encompass descriptive terms such as “sham, device, stratagem and the like”. In other 
words, the remedy would be available whenever an illegitimate use of the juristic 
personality has an adverse effect on a third party that reasonably should not be 
countenanced. 
In Van Zyl v Kaye, the court considered the application of the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil in the context of trusts and provided clarity regarding those instances of sham 
trusts as well as those instances where a court will have to go behind the trust form.715 The 
court stated that if a trust is a sham the remedy of piercing would be of no use since no 
trust has come into existence and, therefore, there is nothing to “go behind”.716 However, 
when a court goes behind the trust form, it is accepted that the trust exists, only for the 
usual consequences of its existence then to be disregarded. The consequence of such a 
finding could result in a trustee being held personally liable for an obligation ostensibly 
undertaken in his capacity as trustee, or in the trust being bound by the transactions 
ostensibly performed by the trustee acting beyond the scope of his authority.717 The 
remedy, it was said, is an equitable one, afforded to a third party affected by an 
                                                          
711
 Lategan v Boyes [1980] 4 All SA 638 (T) 648. 
712
 Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 (3) SA 513 (W) 525F. 
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unconscionable abuse of the trust form,718 provided the circumstances so permit.719 Here 
the epithet “equitable”, according to the court,720 relates to the remedy in its ordinary 
rather than its legal sense.721 In other words, the remedy lends itself to a flexible approach 
fairly and justly to combat the consequences of an unconscionable abuse of the trust 
form722 and generally will be granted when the trust form is used in a dishonest or 
unconscionable manner to evade liability or avoid an obligation.723 It was noted by the court 
in Van Zyl v Kaye that even if the conduct of the relevant trustee in administering the trust 
could be accepted as being illustrative of the trustee disregarding his fiduciary duties and 
treating the trust as his alter ego, his conduct still did not render the trust a sham.724  
However, according to the court in Van Zyl, the conduct of the trustee could lead to the 
following consequences: 
 his removal as trustee; or 
   an independent co-trustee being appointed; or  
 
 his being held liable personally for transactions ostensibly concluded on behalf of the  
trust; or 
 his being held liable delictually.725 
 
It is evident that the test to be applied is to determine whether there was an 
unconscionable abuse on the part of the trustee(s). Whereas the Companies Act contains 
provisions governing the piercing of the corporate veil, it is submitted that cognate 
provisions should not be inserted into the TPCA, given the clarification that has emerged 
from the Van Zyl v Kaye decision. Instead, principles pertaining to going behind the trust 
form should continue to be developed by our courts, since the statutory provisions 
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governing piercing the corporate veil have generated further questions.726 Furthermore the 
absence of a definition of unconscionable abuse in the Companies Act likely is due to the 
realisation that no definition could encompass all types of unconscionable abuse. The 
courts, it is submitted, are best suited to determine whether an unconscionable abuse has 
occurred.  
The submission that the principles pertaining to going behind the trust form should be 
developed by our courts instead of the legislature is strengthened by the controversial 
application of this remedy regarding claims to trust assets in divorce cases. In Badenhorst v 
Badenhorst727 the appellant sought that the court, in awarding a redistribution of assets 
order in terms of section 7 of the Divorce Act,728 consider the assets of an inter vivos trust in 
addition to the respondent’s personal estate on the basis that the trust was the 
respondent’s (trustee’s) alter ego. While the Supreme Court of Appeal acknowledged that 
the trust’s assets did not form part of the respondent’s personal estate, this did not bar the 
court from adding the value of the trust’s assets to the value of the respondent’s personal 
estate in its award of the redistribution order.729 The consideration of the value of the assets 
of alter ego trusts featured in a number of subsequent judgments on the calculation of 
accrual claims730 in divorce proceedings. In both BC v CC731 and RP v DP732 the courts held 
that the value of the trust assets can be taken into account in calculating a spouse’s accrual 
claim. The courts did so because they regarded piercing the trust veneer to permit the 
consideration of the value of alter ego trust assets as a function of the common law, and not 
intrinsically bound to the judicial discretion inherent to the statutory redistribution 
dispensation under the Divorce Act. However, in MM v JM733 the court held that there is no 
legal basis for including trust assets in the calculation of an accrual claim because the 
Divorce Act’s equitable and discretionary redistribution dispensation differs fundamentally 
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 See Cassim (2012) 22-24; Schoeman (2012) 28. However, in Cassim (2013) 197 the author mentions that 
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from the Matrimonial Property Act’s strictly mathematical calculation of accrual claims.734 In 
WT v KT735 the Supreme Court of Appeal concurred with the latter view when it stated 
(seemingly obiter), that unlike with claims for the redistribution of assets which affords the 
court a discretion when awarding such claims, the same did not hold true with regard to 
claims where the parties are married in community of property or out of community of 
property subject to the accrual system. The Supreme Court of Appeal was, therefore, 
unwilling to extend the principles enunciated in the Badenhorst case to accrual claims and 
the division of joint estates in marriages concluded in community of property. The court 
placed particular reliance on section 12 of the TPCA that recognises that trust assets do not 
form part of the personal property of a trustee as a matter of law.736 It is submitted that 
these judicial developments illustrate the potency with which South African courts can 
engage with settling the principles applicable to going behind the trust form in instances of 
the abuse of the trust. Indeed, Du Toit737 notes that, regardless of the WT v KT judgment, 
room still exists for future legal development in this regard. This development, it is 
submitted, should be left to the courts.   
 
4.3.1.4 Independent trustee 
In Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated 
that the Master must ensure that an adequate separation of control from enjoyment is 
maintained in every trust.738 This the Master could do by insisting on the appointment of an 
independent trustee to every trust where (a) the trustees are all beneficiaries and (b) the 
beneficiaries are all related to one another.739 
However, the court’s suggestion that the Master appoint an independent trustee elicited 
criticism, for the following reasons: 
 the difficulty in obtaining a completely independent trustee who would not require 
adequate remuneration for his services; 
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 a completely independent trustee who does not know the family and the founder’s 
reasons for creating the trust, especially in those instances where the trust is a 
discretionary one, may frustrate the founder’s intentions; 
 the Master may not have the expertise or the time to decide without legislative 
guidance who would, in the particular situation, be an appropriate independent 
trustee; and 
 an independent trustee will not have a veto right in respect of trustee decisions where 
the trust instrument requires all decisions to be taken by majority vote.740 
These concerns notwithstanding, the Acting Chief Master of the High court attempted to 
align the registration of trusts and the appointment of trustees with the SCA’s directive by 
means of Circular 2 of 2005, which amended the JM21E and Acceptance of Trusteeship 
forms. The Circular, however, reiterated that (a) each matter still is to be decided upon its 
own merits by taking into account all the information placed before the Master as well as 
adherence to the audi alteram partem rule; and (b) the Master still has a clear statutory 
discretion when it comes to the appointment of trustees.741 
Since the Master already is empowered by virtue of his supervisory role over trusts and 
since the Master in any event will exercise his discretion only after a consideration of all the 
facts, it is submitted that a provision regulating the appointment of an independent trustee 
need not be included in the TPCA. This submission was tested during the interviews and is 
evaluated in chapter five. 
 
4.3.1.5 Preliminary conclusion 
It was argued under 4.2.8.2 above that the TPCA should be amended through the insertion 
of provisions safeguarding the interests of third parties in the event that an abuse of the 
trust form has occurred. However, the preliminary conclusion at this juncture is that a 
provision which has the same effect as the Turquand rule as contained in section 7 of the 
Trusts (Scotland) Act of 1921 should be inserted in the TPCA. 
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4.3.2 Additional remedies 
4.3.2.1 Statutory provisions 
A trustee, like a director, does not stand in a fiduciary relationship to third parties.742  A 
company is a separate entity with its own rights and duties, hence the fiduciary relationship 
exists between the director and the company.743 Nevertheless, provision is made in the 
Companies Act for third parties whereas the TPCA in its current form only affords third 
parties the option to request the removal of a trustee. Hence, our courts are seeking 
remedies in other branches of law. Section 22(1) of the Companies Act, for example, 
contains a reckless trading prohibition clause.  It provides that: 
“A company must not carry on its business recklessly, with gross negligence, with intent to defraud 
any person or for any fraudulent purpose.” 
It is submitted that a similar provision should be incorporated into the TPCA.744 A failure by 
a trustee to comply with trust administration principles could fall within the category of 
recklessness, gross negligence or even fraud (the latter where a trustee alleges that he has 
authority to bind the trust, while knowing that he does not). If a third party can illustrate 
that a trustee’s conduct fell within one of the listed categories, the remedy should be 
afforded to such third party. It is evident from case law analysed under the exposition above 
on business trusts that the TPCA in its current form does not effectively protect third 
parties. While our courts are indeed extending remedies from other branches of law to 
trusts, it is nevertheless apparent that in some instances the facts of the matter would not 
provide a basis for awarding such a remedy. It is thus submitted that additional remedies be 
incorporated in the proposed Act to protect third parties who contract with trusts. This 
submission was assessed during interviews and is discussed further in chapter five. 
 
4.3.2.2 Implied warranty of authority 
In Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies, Harms JA noted that a trustee could be held liable 
personally for breaching a warranty of authority.745 An implied warranty of authority refers 
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   See WT v KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA) 583E-F. 
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 Cassim et al (2011) 467-468; Cilliers et al (2000) 162. 
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 See also Wunsh (1986) 577-579 regarding section 424 of the 1973 Companies Act and section 64 of the 
Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. 
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 Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies 495A. However, the judge emphasised that this remedy, depending on the 
circumstances, could be of little solace. Note that Kerr (2006) 245 refers to this as residual warranty of 
authority. Joubert et al (2003) 214 argues that it is misleading to speak of an “implied warranty” when 
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to the situation where an undertaking is made that the representation is correct. Thus, if the 
statement subsequently turns out to be incorrect, a breach of an implied warranty of 
authority will have occurred.746 
In order to rely on this remedy, a third party will have to show: firstly, that the agent 
represented that he had authority; secondly, that the agent’s representation induced the 
third party to enter into the contract; thirdly, that the agent did not have authority; and 
fourthly, that as a result of the principal not being bound, the third party suffered loss.747 
Since our courts have acknowledged the possibility of the remedy, it is submitted that it can 
be relied upon if the circumstances permit and if the requirements are met. A third party 
will have to prove the quantum of damages he has suffered.748 Once again, this is a remedy 
that should be developed in the context of trusts by our courts and, therefore, should not, it 
is submitted, be regulated under the TPCA. 
 
4.3.2.3 Breach of warranty and misrepresentation 
A breach of a warranty affords the aggrieved party the usual remedies of contract, including 
the option to cancel the contract and to claim damages which are measured according to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the warranty is not based on tacit consensus but on a misrepresentation and that in the absence of 
consensus the real basis of liability has to be misrepresentation. If this position is accepted, then the 
basic rules pertaining to a delict for misrepresentation will have to be assessed.  This, the author argues, 
will be more equitable. See also Kerr (2006) 250-251 who provides reasons why delict should not be the 
basis of liability in situations such as these. 
746
 Kerr (2006) 245. 
747
 Blower v Van Noorden 1909 TS 900. According to Kerr (2006) 249, a successful claimant would be 
entitled to claim reimbursement of any expenditure reasonably incurred in claiming against the 
principal; and the amount which the third party would have received on claiming against the purported 
principal for breach of the purported contract as if had it existed and been breached.  In other words, an 
agent cannot be ordered to perform in terms of the original contract. See also Indrieri v Du Preez [1989] 
2 All SA 254 (C) 258-259, where the court elaborated on the liability of the would-be agent. In this 
regard, it was said that the liability that ensues is not liability to perform in terms of the contract. 
Instead, it is to place the other contracting party in as good a position as if the principal actually had 
been bound. Thus, a third party will have to establish not only what would have been payable under the 
contract, but also how much he would have been able to recover from the agent’s principal had the 
principal been bound. Thus, for example, where a principal is insolvent or indigent, the claimable 
amount would be considerably less than the amount that would have been payable under the contract. 
The onus rests on the third party to establish the quantum of damages that could have been recovered 
from the principal had the principal been bound. This could explain Harms JA’s statement that the 
remedy could be of little solace. 
748
 Joubert et al (2003) 214 are of the opinion that proving misrepresentation would provide a more 
equitable remedy. See also Indrieri v Du Preez 261, where the court stated that “it is difficult to conceive 
of a case in which the would-be agent who purports to act on behalf of an existent, but in truth a non-
existent, principal would not have acted either negligently or fraudulently”. 
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the aggrieved party’s positive interest.749 Also, a warranty that turns out to be false could 
amount to a misrepresentation750 and if a misrepresentation is made prior to the conclusion 
of the contract and subsequently is incorporated into the contract, an aggrieved party can 
sue either for misrepresentation or breach of contract.751 
A misrepresentation can be fraudulent, negligent or innocent.752 A fraudulent 
misrepresentation occurs when a party deliberately deceives another, affording the latter 
the right to sue using the actio legis Aquiliae.753 A negligent misstatement given during pre-
contractual negotiations has been recognised also as giving rise to delictual liability for 
damages.754 With negligent misstatements the question is whether there was a legal duty to 
provide correct information and whether providing this information would have prevented 
the harm.755 There is also so-called misrepresentation by silence, which will occur if there is 
a legal duty to disclose information and this duty is not met. Thus, for example, a failure to 
disclose a material fact will amount to a misrepresentation by silence. However, the general 
rule is that a contracting party need not disclose information even if the disclosure would 
influence the other party’s decision to enter into the contract.756 
It is submitted, that the rules identified above could be of assistance when a court has to 
decide whether a contested statement was a warranty or a representation. Trustees are 
required to give effect to the trust deed and ought to know the limitations imposed on their 
capacity. If trustees enter into a transaction, representing that they have capacity to do so, 
when in fact they do not, their conduct could amount to a fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentation. Also, if the trustees warrant that they are empowered to enter into the 
transaction, as in Rossitier,757 then they should be held liable on the basis of breach of 
warranty. These rules should not, however, be incorporated into the TPCA as they are well 
established in terms of the common law. 
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 Hutchison et al (2012) 118; Van der Merwe et al (2012) 89. 
750
 Christie (2006) 271. 
751
 Hutchison et al (2012) 118. 
752
 Hutchison et al (2012) 117. 
753
 Hutchison et al (2012) 125. 
754
 Loubser et al (2012) 227; Hutchison et al (2012) 129; Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost 1991 (4) SA 559 
(A). 
755
 Loubser et al (2012) 225. 
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 Hutchison et al (2012) 134-135. 
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    Rossitier v Nedbank Ltd (8244/10) [2013] ZAKZPHC 13 (25 February 2013). 
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4.3.3 Pre-formation contracts 
The issue of pre-formation contracts was not considered by the SALRC in its investigation.  
However, this issue becomes relevant in the context of section 6(1) of the TPCA and 
therefore requires consideration. Smith and Van der Westhuizen distinguish between the 
pre-formation situation and the pre-authorisation situation.758 The pre-formation situation 
refers to the situation where the trust has not been formed yet and thus no trustees have 
been appointed. By contrast, the pre-authorisation situation relates either to the situation 
where a trust has been formed and the trustees have been appointed but they have not 
been authorised yet, or it relates to the situation where additional trustees need to be 
authorised for an existing trust whose existing trustees already have been authorised.759 
In Mallinson v Slaters, the court noted that, although trustees were prevented from 
concluding contracts prior to receiving authorisation from the Master in terms of section 
6(1) of the TPCA, nothing prevented the trustees from concluding agreements in 
anticipation of the trust being formed.760 However, the court did not elaborate on the rules 
that would be applicable in this regard. 
Smith and van der Westhuizen contend that pre-formation contracts in the trusts context 
should be regulated statutorily as, for example, with companies.761 However, this 
recommendation must be given further consideration, in light of the concerns raised in 
respect of section 21 of the Companies Act.762 
Pre-formation contracts found in company law are governed by both the common law and 
by statute. In terms of the common law, a company cannot be a party to a contract prior to 
its incorporation. Agency principles are of no assistance because a person cannot act as an 
agent for a non-existent principal. If this does somehow take place, ratification upon 
formation is not possible. This prohibition exists because ratification has retrospective 
effect, that is, it would start operating from the time that the agent entered into the 
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    Smith and Van der Westhuizen (2007) 172. 
759
    Smith and Van der Westhuizen (2007) 172. 
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contract, namely, when the company was not in existence.763 The contract thus will be a 
nullity and the agent can be held liable.764 
As a response to this problem, section 21 of the Companies Act765 facilitates a form of 
statutory agency, placing persons acting as agents in a position to contract on behalf of a 
non-existent company by allowing the company, once it has been formed, to ratify the 
contract.766 Section 21 must be read with the definitions of pre-formation contracts767 and 
agreements768 in section 1 of the Companies Act.769 An alternative is the stipulatio alteri 
which enables a promoter of a company to contract in his own name as a principal for the 
benefit of the company to be formed.770 
Cassim et al raise several concerns regarding section 21, such as: the uncertainty as to 
whether it has restrospective effect; it does not govern the rights of the parties during the 
interim period between execution and ratification; it is not apparent whether a third party 
may withdraw prior to the ratification of the pre-incorporation contract; the uncertainty as 
to whether a promoter can contract out of his liability and whether the provision affords a 
court judicial discretion in apportioning liability between the company and the promoter is 
not clear.771 Cassim also contends that the stipulatio alteri may be the more favourable 
option, as promoters are not liable personally if the company does not ratify the pre-
incorporation contract, which could render section 21 inefficient and ineffective.772 
Given the concerns regarding section 21 and considering that the stipulatio alteri appears to 
be the better option in the company law sphere, it is submitted that provisions regulating 
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 Cassim et al (2011) 150. 
764
 Cassim et al (2011) 150. 
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    Initially, a statutory form of agency was regulated by section 71 of the Companies Act 46 of 1926, which         
         was amended by section 35 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. See Cassim et al (2011) 150; Smith and     
         Van der Westhuizen (2007) 174-175.   
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 Cassim et al (2011) 150. 
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 A pre-formation contract is defined in section 1 as “an agreement entered into before the incorporation 
of a company by a person who purports to act in the name of, or on behalf of, the company, with the 
intention or understanding that the company will be incorporated, and will thereafter be bound by the 
agreement”. 
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 An agreement is defined in section 1 as including “a contract, or an arrangement or undertaking 
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pre-formation contracts need not be incorporated into the TPCA. Instead, it is advised that 
reliance should be placed on the stipulatio alteri which is established well in the common 
law and which would avoid concerns similar to those raised in respect of section 21 of the 
Companies Act. 
 
4.3.4 Sale of a trust 
In recent times, techniques have been used whereby existing trust beneficiaries and 
trustees, holding fixed property, are replaced with new beneficiaries and trustees against 
monetary compensation773 as a means of circumventing the payment of transfer duty.774  A 
question that has arisen is whether the utilisation of this technique is valid.775 According to 
Olivier such a scheme holds no merit and only complicates matters for the trustees and 
beneficiaries as regards the book entry that will have to be made to reflect the 
transaction.776 However, Pace and Van der Westuizen contend that such a transaction falls 
within the definition of “transaction” and “property” in section 1, as read with section 2(1), 
of the Transfer Duty Act,777 resulting in transfer duties being payable, provided the right 
acquired from the beneficiary is a real right or vested right to property.778 
The 2002 amendments to the Transfer Duty Act779 also brought important changes for 
beneficiaries under a discretionary trust who enjoy only contingent rights. Firstly, the 
definition of “property” was amended to include a contingent right to any residential 
property or share or member’s interest held by a discretionary trust, thereby including 
beneficiaries of a discretionary trust who hold contingent rights. Secondly, “transaction” is 
now defined, in relation to a discretionary trust, as the substitution or addition of one or 
more beneficiaries with a contingent right to any property of that trust.780 These 
amendments result in transfer duty being payable upon the acquisition of contingent 
rights.781 
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    Du Toit (2007) 182; Pace and Van der Westuizen (2015) B24 [24.5]. 
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These amendments signify that the sale of a trust has received formal recognition.782 
However, the resultant question is whether the TPCA should regulate the sale of trusts. 
Since the matter of relevance, namely, whether transfer duty is payable is governed by the 
Transfer Duty Act, there is no apparent need to regulate the sale of a trust under the TPCA. 
Nevertheless, it submitted that to provide certainty, a provision is included to the effect 
that: 
“Any transaction involving the sale of a trust is subject to the provisions of the Transfer Duty Act 40 of 
1949, as amended by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 74 of 2002.” 
 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated that certain trust issues, which the SALRC considered should 
not be regulated by the TPCA, have become problematic and require reconsideration. 
Similarly, some aspects of trusts law that the SALRC did not consider, such as the sale of a 
trust and pre-formation contracts, have resulted in practical concerns. All of the 
recommendations made (whether or not it is proposed that such matter should be 
regulated) in the chapter will be tested during interviews to be conducted in accordance 
with the questionnaire. However, the questions are inserted in the main text in chapter five. 
Thus the questionnaire is not replicated.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION: A PROPOSED STATUTE 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
5.1 Introduction 
The analyses in the previous chapters have shown that the South African law of trusts is 
evidently still in the process of developing; moreover, that there is clearly a need for 
legislative reform in regard to certain aspects of contemporary South African trust law. As 
noted in these previous chapters, our courts thus far have played the most significant role in 
developing uniquely South African trust law principles. However, the courts themselves 
have occasionally called for legislative intervention to assist in remedying certain 
problematic areas in the law of trusts.783 
This chapter conveys the information gleaned from interviews with trust practitioners with a 
view to gauging the practicality of some of the proposals for legislative reform advanced in 
the previous two chapters. To this end, the chapter commences with a summation of the 
previous chapters, highlighting the most important issues identified in the analyses 
conducted in the preceding chapters. Thereafter, the manner in which the interviews were 
conducted will be described briefly, followed by a full discussion of the responses to the 
various questions raised in the questionnaires forwarded to trust practitioners. The chapter 
will conclude by a proposing a draft statute, the “Administration of Trusts Act”, founded 
upon the theoretical underpinnings of the research and the results of the interviews. 
 
5.2 Summary of previous chapters  
Chapter one set the background to the study, by formulating the research question and 
identified some of the contemporary difficulties facing South African trust law. The South 
African trust was derived historically from the English trust. Whereas the latter was 
welcomed as an institution that could be utilised in South Africa, the direct application of 
English trust law principles was resisted. Instead, uniquely South African trust law principles 
were to be developed. The chapter thereafter provided a brief exposition of the 
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development of the South African trust, with the dual aim of highlighting the current 
problematic areas in trust law and providing the motivation for legislative reform. Lastly, the 
core elements of a trust were identified, with a view to enlisting them to strengthen the 
arguments for some of the proposed legislative recommendations. 
Chapter two consisted of a comprehensive exposition and analysis of the development of 
the South African trust by both the courts and the legislature. The analysis traversed the 
various approaches -- reconfiguration, innovation and alignment -- that have been adopted 
in developing uniquely South African trust law principles in response to social, economic and 
practical demands. The alignment approach is especially important in this connection, since 
it informs suggestions made in subsequent chapters for improving the statute which 
governs trusts currently. The chapter also demonstrated that while our courts have played 
the biggest role in developing the South African trust, parliament also contributed by 
enacting legislation to regulate certain trust issues. The legislative interventions were 
prompted by new challenges on the socio-economic, jurisprudential and practical fronts. 
However, several problems persist. These stem, firstly, from the TPCA which has been 
overtaken by events and no longer adequately regulates certain aspects of South African 
trust law and practice; and, secondly, from the SALRC’s recommendations that certain 
aspects of trust law not be regulated by the TPCA. 
Chapter three focused on the provisions of the TPCA.  It provided an analysis of each 
provision, highlighting various academic debates where apposite and engaging any practical 
concerns that matter. The analysis suggested that most of the TPCA’s current provisions 
require some form of amendment, because of valid academic critique or because of the 
intrusion of practical challenges or because of the effluxion of time. Several 
recommendations were made throughout the chapter. However, to ascertain whether 
these recommendations are viable in practice, they were tested during questionnaire-based 
interviews with trust law experts from legal practice (see questions in chapter five). 
In chapter four, those aspects of trust law which the SALRC considered in its investigation, 
but recommended should not be regulated by the TPCA, were analysed in detail. The 
chapter also discussed certain other aspects of trust law which the SALRC did not consider in 
its investigation at all, but which have given rise to a range of practical problems.  Proposals 
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for law reform were offered in respect of both the categories of issues. The feasibility of the 
proposals were assessed by way of interviews with trust practitioners (see questions in 
chapter five).  
 
5.3 Interviewing mode 
Individual in-depth one-on-one interviews were conducted with five persons who have 
extensive experience in trust law and who routinely deal with the practical issues pertaining 
to the operation of trusts. The number of interviewees was deliberately limited to 
accommodate the time-consuming nature of the interview process; but also by reason of 
the fact that each interviewee possesses comprehensive practical knowledge which, in turn, 
rendered a larger sample unnecessary. The interviewees were informed that they have the 
option to remain anonymous, but none chose this option. The questionnaires were sent to 
each interviewee to consider prior to the interview. The theoretical underpinnings of the 
proposals for legal reform were discussed during the interviews, as well as some the 
questions that remained unanswered in chapters three and four. The questions from the 
questionnaires are inserted in the main text in chapter five. 
 
5.4 Responses to questions from chapter three 
5.4.1 Definitions 
Question 1 The definition of “trust” 
In chapter three it was submitted that the Income Tax Act784 (ITA) contains an interesting 
and useful definition of “trust”, particularly if one (i) considers the viewpoint of Honoré that 
control, as opposed to ownership, is the definitive feature of a trust and (ii) recognises the 
fiduciary nature of trusteeship. Also, the definition in the ITA conveys the notion of a trust 
as a segregated fund consisting of cash or other assets. Thus, it was submitted that, in view 
of the directive stipulated in section 12 of the TPCA on the separateness of trust property 
from a trustee’s private property, the segregation of the trust estate from a trustee’s 
personal estate ought to be made explicit in the statutory definition of a trust. Based on the 
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foregoing it was proposed that the existing definition in the TPCA be amended to read as 
follows: 
 
  
“trust“means - [any trust fund] - [which either] 
 
(a) [Vests in] - the trustee, in whole or in part, to be administered or disposed of according to the provisions of the trust 
instrument for the benefit of the person or class of persons designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the 
object stated in the trust instrument; or 
(b) [Vests in] the beneficiaries designated in the trust instrument, which property is placed under the control of another person, 
the trustee, to be administered or disposed of according to the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person 
or class of persons designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the object stated in the trust instrument, 
               but does not include the case where the property of another is to be administered by any person as executor, tutor or curator in     
               terms of the provisions of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No. 66 of 1965)”. 
 
However, the interviewees expressed concerns regarding this proposal to amend the TPCA’s 
definition of “trust.” Many had a problem with the use of the concept “vest” as proposed, 
with some observing that it would be difficult to explain the idea to clients. Another 
problem with the proposal was the use of the term “trust fund”, which certain interviewees 
felt would limit the types of arrangements that the current definition allows. All of the 
interviewees felt that the current definition suffices and is not problematic. Evidently, it 
would be untenable from a practical perspective to amend a definition which, according to 
trust practitioners, could engender new concerns. Hence, it is submitted that the essence of 
the current definition should remain intact. This submission is supported by the following 
considerations: (i) the proposed new definition does not provide for the bequeathing or 
making over of ownership, which is a central element of the TPCA’s current definition of 
“trust”; (ii) the proposed new definition provides no elucidation of what a “trust fund” 
entails, thus raising the question whether a definition of “trust fund” should not be included 
in the proposed Act; and (iii) the proposed new definition omits to state explicitly that the 
trust estate is segregated from a trustee’s personal estate. 
It is nevertheless submitted, in light of the fact that duality of estates constitutes part of the 
irreducible core of the South African trust,785 that, notwithstanding the interviewees’ 
express satisfaction with the TPCA’s current definition of “trust”, the current definition will 
benefit from an express importation of the notion of a segregated trust fund, properly 
described, to underscore this core element of the South African trust. It is submitted, 
further, that the current definition also requires some minor amendment because trustees 
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in the wide sense (in other words, those excluded from the TPCA’s operational ambit) are 
not limited to those listed in the last paragraph of the current definition. 
As mentioned earlier, any inclusion of a reference to “trust fund” in the statutory definition 
of “trust” will invariably raise the question of what a trust fund entails. This is where the 
definition of “trust” in the ITA is useful because it states explicitly what a trust fund consists 
of. It is proposed, therefore, that a similar meaning of “trust fund” be inserted in the 
proposed new definition of “trust.” However, since a definition of “trust property” is also 
included in the proposed Act, the amended version of the definition of “trust” will reference 
“property” as opposed to “assets” (as included in the ITA). In addition, it is suggested that 
the omission from the proposed new definition of an explicit indication that a trust is a 
segregated fund be remedied through the inclusion of such an indication. 
As far as trustees in the wide sense are concerned, it was noted above that the last 
paragraph in the current definition is unsatisfactory because it refers to only curators, 
executors and tutors operating under the Administration of Estates Act. This begs the 
question why other trustees in the wide sense, for example, trustees of insolvent estates 
and agents,786 are not also excluded explicitly from the statutory rules governing trustees in 
the narrow sense. Thus, it is submitted that the proposed new definition should address this 
discrepancy. 
While all of the interviewees were opposed to an amended definition of “trust”, it is 
nevertheless submitted, in light of the foregoing arguments, that the existing definition does 
require some form of amendment in order to (i) improve its alignment with the theoretical 
underpinnings of the South African trust; and (ii) sharpen its focus in regard to trustees in 
the wide sense who are excluded from trusteeship in the narrow sense. It is submitted that 
the former objective is best achieved through the inclusion of the notion of a trust fund into 
the definition, not as an attempt to limit the types of arrangements that will fall within the 
definition, but rather to explicitly acknowledge that a trust is segregated from a trustee’s 
personal estate. This, it is submitted, will strengthen the effect of section 12 of the TPCA 
regarding the separateness of a trust estate in a trustee’s hands; moreover, it will 
acknowledge one of the core elements of the South African trust. It is conceded, on the 
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other hand, that the use of the term “vest” in the proposed new definition may cause 
practical difficulties; therefore, the use of this term will be excised from the proposed new 
definition. For these reasons it is suggested that the statutory definition of “trust” be 
amended to read as follows: 
  
“trust “means the arrangement through which ownership in the property of one person is by virtue of a trust instrument made over or 
bequeathed [as a trust fund consisting of cash and/or property which is/are separate from a trustee’s personal estate]-  
(a)    to another person, the trustee , in whole or in part, to be administered or disposed of according to the provisions of the trust 
instrument for the benefit of the person or class of persons designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the 
object stated in the trust instrument; or 
(b)   to the beneficiaries designated in the trust instrument, which property is placed under the control of another person, the 
trustee, to be administered or disposed of according to the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person or 
class of persons designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the object stated in the trust instrument 
          but does not include the case where the property of another is to be administered by any person [who does not administer a 
trust within the meaning of this Act].  
 
Question 2 Definition of “trust instrument” 
It was identified in chapter three that while courts often equate the inter vivos trust with 
the stipulatio alteri, this view is incorrect since there are several identifiable differences 
between a stipulatio alteri and an inter vivos trust.787 It was thus submitted that the 
definition of “trust instrument” in the TPCA should be read with this distinction in mind but 
that the definition of “trust instrument” in the Act need not reflect this distinction expressly. 
To ascertain whether this submission is viable, the following question was posed during 
interviews:  
Should the definition of trust instrument be amended to accommodate the distinction between the creation of the inter vivos trust and 
the trust itself? 
The interviewees were unanimous that including a statutory provision distinguishing 
between the creation of an inter vivos trust and the trust itself is unnecessary. However, 
given that none of the interviewees considered that the absence of the distinction in the 
TPCA led to practical difficulties, it is submitted that the statutory definition of “trust 
instrument” need not elaborate on the distinction between the creation of an inter vivos 
trust on the one hand, and the trust itself on the other hand. While it was noted in chapter 
three that the TPCA’s reference to a “testamentary writing” to date has not posed any 
difficulties, it is submitted that the provision should nevertheless be amended for the sake 
                                                          
787
 See, for example, the concerns raised by Schreiner JA in Crookes v Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (A). 
 
 
 
 
136 
 
of clarity by replacing the words “testamentary writing” with the term “will”, the latter 
being one of the modes through which a trust can be created.  
Question 3 Definition of “property or trust property” 
In chapter three it was highlighted that the TPCA’s current definition of “trust property or 
property” differs from that proposed by the SALRC. It was also noted that the reason for the 
legislature’s inclusion of “contingent interests in property” in the current definition is 
unclear. Based on the foregoing, the following was addressed during the interviews: 
 
In terms of section 1 of the TPCA, “property or trust property” means “movable or immovable property, and includes contingent interests 
in property, which in accordance with the provisions of a trust instrument are to be administered or disposed of by a trustee”. 
What do you think the legislature contemplated by including contingent interests in property? 
The following definition of “trust property” which is based on the recommendation made by the SALRC is proposed: 
“property which in terms of a trust instrument is to be administered by a trustee”. 
The question regarding “contingent interest” elicited several divergent explanations as to 
what the legislature possibly contemplated by including the notion in the current definition. 
For example, one interviewee mentioned that “contingent interest” was a term derived 
from tax law. It is evident, therefore, that this term occasions a great deal of uncertainty 
and, it is submitted, its removal from the current definition of “property or trust property” 
will be a positive step. As to the other aspects of the current definition, one respondent did 
not understand the basis of the distinction between movable and immovable property, 
while another noted that the current definition could be taken to exclude certain types of 
property. None of them raised any objections to the above-mentioned proposed 
amendment to define “property or trust property” more concisely, which definition, it is 
submitted, will eliminate the current practical and legal-theoretical concerns surrounding 
the current definition of “property or trust property” by providing an uncomplicated and 
unproblematic definition. It is suggested, therefore, that the new proposed definition be 
included in the new Act. 
Question 4 Definition of “trustee” 
It was shown in chapter three that the TPCA’s current definition of “trustee” creates several 
anomalies, for example, by having a restrictive effect on the commencement of trust 
administration. The current definition is also not a proper reflection of the law in that it fails 
to acknowledge the fiduciary relationship that arises as soon as acceptance of the 
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appointment of trusteeship takes place. It was thus submitted that if acceptance of the 
appointment constitutes accession to the office of trusteeship, that the current definition be 
amended to reflect this fact, whilst also acknowledging the fiduciary relationship that comes 
into existence. During interviews the following was therefore proposed and asked:  
The following is the proposal made in respect of amending the definition of trustee: 
 
“Trustee means any person (including the founder of a trust) who accepts the appointment of trusteeship, to control and 
administer the trust fund in a fiduciary capacity, and includes any person whose acceptance of appointment as trustee is already of 
force and effect at the commencement of this Act”. 
 
Would this definition negate the practical anomalies that the current definition causes? 
All of the interviewees were of the view that the suggested amendment would be in order, 
while one felt that it would “add value” to the current trust regime. It is submitted, 
therefore, that the proposed new definition not only addresses the legal-theoretical 
concerns revealed by the analysis on point in chapter three, but that it also meets the 
requirement of practical efficacy. Consequently, the amendment will be inserted in the 
proposed Act.  
 
5.4.2 Trust instruments 
Question 5 Documents deemed to be trust instruments 
It was noted in chapter three that the term “agreement” in the TPCA’s current section 2 
appears to relate to oral inter vivos trusts which are later reduced to writing, while the 
definition of “trust instrument” in section 1 includes trusts created through testamentary 
writings as well. It was also emphasised that testamentary trust beneficiaries can agree not 
only to waive any vested rights they have in terms of a will and dispose of their rights inter 
partes,788 but can agree also, prior to vesting, to a re-distribution of benefits after vesting 
takes place.789 Thus, the question that arises is whether oral family agreements that are 
later reduced to writing, insofar as they affect the devolution of benefits under 
testamentary trusts, also are governed by section 2. Based on the case analysis conducted 
under this section, it appears that section 2 does not apply to such agreements and it was 
therefore proposed the section be amended to reflect this position. The following was put 
to the interviewees: 
                                                          
788
 Bydawell v Chapman 1953 (3) SA 514 (A) 523G-H; Hoeksma v Hoeksma 1990 (2) SA 893 (A) 897I-898A. 
789
 Ex Parte Trustees Estate Loewenthal 1939 WLD 81.  
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Section 2 of the TPCA reads: “if a document represents the reduction to writing of an oral agreement by which a trust was created or 
varied, such document shall for purposes of this Act be deemed to be a trust instrument”. 
 
The usage of the term “agreement” in section 2 appears to relate to oral inter vivos trusts which are later reduced to writing, while the 
definition of “trust instrument” includes trusts created through a will as well.  
 
In Bydawell v Chapman the court held that family agreements concluded inter partes cannot relate to how and when devolution is to take 
place as it would alter a testator’s will.  
 
Should section 2 be amended to reflect this reality by including a provision that reads: 
 
“if a document represents the reduction to writing of an oral agreement, other than oral family agreements, by which a trust was 
created or varied, such document shall for purposes of this Act be deemed to be a trust instrument”? 
The relevance of section 2 of the TPCA was questioned by one respondent who was of the 
opinion that all inter vivos trusts are created orally in any event. Another was loath to 
comment as he was not comfortable with the concept of a “family agreement”. Two 
interviewees considered that section 2 does not govern oral family agreements, while 
another felt that the focus rather should be on the impermissibility of such agreements in 
terms of the Wills Act 7 of 1953. Two found the amendment acceptable, provided it is 
stipulated that the oral family agreement relates to devolution. Given that section 2 hardly 
is a model of clarity, it is submitted that its amendment ought to go ahead, subject to the 
proviso referred to in the previous sentence. However, to provide further clarity, it is 
recommended that a definition of “family agreement” be included in the proposed Act in 
the following manner: 
 
“family agreement” means any agreement in terms of which testamentary trust beneficiaries agree to waive any rights they have in 
terms of a will, or dispose of their rights inter partes, or prior to acquiring their rights in terms of a will, agree to a re-distribution of 
benefits after acquiring such rights in terms of a will.   
 
5.4.3 The role of the courts 
Question 6 Variation of trust provisions by the High Court 
In chapter three the submission that courts follow the approach adopted by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in In re BOE Trust Ltd790 was made. This requires that a court begin by 
establishing the wishes of the testator, thereby giving effect to the rights to dignity and 
property. Thereafter, an enquiry must be conducted to determine whether or not there is a 
rule that prevents the court from giving effect to freedom of testation, by taking into 
account the time period and the circumstances in which the trust was created. Once 
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  2013 (3) SA 236 (SCA). 
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informed of the debates surrounding section 13, the following proposal was put to the 
interviewees:  
 
Much debate has arisen over our courts’ interpretation and usage of especially the subjective criterion in section 13. As a means of 
eliminating these debates, it is proposed that section 13 be amended along the following lines: 
 
“If a trust instrument contains any provision which 
 
(a) hampers the achievement of the objects of the founder; or 
(b) prejudices the interests of beneficiaries; or 
(c) is in conflict with the public interest [and ]  
 
[due to a change in circumstances which in the opinion of the court the founder of a trust did not contemplate or foresee], the 
court may, on application of the trustee or any person who in the opinion of the court has a sufficient interest in the trust property, 
delete or vary any such provision or make in respect thereof any order which such court deems just, including an order whereby 
particular trust property is substituted for particular other property, or an order terminating the trust”. 
 
Would this amendment assist? 
An interviewee questioned whether section 13 of the TPCA indeed was necessary if a 
provision in a trust instrument was being attacked on constitutional grounds. However, the 
same interviewee observed that the section was necessary as regards trust provisions which 
do not result in a constitutional attack. The interviewee was of the opinion that the 
amendment could afford the courts too wide a power to interfere. However, it is submitted 
in respect of the interviewee’s last mentioned view that the court will be incapable of 
exercising its power in terms of the proposed section unless an application has been 
brought in terms of said section791 and/or the criterion are met.792 A second interviewee 
questioned the necessity of the sequence of the amendment and suggested that the initial 
sequence be followed. The remaining three interviewees supported the proposed 
amendment. The concerns of the two interviewees notwithstanding, it is submitted that the 
proposed amendment is sensible on the basis of the theoretical analysis presented in 
chapter three. This is so particularly because of the manner in which the courts have 
interpreted the subjective criterion as requiring an unforeseen change in circumstances 
whereas it in fact requires that a trust provision results in unforeseen consequences. Also to 
bring the provision in line with the BOE judgment, as well as the Emma Smith and 
Heydrenrych judgments, it is proposed below in the amended wording that the words “at 
the time that the trust was created” be inserted after “due to a change in circumstances” 
not only because this was a factor considered in the abovementioned cases, but also 
because the lack of foresight or contemplation by the founder cannot occur earlier or later 
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     See for example Pascoal v Wurdeman 2012 (3) SA 422 (GSJ). 
792
     Ex Parte BOE Trust Ltd 2009 (6) SA 470 (WCC) 476F-H; Cameron et al (2002) 517; Du Toit (2007) 54. 
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than at the creation of the trust. Furthermore, whether the founder did or did not foresee 
or contemplate the consequences brought about by the provision (as required by section 13 
of the TPCA) at the time of creating the trust will impact a court’s decision as is evident from 
the BOE judgment. Thus including this aspect would, it is submitted, complete the proposed 
provision. While the initial proposal was met with approval by most of the interviewees, it is 
submitted that the revised proposed amendment to section 13 would not only negate the 
concern of the sequence of the initial proposal by one of the interviewees, but also not stray 
too far from the sequence of section 13 in that compliance with the objective criterion 
follows compliance with the subjective criterion.  
It was noted in chapter three that the interviewees were not questioned on whether or not 
the proposed amendment to section 13 of the TPCA would assist in respect of inter vivos 
trusts where freedom of testation is not at stake. Courts do not enjoy a general common 
law power to deviate from the expressed intention of contracting parties, which principle 
also applies in respect of inter vivos trusts.793 This consequence stems from the principle of 
contractual autonomy, which provides the basis for the principle of freedom of contract, 
with the latter principle giving rise to the maxim pacta sunt servanda.794 Both freedom of 
contract and pacta sunct servanda enjoy constitutional recognition795 As far as contractual 
autonomy is concerned, the court in Brisley v Drotsky796 held that this principle is a direct 
consequence of the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom. An application in 
terms of section 13 can be made in the case of an inter vivos trust to limit a founder’s 
freedom to contract, provided that the relevant criteria are met. Since inter vivos trusts are 
of course also subject to principles that have been given constitutional recognition. It is 
submitted that the proposed amendment will accommodate situations where there is a 
discriminatory provision contained in an inter vivos trust as well. While most of the 
arguments pertaining to section 13 were focused on the constitutional dimension of the 
section, it is submitted that the proposed provision will not cause practical difficulties in 
respect of matters that are not being challenged on constitutional grounds, as part of the 
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     Du Toit (2007) 47. 
794
     Du Toit (2007) 47. 
795
     Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 6E-F. 
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     2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 35F. 
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amendment does after all, as mentioned in chapter three, incorporate a well-established 
common law principle. The proposed amendment to section 13 will thus read as follows:  
 “If a trust instrument contains any provision which [due to a change in circumstances which, in the opinion of the court, the founder of a 
trust did not contemplate or foresee at the time that the trust was created] and which: 
(a) hampers the achievement of the objects of the founder; or 
(b) prejudices the interests of beneficiaries; or 
(c) is in conflict with the public interest,  
 
the court may on application of the trustee or any person who in the opinion of the court has a sufficient interest in the trust property, 
delete or vary any such provision or make in respect thereof any order which such court deems just, including an order whereby particular 
trust property is substituted for particular other property, or an order terminating the trust”.  
  
 
Question 7 Removal of a trustee by the High Court 
It was submitted in chapter three that the decision in Ras v Van der Meulen, where the 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that only a beneficiary is entitled to bring an application to 
remove a trustee797 is too restrictive. In Kidbrooke Place Management Association v Walton, 
the court found that the judgment in Ras v Van der Meulen did not entail that a person who 
has a sufficient interest in the trust property, but who is not a trust beneficiary, cannot rely 
on section 20(1) of the TPCA.798 According to the court in Kidbrooke, such an interpretation 
would be in conflict with section 20(1) which clearly states that “any person having an 
interest in the trust property” could apply for the removal of a trustee. It was further 
submitted that the court’s reasoning in Kidbrooke Place Management Association v Walton 
is sound and that, therefore, section 20(1) should remain unchanged. The following 
question was posed during interviews: 
It is proposed that the provision in this regard remains intact – do you agree? 
The interviewees were unanimous that the current provision should not be modified. Based 
on the theoretical arguments summarised above as well as the unanimous responses from 
the interviewees, no change to the existing provision is therefore proposed. 
 
 
                                                          
797
 Ras v Van der Meulen 2011 (4) SA 17 (SCA) 20C-D. See also Boezacht v Niegaardt (1726/11) [2012] 
ZAECPEHC 73 (9 October 2012) [19]; Burger v Ismail (8399/2013) [2013] ZAWCHC 190 (6 December 
2013) [8]-[9]. 
798
 Kidbrooke Place Management Association v Walton 2015 (4) SA 112 (WCC) 118F-G.  
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Question 8 Failure by a trustee to account or perform his duties 
In chapter three the practical relevance of section 19 of the TPCA regarding recourse to 
court as a remedy against a trustee who failed to account or to perform his duties was 
questioned as it may be assumed that the Master, who plays a supervisory role over 
trustees, would in any event have locus standi to approach the High Court for the relevant 
order. It is evident from the SALRC’s Report that the remedy afforded by section 19 was 
contemplated as being available only to the Master and trust beneficiaries799 – the 
legislature subsequently added the words “any person having an interest in the trust 
property” to the section. The decision in Kidbrooke Place Management Association v Walton 
supports the contention that the words “any person having an interest in the trust 
property” encompasses also parties other than trust beneficiaries. Consequently, the 
Kidbrooke judgment supports the legislature’s wider formulation of the section. In this light, 
it was recommended that the provision should remain intact.  
Based on the above, the following questioned was posed to the interviewees: 
 
In light of the Kidbrooke v Walton decision, it is recommended that the provision remain unaffected – do you agree? 
 
All the respondents agreed that the existing position should continue unchanged, although 
one did suggest that it might be best, in the light of Kidbrooke v Walton, to clarify which 
persons have an interest. It is submitted, however, that this need not be done, as the 
judgment clearly indicates that persons who have an interest are not limited to trust 
beneficiaries. What is more, to specify who may have an interest could lead to the exclusion 
of others who may otherwise qualify. Finally, the court is best placed to determine whether 
a particular applicant’s interest in the trust property is not too remote for the purpose of 
invoking the section. In light of these arguments, it is submitted that section 19 be retained 
in its present form. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
799
 SALRC Report (1987) 64. 
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5.4.4 The Role of the Master 
Question 9 Jurisdiction of the Master 
It was noted in the chapter three that a particular problem associated with trusts is that 
there is no central register for them. This, in turn, makes ascertaining at which Master’s 
office the trust instrument has been lodged difficult.800 Section 3 of the TPCA is argued as 
complicating matters further in that more than one Master potentially could have 
jurisdiction over the same trust. It was, therefore, submitted in chapter three that these 
difficulties could be alleviated by the creation of a public register for trusts. This issue was 
put forth to the interviewees in the following manner:  
In terms of section 3 more than one Master could potentially have jurisdiction over the same trust.  
In Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk the Supreme Court of Appeal highlighted the difficulties that arise due to a lack of a central 
register for trusts. For example, a person who wants to obtain a copy of the trust deed would first have to ascertain at which Master’s 
office the trust deed is lodged. Would establishing a public register for trusts assist in this regard? 
The interviewees were at one that a central register would assist. The Chief Master of South 
Africa was one of the interviewees, and he advised that a central electronic database for 
trusts has come into existence.801 For the past two years, all new trusts that are lodged at 
the Master’s office are allocated unique case reference numbers based on at which office 
the trust was registered. Thereafter the relevant trust documentation is uploaded on the 
electronic system. Thus, all records for new trusts that have been registered can be 
accessed electronically, provided that the person who requests a copy of, for example, the 
trust deed, falls within the categories of persons listed under section 17 of the TPCA. In 
other words the criteria for access to trust documentation have not changed. Thus, while 
there is now an electronic system in place, trust documentation is still not regarded as 
public documentation. Relevant parties can, regardless of the electronic database, still 
request a non-electronic copy of the trust deed at the Master’s office. The electronic 
database at present however, only applies in respect of new trusts, although it is the goal of 
the Master’s office to upload documentation of old trusts on the electronic database once 
they have the necessary resources. The electronic system attempts, inter alia, to negate the 
jurisdiction issue. However, it was emphasised by the Chief Master that the electronic 
system is still a work in progress. It thus appears that the jurisdiction issue will in due course 
fall away. Thus, an amendment of the provision is no longer required.  
                                                          
800
    Nieuwoudt v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) 493H. 
801
    It should be emphasised that the trusts database is not on par with the Companies Register.  
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Question 10 Authorisation of a trustee 
In chapter three is was submitted that Supreme Court of Appeal decisions regarding 
authorisation of trustees under section 6(1) of the TPCA not only failed to acknowledge the 
impact that blanket invalidity of actions performed by unauthorised trustees has in practice, 
but also failed to consider the relationship between section 6(1) and the fiduciary duty 
which follows as soon as a person accepts an appointment as trustee. It was also 
acknowledged that Smith raises engaging arguments regarding the dual purpose approach 
which would allow for ratification transactions concluded by trustees prior to receipt of the 
Master’s authorisation. It was nevertheless submitted that it would make practical sense 
rather to amend section 6(1) to obviate any need for ratification by incorporating, firstly, a 
proviso similar to that contained in the SALRC’s original recommendation on trustee 
authorisation; and, secondly, a provision on retroactivity similar to section 57 of Chapter III 
of the Administration of Estates Act.802 The following was therefore posed to the 
interviewees: 
Section 6(1) has by far resulted in the most case law and academic debate. It is proposed that section 6(1) be amended in the following 
manner: 
 
“(1) Any person whose appointment as trustee in terms of a trust instrument or section 7 comes into force after the commencement 
of this Act, shall act in that capacity only if authorised thereto in writing by the Master; provided that – 
 
(a) a trustee, whether required to furnish security or not, can nevertheless, pending the issuing of letters of authorisation, apply 
in writing to the Master for interim authorisation to perform specific acts with regard to the administration to trust property; and 
 
(b) notwithstanding an application for interim authorisation brought in terms of paragraph (a), if a written application for any 
letters of authorisation was made within fourteen days after the death of the testator or within fourteen days after the creation of 
an inter vivos trust, such letters of authorisation shall be deemed to have been granted immediately after the death of the testator 
or in the case of an inter vivos trust from the date on which the application for letters of authorisation was made”. 
 
Would the inclusion of such an amendment combat the practical difficulties associated with section 6(1)? 
One interviewee suggested that matters would be much simpler if the Master’s power of 
authorisation were removed, since it serves merely as a rubber stamp. In other words, the 
Master should not have a discretion to refuse authorising a trustee unless there is a valid 
reason to do so. This interviewee was also of the opinion that a trustee should not be 
required to do anything other than to prove that the trust has been registered, as it is, 
according to him/her(?), registration, rather than the Master’s authorisation, which brings 
the trust into existence. Whether the trustees have capacity to act should be determined by 
the trustees themselves, and they should have the duty of notifying the Master of who will 
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serve as trustees. If necessary, it should be made a criminal offence for trustees not to 
register the trust. As to the retrospective aspect of the proposal, the interviewee was of the 
opinion that it could work. However, it was emphasised that in practice certain necessary 
steps, such as opening a bank account, may not be possible during the interim period. In this 
regard, proof of lodgement of the trust deed with the Master ought to be accepted 
legislatively as sufficient to endow trustees with authority. 
Another interviewee mentioned that the Master does not analyse who submits or registers 
the trust deed for lodgement. This means that it is not always known whether the person 
registering the trust is acting in his capacity as trustee. Regarding the retrospective aspect of 
the proposed amendment, the interviewee questioned what the position would be if, for 
good reason, it is not possible to adhere to the time frame. The interviewee noted further 
that the Master could issue full authority within 14 days, and that even though the proposal 
might remove hardship, it would create uncertainty. Hence, the extant section 6(1) ought to 
be retained. 
A third interviewee observed that interim authorisation would be required only if there 
were a delay on the part of the Master’s office. The Master is concerned about the ability of 
trustees to exercise their duties. He may require security prior to authorising trustees in 
order to protect the interests of the beneficiaries. If a trustee fails to comply with his duties, 
the Master can make good the damage which the trustee’s omission caused by calling up 
the security. This interviewee also adjudged that the problems associated with persons 
purporting to act as trustees without having authorisation will not be rectified by amending 
stipulations in the TPCA dealing with the Master’s actions and/or responsibilities, but rather 
by amending the TPCA to regard a trustee’s acting without authorisation akin to breach of 
trust, which would expose him to personal liability. He considered that the TPCA should be 
amended to provide for actions by and duties of persons who have been appointed as 
trustees and have accepted their appointment, but who have not yet been authorised by 
the Master. Such persons already would have assumed the fiduciary office of trustee (in 
certain circumstances having to take control of trust assets) and will have to execute certain 
duties imposed by the TPCA prior to their having been authorised as trustees, for example, 
lodgement and payment of the prescribed fee. The interviewee chose not to comment on 
the retrospectivity dimension of the proposal, as no advantages and/or solutions were 
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apparent to him. Furthermore, the interviewee doubted that the Master’s office would 
agree to the retrospective authorisation. 
The fourth interviewee indicated that, from a practical perspective, obtaining interim 
authorisation may take time and, thus, the core issue is not really security but trusteeship 
being authorised from the Master. This interviewee also highlighted the point that a trustee 
does not act always and only as a trustee. In other words, there are various other roles 
which a trustee can play. For example, he could be a party to a contract and fulfil his 
obligations thereunder while awaiting his letters of authorisation. This accords with the 
definition of “trustee”, which allows such person to continue exercising his duties. The 
interviewee suggested that an alternative would be to broaden the idea of a trustee to 
include a “proposed trustee”. As for the retrospectivity aspect, the interviewee did not have 
any strong opinion on it. Instead, he questioned why a trustee should not be able to 
perform basic trust administration after 30 days, if he can prove that he submitted an 
application for authorisation. Furthermore, he considered that the proposed amendment to 
section 6 would not create certainty, and suggested, instead, that the relevant persons liaise 
with the Master after 30 days regarding the application and inform the Master that they 
(the trustees) have failed to provide the relevant documentation. The interviewee noted 
also that the problem does not really arise in respect of new trusts, and pertains to existing 
trusts where a replacement trustee is needed. 
The last interviewee questioned whether the concept of interim authorisation would work, 
given that obtaining actual authorisation from the Master in itself takes time. However, he 
agreed, in the light of the problems that section 6 creates, that the recommendation of 
retrospectivity would make matters easier in practice. Thus, if an application to the Master 
takes longer than 14 days, the remaining trustees could continue administering the trust 
even if their number falls below the prescribed threshold.  This would be out of step with 
case law, but the interviewee noted that our courts do not take into account what happens 
in practice. He also questioned what would happen if, after 15 days, the Master refuses to 
issue letters of authorisation for security reasons, although such refusal is rare. The 
interviewee accepted that the proposal would combat certain practical problems, but 
doubted that the Master’s office would agree to such amendment. 
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There was evidently no consensus amongst the interviewees regarding the proposed 
amendment. Be that as it may, section 6(1)’s peremptory nature and, therefore, its adverse 
effect in instances of trustees’ non-adherence to its prescripts evidently causes several 
practical problems for which a solution ought to be found. While the retrospective aspect of 
the proposed new subsection was felt by some to be practicable, the Chief Master (as 
predicted by some of the interviewees) was opposed to it. Some of the concerns raised in 
this regard are valid, especially those pertaining to security becoming an issue after the 
interim period. Nevertheless, it is submitted that trustees, while they await full 
authorisation, ought to be given interim authorisation to commence basic trust 
administration for the reasons advanced in chapter three and because of the delays, noted 
by interviewees, on the part of the Master’s office in issuing full authorisation. However, 
based on some of the practical concerns raised regarding the retrospectivity of the 
proposed provision, it is submitted that this part of the provision be omitted as there is a 
strong possibility that these practical concerns could indeed materialise and cause further 
complications. It is indeed important that the proposed new Act remedies current 
problematic issues, and not cause additional quandaries. The issue of inserting a penalty 
clause under the authorisation requirement was not discussed during the interviews. 
Instead, the insertion of penalty clauses in the proposed new Act was discussed under the 
appropriate heading, namely, penalty clauses which will be analysed later. It is nevertheless 
submitted that a penalty clause should be incorporated under the authorisation 
requirement, if a trustee administers a trust without any form of authorisation. Firstly, the 
proposed amendment will afford a trustee time to obtain at least interim authorisation 
which will enable such trustee to commence basic trust administration. Secondly, case law 
such as Parker reveals that a trust cannot be bound if a trustee does not have authorisation 
to act. Thirdly, a trustee should not escape liability where there is non-compliance with the 
authorisation requirement. For these reasons, it is submitted that a trustee, like an executor 
who liquidates and distributes a deceased estate without letters of executorship, should be 
subject to a penalty clause. Thus, a penalty clause will be attached as a consequence to the 
non-compliance with the authorisation requirement, which it is further submitted, will serve 
as a deterrent. Accordingly the proposed amendment will read as follows: 
 
(1)  Any person whose appointment as trustee in terms of a trust instrument or section 10 comes into force after the commencement of 
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this Act, shall act in that capacity only if authorised thereto in writing by the Master. 
(2) Pending the issuing of letters of authorisation, a trustee, whether required to furnish security or not, can apply in writing to the 
Master for interim authorisation to perform specific acts with regard to the administration to trust property. 
(3)  Any trustee who administers a trust estate without authorisation is guilty of an offence and will be liable on conviction to a fine or 
imprisonment not exceeding six months.  
 
Question 11 Security 
It was stated in chapter three that section 6(2) of the TPCA would have to be amended by 
deleting its proviso if section 6(1) is indeed amended in accordance with the proposal 
suggested under Question 10 above. This is based on the premise that retaining the proviso 
under this subsection will be superfluous in that the proposed amendment regarding 
authorisation will afford a trustee the right to commence basic trust administration, which is 
indeed what section 6(2) currently provides for pending the furnishing of security. The 
following issues of a practical nature regarding the furnishing of security were canvassed in 
the interviews with trust practitioners: 
 
Should section 6(2) indicate the form that security should take (for example an “amount”)?  
What is meant by “for the due and faithful performance of his duties as trustee” is not apparent – should the purpose for which security is 
furnished, namely, to be granted letters of authorisation rather not be stated more explicitly? 
All the respondents mentioned that security usually takes the form of a bond of security.  
One noted that stipulating the form that security should take could limit the possibilities. 
Another mentioned that insurance companies usually are loathe to issue a bond of security 
to a “lay trustee”, requiring instead that such trustee take out a mortgage bond. This 
observation raises the question of what type of security would suffice. However, there 
clearly are no concerns as to the form that security can take in practice. What is more, 
specifying the form of security indeed could foreclose the possibilities. Hence, it is proposed 
that such specification ought to be avoided.  
All the respondents agreed that security is given not to obtain letters of authorisation but to 
ensure that, should the trustees fail in the due and proper performance of their duties, the 
Master may call up the security. This purpose of security is stated clearly in the current 
provision. Thus, no amendment is required. 
Some of the respondents were unsure of the meaning of “due and faithful performance of 
duties” by a trustee. One was of the opinion that the formulation relates to a trustee 
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fulfilling his duties in terms of the common law, statutory law, his fiduciary duties and those 
duties flowing from the trust deed. Whereas the meaning of the formulation is not 
apparent, it very likely relates to a trustee’s compliance with the directives in section 9 TPCA 
regarding care, diligence and skill; and the statement made by the respondent regarding the 
fulfilment of a trustee’s various duties appears acceptable in this light. Since “due and 
faithful performance of duties” does not appear to cause practical concerns, it is submitted 
that the formulation be retained in the proposed new Act’s prescripts on the furnishing of 
security by trustees. 
Question 12 Corporations appointed as trustees 
The analysis in chapter three on this point showed that in Metequity Ltd v NWN Properties 
Ltd803 the court addressed most of the interpretational uncertainties pertaining to section 
6(4) of the TPCA. Be that as it may, it is suggested that section 6(4) be amended to give 
linguistic effect to the Metequity judgment. This submission was tested during the 
interviews: 
Regardless of the clarification pertaining to section 6(4) that was given in Metequity Ltd v NWN Properties Ltd, it is nevertheless submitted 
that section 6(4) should be amended to read: 
 
“If any authorisation is given in terms of this section to a trustee which is a corporation, such authorisation shall, subject to the 
provisions of the trust instrument, be given in the name of a nominee of the corporation for whose actions as trustee the 
corporation [as trustee] is legally liable, and any substitution for such nominee of some other person shall be endorsed on the said 
authorisation.” 
 
Do you agree? 
All of the interviewees agreed that the proposed amendment to section 6(4) is instructive 
and, given that it translates the clarity yielded by the Metequity judgment into the text of 
the new Act, it is proposed that the subsection be amended accordingly. 
Question 13 Appointment by Master of trustees and/or co-trustees 
Based on the analysis of the decision in Moore v Mrs Du Toit in chapter three, which 
judgment is submitted as being sound, it was proposed that section 7 of the TPCA regarding 
the Master’s power to appoint trustees and/or co-trustees in its current format is not in 
need of amendment. The following question was put forth to the interviewees: 
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It is proposed that the provision remains intact – do you agree? 
Four of the five respondents agreed with the provision remaining unchanged. However, one 
enquired whether, given that trust deeds frequently stipulate the number of trustees, the 
Master can appoint an additional trustee despite what the trust deed states and, if so, what 
the basis of such an appointment can be. Cameron et al expressed similar concerns, and the 
authors’ views in this regard were noted in chapter three. However, in light of the fact that 
the majority of the respondents agreed with the recommendation, and taking into account 
the reasons advanced in chapter three in favour of the retention of section 7 in unamended 
form, it is proposed that the provision ought to be retained as it stands. 
Question 14 Foreign trustees 
It was highlighted in the chapter three that foreign trustees are treated differently from 
domestic trustees as regards both letters of authorisation and the furnishing of security. 
While there is no existing case law on section 8 of the TPCA regarding the authorisation of 
foreign trustees (which suggests that the provision does not cause practical concerns) the 
following practical questions were posed during interviews:  
Will the TPCA apply to a foreign trustee if the Master does not issue a letter of authorisation to such trustee?  
If the Master chooses to not authorise a foreign trustee, will the foreign trustee lack the capacity to act on behalf of the trust in light of the 
Lupacchini judgment?  
Also, is a foreign trustee by virtue of the reference to section 6 of the TPCA subject to the duty to provide security? 
As to whether or not the TPCA applies to a foreign trustee if the Master does not issue a 
letter of authorisation to such trustee, two interviewees answered in the affirmative. 
Another suggested that the clause be amended to state that the section applies to resident 
trusts, which consequently would answer the question in the affirmative. The fourth 
interviewee could not comment as he had no experience of foreign trusts. Nevertheless, he 
questioned what is meant by the term “foreign”. Does it refer to a South African citizen 
abroad, or a foreign citizen?  The last interviewee stated that the Master’s office may be 
best suited to answer the questions posed under this section. 
The Chief Master answered yes as to whether a foreign trustee will lack the capacity to act 
in the light of Lupacchini v Minister of Safety and Security, if not authorised by the Master. 
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As to whether the reference to section 6 of the TPCA imposes on a foreign trustee the duty 
to provide security, most interviewees answered in the affirmative, except one who 
mentioned that the Master’s office now insists on a domicilium address. Notably, however, 
the Chief Master was amongst those who gave a positive answer.  It thus may be necessary 
to amend the provision to account for the operational realities of the Master’s office in this 
regard by stating for example that that such trustee may only administer a trust if he/she 
has the necessary authority. 
Question 15 Trustee providing Master with an account 
A comparison was made in chapter three between section 152 of the Insolvency Act804 and 
section 16 of TPCA regarding a trustee’s duty to provide the Master with an account when 
called upon to do so. It was submitted that section 16 be amended along similar lines to 
section 152 of the Insolvency Act. The following was asked regarding this aspect during the 
interviews: 
Section 152(2) of the Insolvency Act empowers the Master to give a written notice to, inter alia, a trustee who in the opinion of the 
Master has information which the Master considers desirable to obtain.  This notice serves as a means of summonsing the person to 
appear before, inter alia, the Master at the place, date and time stipulated in the notice to provide the Master with all the information 
within his knowledge concerning the insolvent’s estate or the administration thereof. 
Section 16(1) of the TPCA does not appear to have the same effect as section 152(2) in that the former provision merely states “to 
deliver” the documents to the Master after he has requested it. 
Should a trustee personally deliver the documents to the Master or will delivery by post suffice? 
Section 16(1) does not provide a time frame within which the documents ought to be delivered to the Master, but one assumes that the 
Master will specify a time frame in his notice.  With section 152(2) however, a trustee is required to personally appear with the 
requested documentation before the Master on the specified date.  
It is submitted that section 16(1) be amended to include similar wording to that contained in section 152(2) – do you agree? 
As to whether a trustee should deliver the documents to the Master personally or whether 
delivery by post would suffice in terms of the TPCA, all of the respondents were in 
agreement that delivery of documentation by post ought to suffice. 
One respondent felt that there was no use for section 16(1) of the TPCA if it cannot be 
enforced. However, he noted that the proposed amendment would have to be checked 
against the Master’s power to request information to ensure that there is no abuse of 
power. Furthermore, in cases of breach of trust, the Master should have authority to 
summon a trustee to appear personally before him.  Another respondent agreed and stated 
that the amendment would enhance the Master’s ability to regulate trustees more 
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effectively and to hold trustees more accountable. The third respondent answered this 
question in the negative, stating that the amendment would be draconian while noting that 
a personal appearance by a trustee may be the only way to resolve problems. The remaining 
two respondents agreed with the proposal, with one observing that such an amendment 
would result in better regulation and control.  While there were some negative comments 
regarding the proposal, most of the respondents agreed that section 16(1) of the TPCA 
should be amended to incorporate wording similar to that of section 152(2) of the 
Insolvency Act. It was submitted in chapter three that a trustee will best be suited to answer 
questions if he appears before the Master personally. Enabling the Master to call the trustee 
to appear before him personally will also negate the back-and-forth effect of 
correspondence and ensure that any issues are resolved timeously. In light of these practical 
considerations, and the positive effect of the proposed amendment on the Master’s powers 
of supervision over trustees, it is thus submitted that section 16(1) be amended accordingly.  
Question 16 Remuneration of a trustee 
It was noted in chapter three that section 22 of the TPCA regarding trustee remuneration 
raises several questions. A comparison was also made with the Administration of Estates Act 
and the Insolvency Act regarding matters pertaining to remuneration. In this regard, the 
following questions were raised, and proposals were made during the interviews: 
In terms of section 22: 
 
“A trustee shall in respect of the execution of his official duties be entitled to such remuneration as provided for in the trust 
instrument or, where no such provision is made, to a reasonable remuneration, which shall in the event of a dispute be fixed by the 
Master”. 
 
The provision raises several questions: firstly, who decides on a trustee’s remuneration, if the trust instrument is silent? 
Secondly, does the Master only play a role if an agreement cannot be reached and a dispute arises as to what a reasonable remuneration 
is? The provision does not assist is determining what a reasonable remuneration may be, and leaves this decision with the Master.  
By way of comparison section 51 (1)(b) of the Administration of Estates Act provides that, in the event that a will is silent on the issue of 
remuneration, an executor will receive out of the assets of the estate a remuneration that will be assessed according to a prescribed tariff 
which shall be taxed by the Master. Section 51 (3)(b) goes further and empowers the Master to disallow remuneration either wholly or in 
part if an executor fails to discharge his duties or discharges them in an unsatisfactory manner. Section 63(1) of the Insolvency Act states, 
inter alia, that a trustee is entitled to a reasonable remuneration, that is to be taxed in accordance with the prescribed tariff contained in 
the Act. The provision however, goes further by stating that the Master may for good cause reduce, increase, or disallow remuneration in 
whole or in part if there is any failure or delay on the part of a trustee in discharging his duties or any improper performance of his duties.  
The provisions in both Acts allow the Master to consider a trustee’s discharge of his duties as a means to assist the Master in making his 
decisions regarding remuneration. Furthermore, there is a prescribed tariff as far as executors are concerned, and a tariff that can be used 
in taxing a reasonable remuneration of trustees of insolvent estates.  
It is submitted, that in the event that the trust instrument is silent on the issue of remuneration, that the Master be empowered, to 
determine a reasonable remuneration with the court playing a supervisory role, in the event that any interested parties are aggrieved by 
the decision of the Master. Also, that in assessing the issue of remuneration, that a provision with wording similar to both Acts that will 
allow the Master to reduce or disallow remuneration in the event of a trustee failing to discharge his duties be included.  
However, before an actual provision to this effect is proposed, are there guidelines to assist to determine what a reasonable remuneration 
would be? 
Should trustees under the TPCA be subjected to a prescribed tariff in the event that the trust deed is silent? 
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Most of the interviewees stated that if the trust instrument is silent on remuneration, the 
trustees themselves make the decision on appropriate remuneration. One felt that the 
Master should not be involved in determining remuneration for trustees if it is not provided 
for in the trust deed. Another stated that there is good practice regarding setting trustee 
fees according to market dynamics. Two other interviewees agreed with the proposal as a 
whole. As to whether or not there should be a prescribed tariff in the event that the trust 
deed is silent, three responded positively and two negatively. In light of these mixed 
responses, it is submitted that, while there are evidently fee guidelines in practice, it may 
still be useful that a prescribed tariff be incorporated into the proposed new Act to assist in 
those instances where the trust deed is silent on the matter of trustee remuneration. 
It is not apparent from section 22 whether the Master plays a role only if an agreement 
cannot be reached and a dispute arises as to what is a reasonable remuneration. The 
section also does not assist in determining what a reasonable remuneration may be and 
thus leaves this decision with the Master. In this regard, the Chief Master mentioned that 
the matter is complex, with the following factors being taken into consideration in 
determining a reasonable remuneration: the time spent on matters pertaining to the trust, 
the degree of skill of the trustee, and what would be a fair amount of remuneration under 
the circumstances. One interviewee noted that it is up to the Master to decide trustee 
remuneration in terms of section 22. Another suggested that there is an industry-related 
remuneration regime, but there is no certainty in this regard. Not all trustees are 
professionals and thus industry-related remuneration will not apply to non-professional 
trustees. On the strength of the foregoing, it is proposed that section 22 ought to remain 
unchanged but for the recommendation that a prescribed tariff be inserted in the 
corresponding provision of the proposed new Act.  
 
Question 17 Removal by Master 
It was proposed in chapter three that, since a trustee’s good name and character are at 
stake and taking into account the requirements of procedural fairness and the audi alteram 
partem principle, it would be appropriate to amend section 20(2) paragraph (e) of the TPCA 
through the inclusion of a prescript requiring of the Master to afford a trustee an 
opportunity to respond to any allegation in respect of his administration of the trust that 
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has been made against him as a precursor to his possible removal from office. It was further 
submitted that the approach taken by the legislature in the Administration of Estates Act to 
the removal of an executor is instructive here. It was also suggested that section 20(2) 
paragraph (e) of the TPCA be amended to include a stipulation requiring the Master to send 
the trustee a notice by registered post informing him of the grounds for removal and a date 
on which the trustee can appear before the Master to answer the allegations against him. 
Further concerns regarding section 20(2) TPCA were canvassed during interviews in the 
following manner: 
In Ganie v Ganie the court stated that section 20(2) does not require the Master to provide a notice to a trustee, for example, informing 
him of the grounds for the trustee’s removal. The court however relied on Cameron et al’s view that in order for the Master to remove a 
trustee, a trustee should be given proper notice and be informed about the precise grounds for the proposed removal. This they say is 
necessary as the removal would constitute an impairment of the trustee’s good name and character as well as deprive him of his right to 
remuneration.  
Since a trustee’s good name and character is at stake, and because of the requirements of procedural fairness and the audi alteram 
partem principle, it is submitted that it would be appropriate to amend paragraph (e) to include the Master affording a trustee an 
opportunity to respond to any allegation that has been made against him in respect of his administration of the trust.  
Another concern relates to the two month time frame specified in paragraph (b): 
Is this time frame adequate? 
Should it not be longer since neither section 6(2) or (3) stipulates a time frame within which a trustee ought to give security?  
As far as subsection (3) is concerned:  do trustees indeed return their letters of authorisation without delay.  
What is meant by “without delay”?  
Is there a certain time frame that the Master affords a trustee to return his/her letters of authorisation?  
If not, should a time frame not be included?  
What recourse does the Master have if a trustee does not comply with subsection (3)?  
Would imposing a criminal sanction similar to that contained in section 102(1)(i)(v) of the Administration of Estates Act be of assistance? 
Section 102(1)(i)(v) states that if an executor fails to comply with, inter alia, section 54(5) (which requires an executor to return his letters 
of executorship without delay) the executor shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding three months. 
None of the interviewees had any concerns with the proposal to amend section 20(2)(e) of 
the TPCA to include a provision requiring the Master to afford a trustee an opportunity to 
respond to any allegation that has been made against him in respect of his administration of 
the trust in light of the theoretical submissions made in chapter three. 
All of the interviewees felt that the two-month time frame within which a trustee ought to 
give security as specified in section 20(2)(b) was ample, adequate and not unreasonable. 
One interviewee also mentioned that the Master can grant an extension and thus the time 
frame is not a concern. Hence, there is no need to amend this aspect of the current 
provision. 
Regarding section 20(3), the question was whether trustees in fact do return their letters of 
authorisation without delay. One interviewee stated that, in practice, the Master may 
refuse to accept the resignation of a trustee and/or refuse to appoint a new trustee or 
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further trustees unless the original letter accompanies the trustee’s 
resignation/appointment. However, due to practical difficulties in this regard, the Master 
permits an affidavit to the effect that, for example, the original letter has been lost or 
destroyed or cannot be found. This would accommodate the resignation of a trustee who, 
for whatever reason, has no access to the original letter. Another interviewee noted, 
similarly, that no new letters of authorisation can be obtained unless the old letter is 
handed in. However, in practice if it is lost or the remaining trustees do not have it in their 
possession, they send an affidavit to inform the Master that they will hand it in as soon as 
they have recovered possession of it. A third interviewee mentioned that if a trustee is 
removed, he most likely will not comply with the subsection, so a time frame might not 
work in practice. Nevertheless, it was suggested that a time frame may be included because 
“without delay” is vague. According to a fourth interviewee, trustees do not always comply 
with this provision, thus requiring that the central register database be up to date to enable 
the public to know the current position. 
As to whether there is a certain time frame that the Master affords a trustee to return 
his/her letters of authorisation, one interviewee stated that he was unsure. Another 
questioned whether a time frame could be imposed if there is no sanction for non-
compliance with the duty to return letters of authorisation. Regarding the possible 
specification of a time frame, one interviewee suggested that it should be kept open, while 
another conceded that a time frame could be included as the provision is vague. Two others 
answered in the negative. As to the recourse available to the Master for non-compliance, 
the Chief Master mentioned that there is none, while noting that a letter of authorisation 
will be invalid once it has been replaced. 
Lastly, most of the interviewees responded affirmatively to the idea of imposing a criminal 
sanction similar to that contained in section 102(1)(i)(v) of the Administration of Estates Act, 
while one felt that the proposal was unnecessary. In light of the foregoing practicalities, 
coupled with the theoretical underpinnings of the proposal for amendment to section 20(2) 
advanced in chapter three, it is suggested that the proposal to create a penalty clause in the 
event of a trustee’s non-compliance be endorsed since the Master currently has no recourse 
against a non-compliant trustee. It is submitted, furthermore, that it is appropriate to 
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recommend a time frame within which a trustee ought to return his/her letters of 
authorisation in light of the proposed penalty clause. 
 
5.4.5 Duties of Trustees 
Question 18 Lodgement 
It was noted in chapter three that the court in Groeschke v Trustee Groeschke Family 
Trust,805 emphasised that section 4(2) of the TPCA does not stipulate that a failure to lodge 
an amendment of a trust deed would render the amendment invalid. Section 4(2) also does 
not provide a time frame for the lodgement of the document, or the form that the 
document should take, nor is the content of the document stipulated. The lodgement of a 
complete, amended deed of trust after an amendment has taken place is also not required. 
Of importance, according to the court in Groeschke, is the fact that the document amending 
the trust deed is indeed lodged with the relevant Master.806 Furthermore, non-compliance 
with section 4(2) will not result in the invalidation of the amendment.807 Considering that 
time frames are imposed in other provisions of the TPCA dealing with administrative actions 
– see sections 5 and 20(2)(b) in particular –  the interviews were used to examine the 
question whether a time frame for trustees to lodge trust deeds ought to be incorporated 
into the new Act. An attempt was also made to ascertain how soon appointed but 
unauthorised trustees lodge the trust document and whether the Master allows lodgement 
in the light of the Lupacchini judgment. These matters were re-examined in the following 
manner: 
Section 4 states: 
“(1) Except where the Master is already in possession of the trust instrument in question or an amendment thereof, a trustee whose 
appointment comes into force after the commencement of this Act shall, before he assumes control of the trust property, upon 
payment of the prescribed fee, lodge with the Master the trust instrument in terms of which the trust property is to be administered 
or disposed of by him, or a copy thereof certified as a true copy by a notary or other person approved by the Master. 
(2) When a trust instrument which has been lodged with the Master is varied, the trustee shall lodge the amendment or a copy 
thereof so certified with the Master”. 
The usage of the words “a trustee whose appointment” in section 4(1) raises the question as to whether a trustee who lodges a copy of 
the trust deed will not be acting in contravention of the Lupacchini judgment? 
Would the proposed amendment of section 6(1) cater for this anomaly? 
In Groeschke v Trustee Groeschke Family Trust the court highlighted that section 4(2) does not stipulate that a failure to lodge an 
amendment of a trust deed would render the amendment invalid. Also no time frame for the lodgement of the document, or the form 
that the document should take, or the content of the document is stipulated. 
In light of the time frames imposed by sections 5 and 20(2)(b) of the TPCA would it not be preferable that section 4 provide a time frame 
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Mohammedan (2443/2007) [2008] ZANWHC 20 (3 July 2008) [33] where the court held that the 
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within which trustees ought to lodge trust deeds? 
How soon do appointed but unauthorised trustees lodge trust deeds? 
Does the Master allow lodgement of trustees by appointed, but unauthorised trustees? 
Most of the interviewees felt that there was no contravention of Lupacchini v Minister of 
Safety and Security, since the person does not act always in the capacity of trustee when 
lodging. Further, one stated that if the proposals regarding section 6(1) to the effect that a 
trustee may apply for interim authorisation are accepted, then section 4 would not be 
problematic as currently there is a conflict in that case law on section 6(1) reveals that an 
unauthorised trustee is prevented from doing anything in respect of the trust, yet an 
appointed but unauthorised trustee is required to lodge the trust deed in terms of the TPCA. 
Evidently, therefore, there are no real concerns regarding section 4’s operation from a 
practical perspective. It is submitted, furthermore, that the proposal to amend the 
definition of trustee would be in line with section 4(1) because it gives credence to the fact 
that a person becomes a trustee upon acceptance as opposed to authorisation. Also, 
allowing a trustee to apply for interim authorisation in terms of the proposed amendment 
to section 6(1) while awaiting full authorisation, would enable such trustee to lodge the 
trust deed without infringing section 4(1). 
As to whether or not the proposed amendment of section 6(1) would cater for the 
(theoretical) anomaly between section 4(1) and Lupacchini v Minister of Safety and Security, 
most of the interviewees answered in the negative. However, one interviewee felt that the 
proposal would be in order due to the current conflict between case law on unauthorised 
trustees and section 4(1) which imposes a duty on appointed but unauthorised trustees to 
lodge trust deeds as noted above. With regard to the judgment in Groeschke v Trustee 
Groeschke Family Trust and its implications for section 4(2), one interviewee noted that 
there are certain authorities who argue that unless and until such time that the amendment 
is lodged with the Master, it is invalid. Another interviewee felt that there would be no 
practical difference if a time frame were included. Three interviewees responded in the 
affirmative to the proposed inclusion of a time frame for lodgement. In order to create 
certainty, it is proposed, therefore, that such a time frame indeed be included in section 4. 
Most of the interviewees indicated that trust deeds are lodged relatively quickly by 
appointed but not yet authorised trustees. The Chief Master however observed that no 
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distinction is made between appointed but unauthorised trustees as opposed to authorised 
trustees in respect of lodging a trust deed. 
The question as to whether the Master allows lodgement by trustees who have been 
appointed but not yet authorised elicited affirmative responses from all of the interviewees, 
except one who suggested that the Master answer this question. Since this practice is 
theoretically in conflict with the current statutory regime, it makes more sense that the 
definition of trustee and section 6(1) be amended as proposed earlier. The current 
definition of trustee for example, prohibits a trustee despite having been appointed as such 
and having accepted the appointment, from commencing basic trust administration until 
authorised thereto by the Master. So while the Master allows appointed, but unauthorised 
trustees to lodge trust deeds, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Lupacchini held that an 
unauthorised trustee is incapable of doing anything until such trustee has the necessary 
authority.    
Question 19 Notification of address 
It was submitted in chapter three that, in order to provide legal certainty, section 5 of the 
TPCA be amended to indicate that the designated address furnished by a trustee to the 
Master will serve as a domicilium address. It was also envisioned that the interviews would 
be used to ascertain whether trustees indeed comply with this duty, and whether a criminal 
sanction ought to be imposed if a trustee fails to comply with the fourteen-day period 
stipulated in the section. This inquiry was conducted in the following manner:  
While section 5 provides that the address may be used for the purpose of service of process, which in all likelihood suggests that it may be 
used for the service of legal documents, it is submitted that section 5 be amended to provide legal certainty by stating that the chosen 
address will serve as a domicilium address -  do you agree? 
Do trustees indeed comply with the duty to inform the Master of any change in address? 
Should a criminal sanction be imposed if a trustee fails to comply with the prescribed fourteen-day period? 
All the respondents agreed that section 5 should be amended to provide legal certainty by 
designating the chosen address as a domicilium address. Thus, this amendment will be 
pursued. 
As to whether or not trustees comply with their duty to inform the Master of any change of 
address, one respondent mentioned that there is non-compliance with this duty in many 
instances. Two others stated that there usually is an oversight on the part of the trustee as 
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regards informing the Master. Another claimed that he could not assist in this regard, but 
did advise that usually trustees forget to inform the Master. However, the Chief Master 
answered in the affirmative. 
The suggestion that a criminal sanction should be imposed if a trustee fails to inform the 
Master of a change of address was rejected by most respondents. Since trustees who 
change address without advising the Master can, according to the Chief Master be held to 
their previous address, it is proposed that the suggestion to import such a criminal sanction 
be abandoned. 
Question 20 Statutory duty of care 
It was stated in chapter three that other than section 9(1) of the TPCA setting out the 
minimum standard of care expected of a trustee, no content to the duty of care is 
provided.808 It was also highlighted that the invalidity of exemption provisions in trust 
instruments as provided for in section 9(2) was inserted into the TPCA on Wunsh’s 
recommendations. It was noted further that it is not apparent how section 9 impacts on 
trust administration where there is an element of risk involved, for example, when a trustee 
is required to invest trust money. It was also highlighted that Balden and Rautenbach are of 
the view that the TPCA should follow in the footsteps of the English Trustee Act of 2000 by 
including provisions that regulate trustee investments. These questions were addressed 
during interviews in the following manner: 
How does section 9(1) and (2) impact on trust administration where there is an element of risk involved, for example, where trustees are 
empowered by the trust deed to invest trust moneys? 
Balden and Rautenbach argue that the TPCA follow in the footsteps of the English Trustee Act 2000 by including provisions relating to 
trustee investments. 
Will implementing provisions relating to trustee investments assist in practice? 
Also, how does the duty of care impact on the business deals of trustees of business trusts which often involve an element of risk? In 
other words, how will a trustee involved in business deals abide by his duty of care? 
In response to the enquiry concerning the impact of section 9 on trust administration where 
there is an element of risk involved, one interviewee stated that ample guidelines in this 
regard were set out in Administrators Estate Richards v Nichol.809 Another considered that 
risk is assessed based on the needs of an individual, while a third noted that one would have 
to look at the object and purpose of the trust in this regard. Another interviewee stated that 
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this is a matter that cannot be dealt with in terms of legislation. The Chief Master stated 
that the established law should not be changed as it could limit free market powers 
regarding investments. 
All the interviewees were opposed to the recommendation of Balden and Rautenbach that 
the TPCA follow in the footsteps of the English Trustee Act 2000 by including provisions 
relating to trustee investments. 
Regarding the impact of the duty of care on the business deals of trustees, one of the 
interviewees stated that trust deeds of business/trading trusts normally do (and should) 
empower trustees to take business risks to prevent them from failing in their fiduciary and 
common law duty of care. Also, trust deeds preferably should give detailed investment 
guidelines in support of the specific objective(s) of the trust. Another interviewee proposed 
that one should consider the object and purpose of the trust, and that such consideration 
involves a subjective test. The next one stated that the matter concerns only the trustee; in 
other words, it is a problem for the trustee to tackle and not a matter that can be legislated.  
Another mentioned that the case of Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 
provides some guidelines/rules that adequately manage this area,810 without elaborating on 
what these guidelines or rules are. However, one may assume that these guidelines/rules 
relate to the SCA’s statement that the duties imposed on trustees and the standard of care 
they should adhere to derives from the principle that there should be a separation between 
enjoyment and control which principle ensures diligence on the part of the trustees. It was 
further stated that a failure on the part of a trustee to adhere to his duties could result in an 
action by the beneficiaries ensures an independence of judgment on the part of a trustee.811 
There appears to be ample authority that an element of risk in trustee investment is 
acceptable, and that South African courts have laid down useful guidelines on how to meet 
such risk in judgments such as Administrators Estate Richards v Nichol and Land and 
Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker. It is thus submitted that there be no additions 
relating to trustee investments made to the new Act. 
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161 
 
Question 21 Trust account 
In chapter three it was noted that section 10 of the TPCA does not specify the type of 
account to be used for the depositing of trust money, nor whether the account should be 
opened in the name of the trust or the trustee. It was also shown that section 10 differs on 
point from the recommendation initially made by the SALRC.  It was submitted that, in order 
to provide legal certainty, section 10 be amended to stipulate that the account should be 
opened in the name of the trust, as per the recommendation of the SALRC. To illustrate the 
lack of powers that the Master has in respect of overseeing that a trustee complies with this 
duty, a comparison was made with section 28 of the Administration of Estates Act which 
contains provisions relating to an executor’s duty to open a bank account in the name of the 
estate, and which affords the Master several powers pertaining to that bank account. As a 
means of ensuring that a trustee complies with this duty, it was submitted that the inclusion 
into the TPCA of a provision similar to section 28 of the Administration of Estates Act would 
assist on two counts:  (i) it would empower the Master to fulfil a supervisory role over a 
trustee’s handling of trust funds, thereby placing the Master in a better position to call for 
an investigation in terms of section 16(2); and (ii)  the penalty clause attached to a failure to 
comply with this duty may serve as a deterrent, in that trustees run the risk of being 
imprisoned for their non-compliance. In order to determine whether amending section 10 in 
this light would assist in practice, the following were canvassed during interviews: 
Should section 10 be amended by stipulating that the account should be opened in the name of the trust? 
Section 28 of the Administration of Estates Act contains provisions relating to an executor’s duty to open a bank account in the name of 
the estate.  It also empowers the Master to request information from an executor regarding the bank and the branch at which the account 
was opened, and to direct the manager of the branch to refuse an executor, except with the permission of the Master, to withdraw money 
from the account. An executor, who wishes to transfer the account to another bank, also requires the Master’s permission.  A failure on 
the part of an executor to comply with the requirements in section 28 will result in the executor being guilty of an offence and to be liable 
on conviction to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding six months (section 102 (h)(iv)). 
Should a similar provision be incorporated in the TPCA? 
One respondent advised that in practice the account contemplated in section 10 TPCA is 
almost always opened in the name of the trust. Hence, the proposed amendment of section 
10 would be superfluous. Another suggested that an investment account should rather be 
opened, as most banks do not pay interest on trust accounts. The remaining three 
interviewees favoured the proposed amendment. It is submitted that, in light of these 
responses, it would be desirable to create legal certainty by amending the section to 
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stipulate that the account to be opened for the purpose of depositing trust money be 
opened in the name of the trust. 
As to whether a provision similar to section 28 of the Administration of Estates Act should 
be incorporated into the TPCA, one respondent demurred, because such a provision would 
be restrictive and limit the discretionary powers of trustees and the flexibility associated 
with trusts. Another respondent also objected, because many trusts do not need a bank 
account. Two respondents agreed, while the last considered that it would be unnecessary 
since section 28 of Administration of Estates Act is an old banking situation that needs 
revamping. The favoured view thus seems to be that, for reasons of practicality, section 10 
of the TPCA should not be amended in conformity with section 28 of the Administration of 
Estates Act. It is submitted that the aforementioned view of the last respondent that section 
28 is essentially an outdated provision, provides a potent reason not to align section 10 with 
it. 
Question 22 Registration and identification of trust property 
It was submitted in chapter three that, in order to ensure that a trustee complies with the 
duty to separate (and keep separate) trust property from his personal property, a further 
statutory duty be incorporated into the proposed new Act compelling trustees to submit 
trust accounts to annual audits, with a failure to do so resulting in criminal sanctions. This 
submission was based on the premise that annual audits would ensure that trustees 
studiously identify trust property as such, as they would have to provide details pertaining 
to the trust property for purposes of annual audits. An auditor, it was submitted, would be 
in a position to identify whether a trustee has indeed complied with this duty. It was 
proposed, furthermore, that a penalty clause to address non-compliance would serve as a 
deterrent to trustees mixing trust property with private property. These submissions were 
put to the interviewees in the following manner:   
It is submitted that a provision compelling trustees to submit trust accounts to annual audits be incorporated in the TPCA, with a failure 
to do so resulting in criminal sanctions - do you agree? 
None of the respondents agreed with the proposal that annual audits be made compulsory, 
especially in the light of the costs involved. Instead, it was suggested by most of the 
respondents that trustees should keep a set of financial statements, especially since such 
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statements have to be filed with the South African Revenue Services in any event. While all 
of the respondents were opposed to the recommendation, it is nevertheless submitted that 
annual audits should be made compulsory for the following reasons: firstly, it is doubted 
that the filing of financial statements of the trust has the same effect as audits if one 
considers the increase in matters involving an abuse of the trust form; and secondly, one of 
the ways in which the abuse of the trust form can be curbed is through annual audits as an 
auditor, as mentioned earlier is well equipped to identify whether a trustee indeed complies 
with this duty. While the costs of an audit may be an issue, it is submitted that section 30 of 
the Companies Act812 is instructive in this regard. Section 30(2)(a) requires the financial 
statements of a public company to be audited on an annual basis. Section 30(2)(b) relates to 
the financial statements of “any other company” and states inter alia that the financial 
statements must: 
“in the case of any other company- 
be audited, if so required by the regulations made in terms of subsection (7) taking into account 
whether it is desirable in the public interest, having regard to the economic or social significance of 
the company, as indicated by- 
(aa) its annual turnover; 
(bb) the size of the workforce; or 
(cc) the nature and extent of its activities”.   
Subsection (7) states that the Minister may make regulations as well prescribe different 
requirements for different companies and prescribe inter alia which categories of private 
companies should have their financial statements audited as contemplated under section 
30(2)(b)(i).   
It is submitted that a similar provision to section 30(2)(b) and (7) be included in the 
proposed Act for the reasons mentioned above.                   
Question 23 Separate position of trust property 
In chapter three it was highlighted that the court in Yarram Trading CC t/a Tijuana Spur v 
Absa Bank Ltd acknowledged that situations where a trustee combines trust property with 
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his private property still require attention.813 The court nevertheless stated that, even if 
there is no proper separation between a trustee’s personal estate and the trust property, 
the private creditors of a trustee cannot direct their claims against the trust estate.814 To 
assist in this regard, it was once again submitted that a statutory duty to submit annual 
audits should be incorporated in the proposed Act. Furthermore, whether or not a related 
provision that caters for situations where a trustee mixes trust property with his personal 
property should be incorporated into the TPCA, was also raised. The following questions 
were put to the interviewees in this regard:   
Should a related provision that caters for situations where a trustee mixes trust property with his personal property be included in the 
TPCA? 
Here, three interviewees said no to the idea of a provision to deal with trustees who 
commingle trust property and personal property. However, two suggested that a criminal 
sanction should be imposed if a trustee is guilty of such conduct. It is submitted that in 
instances where a trustee commingles trust property with personal property, the 
beneficiaries of the trust have an action for breach of trust, which will impose personal 
liability on the trustee. Thus, a related provision should not be inserted in the proposed Act. 
Question 24 Custody of documents 
It was noted in chapter three that no case law on section 17 of the TPCA regarding a 
trustee’s custody of trust documents was found, which seemingly implies that the provision 
does not cause practical difficulties and therefore is in no need of amendment. The 
following question was nevertheless posed during the interviews to ascertain whether there 
are indeed practical difficulties associated with the provision: 
How often does the Master receive requests for the destruction of trust documentation prior to the lapse of the five-year period 
stipulated in section 17? 
With respect to the frequency of requests to the Master for the early destruction of trust 
documentation, three interviewees were not sure while another considered that the Master 
could answer the question best. The Chief Master stated that he seldom heard of requests 
in this regard. 
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Most interviewees stated that section 17 of the TPCA does not cause practical problems.  
However, one declared that it does, especially when trusts are terminated and trustees then 
have to provide funding to safeguard the trust documents. Since most of the interviewees, 
including the Chief Master, concurred that section 17 does not cause practical concerns, 
except for the funding concern arising from termination, it is submitted that the section 
remains intact. It is submitted, further, that the advantage and certainty yielded by the 
retention, for five years after a trust’s termination, of a constructive record of the trust’s 
affairs, outweighs the funding concern expressed by only one interviewee. It is thus 
suggested that section 17 be included in unamended form in the new proposed Act. 
Question 25 Resignation by trustee 
Under the analysis in chapter three of section 21 of the TPCA on trustee resignation, it was 
submitted that the court’s suggestion in the Meijer case to the effect that proof of a written 
resignation letter being sent to the Master coupled with an acknowledgment of receipt 
thereof by the Master’s office would suffice815 is sound as it would be unreasonable for a 
trustee to remain in office until the Master has removed his name from the letters of 
authorisation. However, the issue of not knowing how long it takes for a Master to remove a 
trustee upon receiving notification of said trustee’s resignation was noted. The following 
was, therefore, addressed during interviews:  
Section 21 states: 
“Whether or not the trust instrument provides for the trustee's resignation, the trustee may resign by notice in writing to the Master 
and the ascertained beneficiaries who have legal capacity, or to the tutors or curators of the beneficiaries of the trust under 
tutorship or curatorship”. 
In Soekoe NO v Le Roux the court held that when a trustee resigns he is not legally relieved of his duties and remains accountable to his 
fellow trustees until replaced by the Master. 
In Meijer No v Firstrand Bank Limited (Formerly known as First National Bank of Southern Africa) the court noted that the TPCA is silent on 
when resignation by a trustee takes effect.  However, to avoid the hardships that would follow if the judgment in Soekoe was followed, the 
court suggested that proof of the resignation letter being sent to the Master in writing, coupled with an acknowledgment of receipt by the 
Master’s office would suffice. 
How long does it take for the Master to remove a trustee upon receiving notification of a trustee’s resignation? Which approach is better? 
All of the interviewees supported the approach adopted in Meijer No v Firstrand Bank 
Limited (Formerly known as First National Bank of Southern Africa).  Thus, an amendment to 
section 21 along the lines of this decision will be formulated in light of the theoretical 
arguments raised in chapter three and the positive response from the interviewees. This 
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amendment will center on the trustee being allowed to resign once the trustee has given 
notice in writing to the relevant parties. The amendment will also state that a copy of the 
resignation letter with an acknowledgment of receipt thereof by the Master will amount to 
a valid resignation. 
 
5.4.6 Rights of beneficiaries/third parties 
Question 26 Variation of trust instruments 
In chapter three it was shown that section 14 of the TPCA’s most problematic requirement 
regarding consent to the variation of trust instruments is that the variation should be “to 
the benefit of” the trust beneficiaries. While this challenge was acknowledged in chapter 
three, it was nevertheless submitted that, should there be a dispute as to whether or not 
the amendment is “to the benefit of” the beneficiary, the courts are best placed to resolve 
the matter, and that the provision therefore should remain as is for the purpose of inclusion 
in the new Act. This submission was put to the interviewees in the following manner: 
It is submitted that should there be a dispute as to whether or not the amendment is “to the benefit of” the beneficiary, the courts would 
be in the best position to resolve the matter.  It is proposed that the provision remained intact - do you agree? 
All of the respondents agreed with the submission that the current provision should stand 
as is. Based on the analysis on section 14 undertaken in chapter three as well as the 
interviewees unanimous agreement with the proposal to retain the provision in unamended 
form, it is submitted that the section be transplanted as is into the new Act. 
Question 27 Report of irregularities 
The efficacy of section 15 of the TPCA on the reporting of material irregularities by an 
auditor of trust accounts was brought into question in chapter three since audits of trust 
accounts are not compulsory statutorily. It was submitted that it is doubtful that trustees 
who are involved in maladministration would make use of an auditor. It was also suggested 
that this shortcoming may be exacerbated because copies of trust accounts need not be 
lodged with the Master’s office. Thus, it was submitted in chapter three that these realities 
strengthen the proposal that a provision compelling trustees to submit trust accounts to 
annual audits be incorporated into the TPCA. The interviewees were addressed on this 
aspect in the following manner:  
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The efficacy of this provision is questionable since audits are not compulsory.  It is also doubted that trustees who are involved in 
maladministration would make use of an auditor.  Furthermore, copies of trust accounts need not be lodged with the Master’s office.  
The following questions are posed: 
How often are irregularities noted by an auditor reported to the Master? 
Should the TPCA not make annual audits compulsory? 
One respondent could not say how often irregularities noted by an auditor are reported to 
the Master. One answered “zero to none”, with another observing that lodgement of trust 
accounts with the Master is no guarantee that an irregularity would be noted. That latter 
mentioned also that irregularities are found mainly in family trust cases/alter ego situations.  
The fourth respondent suggested that irregularities are noted only if someone complains.  
The Chief Master stated that irregularities seldom are reported. 
It is submitted that the responses from the interviewees strengthens the argument that 
annual audits should be made compulsory.  
Question 28 Copies of documents 
It was highlighted in chapter three that, insofar as access to trust documents in terms of 
section 18 of the TPCA is concerned, the TPCA does not define persons who have a 
“sufficient interest” in a trust document. It was nevertheless suggested that the TPCA’s 
notion of “interest” is flexible, and the Master’s power to judge the sufficiency of any 
claimed interest implies that a narrowly technical or legalistic approach was not 
envisaged.816 It was also emphasised that, should any such person feel aggrieved by the 
Master’s refusal to grant access to the trust deed, reliance can be placed on the remedy of 
access to court provided by section 23 of the TPCA. Based on these reasons, it was 
submitted that section 18 of the TPCA remains intact. This submission was tested during 
interviews in the following manner:  
It is proposed that the provision should remain intact - do you agree? 
Three interviewees agreed that the provision should not be changed.  Another suggested 
that copies of trust documents should be available to everyone and that the word “interest” 
should be removed as proof of an “interest” is required. The Chief Master noted that a 
distinction must be made between private or public persons so as to create certainty. It is 
submitted that distinguishing between private and public persons would create further 
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uncertainty as it may prove difficult to identify the persons who fall within these classes. In 
light of the Kidbrooke decision, all that seems to be required is for the person to establish an 
interest in the trust to acquire a copy of the trust deed. Whether the person has such an 
interest is left in the discretion of the Master.   
Question 29 Access to court 
It was submitted in chapter three that section 23 of the TPCA acknowledges that the Master 
may err in his decisions regarding trusts and trustees, thus making it imperative that the 
courts assist aggrieved parties in this regard. On this basis it was proposed that the provision 
does not require amendment. The following question was posed during interviews: 
It is submitted that this provision should not be amended - do you agree? 
All the interviewees were in agreement that this provision should remain as is.  However, 
one interviewee mentioned that a practical problem arises when the Master does not 
exercise his discretion, which is seen as an unwillingness or inability to perform his duties to 
the fullest extent. Parties then are forced to approach the court, which results in costs, 
effort and time delays. It is submitted that the right of aggrieved parties to approach the 
court in relation to decisions made by the Master should be retained unchanged. It is 
impossible in practice to regulate or manage the Master’s office regarding the concern 
identified by one of the interviewees which further strengthens the argument that the 
provision should remain intact. Also, the provision protects aggrieved parties in that they 
may approach the court if the Master makes an erroneous decision. While approaching a 
court may result in costs, a cost order can be awarded against the Master, which would then 
cover some of the costs of the aggrieved party.  
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5.5 Responses to questions from chapter four 
Question 1 Legal personality of a trust 
It was submitted in chapter four that, notwithstanding the academic debate surrounding 
this issue, legal personality should not be bestowed on a trust for the following reasons: (i) 
legal personality would diminish the flexibility of the trust institution as it would require 
increased statutory regulation; (ii) most theoretical and practical difficulties resulting from a 
trust’s lack of legal personality are resolved by virtue of the fact that the trustee is vested 
with the trust’s assets and liabilities in an official capacity; and (iii) it is the lack of legal 
personality that distinguishes the trust from other institutions such as companies and close 
corporations. The interviewees were nevertheless posed the following question: 
Should a trust be bestowed with legal personality? 
Three interviewees were of the opinion that a trust should not be endowed with legal 
personality, while another could not see what difference would be made if a trust were to 
be so endowed. Furthermore, legislation exists that recognises a trust as a legal persona for 
particular purposes. The remaining interviewee felt that bestowing legal personality upon a 
trust would end the academic debate in this regard.  However, he noted that it would make 
no difference in practice. Whereas the academic debate indeed would end if trusts were to 
be invested with legal personality, there evidently is no practical need to do so. Thus, as 
proposed, legal personality ought not to be bestowed upon trusts, and the new Act will, 
therefore, not contain any provision that generally endows trusts with legal personality. 
Question 2 Limitation on the duration of a trust 
The academic arguments justifying the need for the imposition of a limitation on a trust 
founder’s freedom to establish trusts that are to remain operative indefinitely were 
addressed in chapter four. While it was acknowledged that many of the theoretical views in 
favour of the limitation of the duration of trusts are valid, it was nevertheless submitted 
that a general rule against perpetuities would not be justified, particularly not in the case of 
charitable trusts since it would for example, limit the number of beneficiaries in situations 
where the trust is a wealthy one. In order to gauge practitioners’ views on the matter, the 
following question was posed in the interviews:     
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Should a provision similar to that contained in section 6 of the Immovable Property (Removal or Modification of Restrictions) Act, which 
limits fideicommissary property to two successive sets of beneficiaries be included in the TPCA? Should affluent charitable trusts be 
subjected to such a provision as well? 
The interviewees were unanimous that there should be no limitation placed on the duration 
of trusts, which sentiment reinforces the above proposal in this connection. Some of the 
reasons provided were that charitable trusts have been terminated even though there was 
no limitation on the duration of the trust, that there is no need for a provision to this effect 
as there are sufficient mechanisms in this regard (it is assumed that the interviewee was 
referring to section 13 of the TPCA); that in the case of family trusts which usually have a 
limited number of beneficiaries, the trust will in any even diminish; that one should not 
“scratch where it does not itch”; and simply that there should not be limitation on the 
duration of trusts.   
Question 3 Apportionment of costs or income 
It was submitted in chapter four that the SALRC’s rejection of inflexible rules pertaining to 
the apportionment of costs and income are sound and that a statutory apportionment 
provision would mean that a founder would not have a choice to decide how and from 
where expenses should be paid or to confer a discretion to this end on the trustees. It was 
therefore proposed that no provision relating to the apportionment of costs and income of 
the trust should be incorporated into the proposed Act. The following question was 
addressed during the interviews: 
Should provisions pertaining to the apportionment of income and capital be included in the TPCA?  Does the current position in this regard 
cause any practical difficulties? 
The interviews revealed that the absence of provisions in the TPCA pertaining to the 
apportionment of income and capital does not translate into any practical difficulties, and 
the respondents were at one that a provision governing the apportioning of costs or income 
should not be included in the proposed Act. Thus, no provision to this effect will be 
proposed. 
Question 4 Trust agreement for the benefit of a third party 
It was submitted in chapter four that it is not certain how confirming the legal nature of 
inter vivos trusts statutorily would assist with the current debate regarding this issue. Thus, 
it was suggested that a provision on the legal construction of an inter vivos trust should not 
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be included in the proposed Act. This submission was tested during the interviews in the 
following manner: 
Should a provision confirming that an inter vivos trust operates as a contract for the benefit of a third party be included in the TPCA? If so 
why? 
The respondents once again were of one mind that the proposed Act should not contain a 
provision confirming that an inter vivos trust deed operates as a contract for the benefit of a 
third party, which is a matter that was addressed under question 2. This thus accords with 
the above proposal not to regulate this matter statutorily. 
Question 5 Disqualification of trustees and restriction to certain professions 
It was noted in chapter four that, while the TPCA does not include provisions on the 
disqualification of trustees, certain persons by law cannot act in the capacity of trustee.  
Based on the settled principles in this regard, it was submitted that there is no need to 
include a provision stipulating expressly which persons are disqualified from acting as 
trustee. 
On the question whether trusteeship should be limited to certain professions, it was 
submitted in chapter four that the SALRC’s arguments not to do so appear sound. It was 
further argued that founders should not be limited to appointing as trustees persons in 
specific professions. Hence, it was submitted that a provision limiting trusteeship to certain 
provisions not be included in the proposed Act. These submissions were put to the 
interviewees and the following questions were posed: 
Would it be useful to include a provision listing the persons disqualified from acting as trustees? 
Should trusteeship be limited to certain professions? If so why? 
Two interviewees mentioned that the question of disqualified persons is covered sufficiently 
by the TPCA’s removal provision and thus a new provision is not necessary. Two others 
responded in the negative. The fifth interviewee suggested that the interviewer looks at the 
Companies Directive in this regard. The responses point to the conclusion that the proposed 
Act should not include a provision disqualifying certain persons from acting as trustees. 
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All of the interviewees agreed that trusteeship should not be limited to certain professions.  
Thus, no provision to this effect ought to be inserted into the proposed Act for the reasons 
mentioned above. 
Question 6 Notarial execution of trust deeds 
It was submitted in chapter four that the arguments raised by the SALRC on the cost 
implications of notarial execution of inter vivos trust deeds in particular were valid. The 
following question was posed to the interviewees: 
Should notarial execution in respect of inter vivos trusts be made compulsory? 
The respondents were unanimous that notarial execution in respect of inter vivos trusts 
should not be made compulsory, inter alia, because the costs would be prohibitive and 
because notaries may not have the necessary experience of trusts. Costs, the possible lack 
of expertise on the part of the notary in trusts, encroaching effective competition and the 
fact that a founder is not prevented from seeking the services of a notary in any event were 
some of the reasons presented by the SALRC in rejecting compulsory notarial execution. 
Furthermore, notarial execution does not necessarily imply that the notary in fact drafted 
the document. As stated by the SALRC, a notary who is not an expert on trusts could do 
more harm than good.817 Thus, the only manner in which notarial execution will be effective 
is if all notaries are required to have expertise on trust law, which at present is not a 
requirement. While notarial execution will certainly ensure that the founder’s wishes have 
been expressed correctly and that the founder understands the implications creating a 
trust818 there are currently no practical concerns regarding inter vivos trusts being formality 
free. Thus, no provision to such effect should be incorporated into the proposed Act. 
Question 7 Standard clauses for trust deeds 
It was noted in chapter four that the advantages of including a schedule containing standard 
clauses for trust deeds was not apparent to the SALRC when it made its proposals for the 
TPCA.  It was also argued that it is not evident how a schedule containing standard clauses 
would assist in the drafting of trust instruments, particularly in light thereof that this task is 
often undertaken by professional drafters. It was felt, furthermore, that such a schedule 
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might inhibit a founder’s right to include any provision he deems necessary in a trust deed. 
It was maintained that, as long as the provisions stipulated by the founder are not 
impossible, vague or uncertain, contra bonos mores or illegal, founders should not be 
limited in regard to the content of trust instruments. Hence, it was submitted that a 
provision which stipulates standard clauses for trust deeds ought not to be inserted into the 
proposed Act. The following question was posed to the interviewees in this regard: 
Should the TPCA contain a schedule regarding standard clauses that should be included in a trust deed? Would it assist practically? 
All the interviewees considered that the TPCA should not contain a schedule of standard 
clauses for a trust deed and that it would not assist practically. Since such a provision will be 
of no practical value, the proposed new Act will not contain any provision to that effect. 
Question 8 Trading/business trusts 
The analysis on trading/business trusts undertaken in chapter four illustrated that an abuse 
of this trust form has increased over time. Thus, some scholars have proposed greater 
regulation of business trusts so as to curb its abuse. However, it was also emphasised in 
chapter four that it is not the business trust itself that has given rise to the current problems 
associated therewith, but rather the trustees’ conduct in administering such trusts.  It was 
thus submitted that, rather than regulating business trusts specifically in the proposed new 
Act, it is necessary instead to incorporate into that Act provisions safeguarding the interests 
of third parties who contract with trusts. Concerns relating to the recommendation that an 
institution such as the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission supervise business 
trusts, while the trustees are subject to the TPCA under the supervision of the Master was 
also raised in chapter four. The principal objection in this regard is that, while this 
Commission has knowledge pertaining to companies, it does not have knowledge regarding 
the administration of trusts. To ascertain whether the submissions are viable, the following 
questions were put to the interviewees:  
Should business trusts be regulated in terms of the TPCA? If so, should the supervisory functions of the Master instead be fulfilled by the 
Commission in respect of business trusts? Is it the business trust per se or trustees administration of these trusts that have given rise to 
the current problematic issues in respect of such trusts? Would it not be more appropriate to regulate trustee conduct? 
All of the interviewees responded in the negative to the notion that business trusts should 
be regulated by the TPCA and that responsibility for their supervision be transferred from 
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the Master to the Companies Commission. Instead, the interviewees concurred that trustee 
conduct had to be regulated more effectively, with one specifically noting that it is the lack 
of proper administration by trustees that has given rise to the current problems besetting 
business trusts. These views conform to the arguments against regulating business trusts 
raised in chapter four. Thus, it is submitted that the new Act should not contain any 
provisions on the regulation of business trusts specifically. 
Question 9 Penalty clauses 
It was argued in chapter four that, notwithstanding the SALRC’s opposition to penalty 
clauses, criminal sanctions should, for the reasons that follow, be inserted into the proposed 
new Act.  Firstly, at the time of the SALRC’s investigation, the problems faced by the courts 
relating to abuse of the trust form resulting from trustees’ default in administering trusts in 
accordance with the core principles of trust administration were not as common. Secondly, 
the SALRC’s statement that there are sufficient civil remedies is no longer justified since our 
courts now are seeking remedies in other branches of law such as the application of the 
rules of piercing the corporate veil (going behind the trust form) to assist third parties in 
instances where trustees abuse the trust form. Thirdly, there is no reason in principle why 
penalty clauses, similar to those contained in legislation regulating other fiduciary 
functionaries, cannot be included in the proposed new Act. It was submitted further that 
the inclusion of penalty clauses has indeed become a necessity, not only as a means of 
impressing upon trustees the importance of fulfilling their statutory duties, but also to serve 
as a warning that attempting to escape liability using trite principles of trust law, as 
happened in the Parker case amongst others, is serious enough to warrant a criminal 
sanction. The following questions were therefore posed to the interviewees: 
Should penalty clauses be incorporated in the TPCA? Do you think that it would ensure that trustees comply with their duties more 
diligently? Would for example inserting a provision similar to section 216 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 which states: 
 “Any person convicted of an offence in terms of this Act, is liable- 
(a) in the case of a contravention of … to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, or to both a fine and 
imprisonment; or 
               (b) in any case, to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months, or to both to a fine and imprisonment”. 
Or 
section 102(1)(ii) of the Administration of Estates Act that makes it an offence liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding twelve months if an executor liquidates and distributes a deceased estate without letters of executorship, assist? 
The idea that penalty clauses and a provision similar to section 216 of the Companies Act or 
section 102(1)(ii) of the Administration of Estates Act be included in proposed Act elicited 
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the following views: that more should be done to hold trustees personally liable for breach 
of trust and the various consequences of being removed as a trustee; that a penalty clause 
may serve as deterrent (with one interviewee specifically mentioning that prison should not 
be an option); that such a provision (that is, a penalty clause) may be useful, but it should 
not be extreme. The Chief Master, however, mentioned that penalty clauses should be 
limited to those instances where he had agreed with the inclusion of a penalty clause. It is 
submitted that, while removal is a possible response to trustee dereliction, it is not a potent 
enough consequence to serve as a deterrent against trustee misconduct in respect of trust 
administration. However, it is submitted that inserting penalty clauses will in fact serve as a 
deterrent against such misconduct. Thus, a penalty clause ought to be included where 
apposite. 
Question 10 Hague Convention 
It was highlighted in chapter four that, while the SALRC did not consider the policy question 
of whether South Africa’s accession to the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Trusts and on their Recognition was desirable, the SALRC did not have objections to the 
accession.819 As to whether or not the Convention should be ratified, the interviewees were 
asked the following: 
Should South Africa ratify the Hague Convention on trusts? If so why? 
Four of the interviewees had no problem with South Africa ratifying the Hague Convention, 
while the fifth chose to not comment. It is, of course, not feasible to pursue ratification of 
the Hague Convention via an inclusion in the proposed Act and, thus, this matter will not be 
pursued. 
Question 11 State control over charitable trusts 
It was noted in chapter four that charitable trusts have attracted much judicial attention in 
recent years as exclusionary provisions contained in charitable testamentary trusts were 
challenged on constitutional and policy grounds. It was also submitted that the problems 
regarding the courts’ engagement with this matter did not relate to the trusts themselves, 
but rather to the courts’ varying interpretations of section 13 of the TPCA regarding the 
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 SALRC Report (1987) 97. 
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variation of trust provisions. It was thus submitted that no special provisions governing 
charitable trusts should be incorporated into the proposed Act. The following question was 
posed to the interviewees in this regard: 
Should charitable trusts be governed statutorily along similar lines to England where an England and Wales Charities Act 2006 regulates 
such trusts? 
The interviewees were unanimous that charitable trusts should not be regulated statutorily.  
Some mentioned that SARS already regulates charitable trusts for tax purposes. On the 
strength of the theoretical arguments advanced in chapter four against regulating charitable 
trusts specifically as well as the responses obtained from the interviews, it is thus proposed 
that no provisions regulating charitable trusts be included in the new Act. 
Question 12 Taxes 
It was submitted in chapter four that matters pertaining to the taxation of trusts are 
regulated by various pieces of legislation, and that, therefore, the proposed Act need not 
include provisions regarding the taxation of trusts. The interviewees were asked the 
following question in this regard: 
Is it necessary to regulate matters regarding tax in terms of the TPCA? 
All the interviewees agreed that it is not necessary to regulate tax matters in the proposed 
Act.  Thus, no tax provisions will be proposed for the new Act. 
Question 13 Interpretation of trusts 
While the SALRC felt that there was no justification for including such a provision pertaining 
to interpretation matters, a comparison was made in chapter four with section 96(3) of the 
Administration of Estates Act which makes provision for instances where there is a 
difference of opinion between the Master and an executor regarding a question of law in 
which a minor is interested. However, it was highlighted that section 96(3) is not utilised 
often because differences on questions of law usually are dealt with under section 35(9) of 
the Act which empowers the Master, after consideration of an objection against a 
liquidation and distribution account or, if apart from any objection, he is of the opinion that 
the account is incorrect and should be amended, to direct the executor to revise the 
account. It was submitted that the proposed new Act should contain a provision similar to 
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section 35(9) of the Administration of Estates Act because it would not only save the trust 
the costs of approaching a court for clarification but also, since the Master already fulfills 
this duty in respect of executors if and when required, there appears to be no good reason 
why the same cannot apply to trustees. Whether this submission is viable was tested during 
the interviews in the following manner: 
Should a provision similar to that contained in section 35(9) of the Administration of Estates Act regarding interpretation difficulties be 
included in the TPCA? 
All of the respondents felt that such a provision dealing with problems of interpretation 
should not be included in the proposed Act, which indicates that there are no practical 
concerns deriving from the lack of such a provision in the current Act. While the initial 
proposal was for a provision similar to section 35(9) of the Administration of Estates Act to 
be inserted in the proposed Act, this viewpoint no longer stands for the following reasons: 
Firstly, section 96(3) relates to a difference of opinion regarding a question of law between 
the Master and an executor in respect of the distribution of an estate where a minor is 
interested. In such instance, there is no other alternative but to approach the court. 
Furthermore, section 23 of the TPCA caters for such situation in any event. Secondly, section 
35(9) of the Administration of Estates Act relates to an objection in respect of the 
liquidation and distribution account and thus, not questions of law. It is further submitted 
that courts are best suited to answer questions of law pertaining to the administration of a 
trust. For these reasons, a provision relating to interpretation concerns should not be 
governed in terms of the proposed Act. 
Question 14 Statutory provisions 
It was submitted in chapter four that there are several provisions in the Administration of 
Estates Act, the Insolvency Act and the Companies Act which could assist in improving 
current provisions in the TPCA or in better regulating trustees in their administration of a 
trust. To ascertain whether inserting provisions (where apposite) similar to those contained 
in the abovementioned Acts, the following question was posed during interviews:    
Do you think that including statutory provisions similar to those contained in the Administration of Estates Act, Insolvency Act and 
Companies Act regarding for example compulsory annual audits would render the trust institution less flexible? 
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The interviewees were not opposed to this recommendation, but one noted that any 
additional regulation using existing statutory provisions should be used only where 
necessary. The favourable responses to this proposal yielded by the interviews reinforce the 
submission based on the theoretical analysis undertaken in chapter four that the 
incorporation of provisions drawn from other legislation will enhance the operational utility 
of the proposed new Act. Such incorporation will, therefore, be proposed where 
appropriate. 
Question 15 Turquand rule 
In the analysis in chapter four, it was submitted that the Turquand rule could find 
application to trusts especially in instances where trustees place reliance on non-compliance 
with the joint-action rule to extricate themselves from liability purportedly incurred as 
trustees. The proposal by De Waal and Du Plessis regarding inserting a provision similar to 
section 7 of the Trusts (Scotland) Act into the proposed new Act was also addressed, and it 
was acknowledged that such a provision would conflict with the joint-action rule. However, 
it was nevertheless submitted that the frequency with which trustees use deficiencies in 
authorisation as well as their lack of compliance with the joint-action rule to escape liability 
necessitates the incorporation of a similar provision into the proposed Act. The following 
questions were put to the interviewees in this regard: 
Should the Turquand rule apply to trusts? 
Should a provision similar to that contained in the Companies Act be included in the TPCA? 
Would it be preferable to include a provision similar to that contained in section 7 of the (Scotland) Act of 1921? The provision reads: 
“Any deed bearing to be granted by the trustees under any trust, and in fact executed by a quorum of such trustees in favour of any 
person other than a beneficiary or a co-trustee under the trust where such person has dealt onerously and in good faith shall not be 
void or challengeable on the ground that any trustee or trustees under the trust was or were not consulted in the matter, or was or 
were not present at any meetings of trustee where same was considered, or did not consent or concur in the granting of the deed, or 
on the ground of any other omission or irregularity of procedure on the part of the trustees or any of them in relation to the granting 
of the deed…” 
The provision would revoke the joint-action rule? Do you think it would be wise to do so? 
Would the inclusion of such a provision render reliance on for example the Turquand rule; ostensible authority; going behind the trust 
form, etc necessary? 
As to whether the Turquand rule should apply to trusts, one respondent declared that it was 
not necessary, especially since financial institutions have become more conscious and/or 
alert as far as acquiring information pertaining to whether or not a trustee indeed has the 
necessary capacity to act on behalf of the trust. The remaining respondents answered in the 
negative, with one mentioning that a floodgate would be opened and that it is third parties 
who should inquire whether trustees are complying with their duties. Consequently, a 
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provision similar to that contained in section 20(7) of the Companies Act which provides for 
a statutory Turquand rule ought not to be included in the TPCA. 
Most of the respondents were not enthusiastic about a provision similar to section 7 of the 
Trusts (Scotland) Act, especially since it would negate the joint-action rule. For example, one 
stated that by enforcing a majority rule, third parties are protected and not the trust 
beneficiaries. This respondent advised that an obligation to disclose should instead be 
placed on the trustees and a sanction should be imposed if they fail to disclose relevant 
information to third parties. Another was against the non-application of the joint-action rule 
because trustees are co-owners of trust property and thus should act jointly. A third 
respondent stated that including such a provision would not be in the interests of the 
beneficiaries, and a fourth said that, while he was not keen on such a provision, the joint-
action rule can be excluded in any event through a stipulation to that effect in a trust 
instrument. The remaining respondent was of the view that such a provision could be open 
to abuse where there are no third parties involved, as trustees could then do as they 
pleased. However, if the provision is limited to third parties, then it could assist without 
jeopardising the position of trust beneficiaries, who will always have other remedies against 
errant trustees.   
It is submitted, notwithstanding the interviewees’ lukewarm responses to the proposal 
under discussion, that trustees’ reliance on their non-compliance with the joint-action rule 
has become increasingly prevalent in recent times – a submission supported by the 
abundance of recent case law on point. Our courts have been extending remedies from 
other branches of law to trusts to combat this phenomenon. This modus operandi can be 
criticised as being artificial – the objections raised in a Supreme Court of Appeal judgment 
such as Nieuwoudt against the extension of the Turquand rule to trusts underscores this 
assertion. However, reliance on one of these remedies that have been extended curially 
may possibly not succeed if certain requirements are not met or if the facts in issue do not 
render the remedy applicable. Also, since the joint-action rule can be excluded in terms of 
trust instruments, there appears to be no principled objection to the inclusion of a provision 
in the proposed new Act that recognises that non-compliance with this rule should not 
invalidate a transaction entered into by trustees. However, it is conceded that the 
interviewees’ concerns regarding the possible abuse of such a statutory remedy is valid; 
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consequently, it is suggested that emphasis should be placed, as it is in section 7 of the 
Trusts (Scotland) Act on the requirement that the third parties with whom the trustees 
transacted must have acted in good faith. Thus, if a third party is, for example, in possession 
of the trust deed and is aware that trustees are required to act jointly, reliance cannot be 
placed on the remedy afforded by the proposed provision. It is submitted, therefore, that a 
provision akin to section 7 of the Trusts (Scotland) Act would be of assistance in those 
instances where a trustee, for example, misrepresents that he or she is acting on the 
ostensible authority of the other trustees, while this is untrue. It is proposed, therefore, that 
a similar provision be inserted in the proposed new Act.    
Question 16 Ostensible authority 
It was submitted in chapter four that the principles pertaining to ostensible authority are 
well established in the common law and, therefore, that incorporating provisions pertaining 
to this matter into the proposed Act under the rubric of protecting third party interests is 
not necessary. This submission was tested during interviews in the following manner: 
Should the common law requirements of ostensible authority be incorporated in the TPCA? Or should our courts instead develop the 
application of ostensible authority to trusts? 
Four of the respondents opted for the courts developing the application of ostensible 
authority to trusts as opposed to incorporating a provision in the TPCA. The fifth suggested 
that a legislative estoppel be developed against trustees, thereby eradicating the need for 
penalty clauses. It is submitted that the development of this remedy should remain in the 
hands of our courts because as mentioned earlier, they are well developed in terms of the 
common law. A provision in the new Act regulating trustees’ ostensible authority for the 
purpose of protecting third-party interests is, consequently, not envisioned. 
Question 17 Going behind the trust form 
While it was noted in chapter four that the Companies Act contains provisions governing the 
piercing of the corporate veil, it was submitted that similar provisions should not be inserted 
into the proposed Act. The principal reasons advanced in support of this contention were: 
given the clarification that has emerged from the Van Zyl v Kaye decision that principles 
pertaining to going behind the trust form should continue to be developed by our courts. 
More so since the statutory provisions governing piercing the corporate veil have generated 
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further questions.820 It was further submitted that the courts are best suited to determine 
whether an unconscionable abuse has occurred. Also, the absence of a definition of 
unconscionable abuse in the Companies Act is likely due to the realisation that no definition 
could encompass all types of unconscionable abuse. The following questions were posed 
during interviews in this regard:  
Should provisions similar to those contained in the Companies Act regarding piercing the corporate veil be included in the TPCA? Or 
Should our courts continue to develop the application of this doctrine to trusts? 
The interviewees were unanimous that our courts should continue developing the doctrine 
of going behind the trust form. These responses confirm the above submission that our 
courts are indeed are best equipped to do so, thus rendering an insertion of provisions 
relating to going behind the trust form into the new Act unnecessary. 
Question 18 Independent trustee 
In chapter four it was posited, in light thereof that the Master is empowered by virtue of his 
supervisory role over trustees and since the Master in any event will exercise his discretion 
only after a consideration of all the facts, that a provision regulating the appointment of an 
independent trustee need not be included in the TPCA. This submission was tested during 
the interviews in the following manner:  
Should a statutory provision empowering the Master to appoint an independent trustee under the situations mentioned in Parker be 
incorporated in the TPCA? 
Or should the Master instead continue exercising his discretion in this regard? 
The interviewees differed considerably as to whether the appointment of an independent 
trustee should be regulated statutorily or should remain in the discretion of the Master. For 
example, one interviewee stated that the word “independent” is not the correct 
description. Instead, the focus should be on the need for a professional trustee where 
relevant. This respondent nevertheless supported the proposal that there should not be a 
statutory provision empowering the Master to appoint an independent trustee. Another 
interviewee answered the question in the affirmative, especially if circumstances exist that 
justify the appointment of an independent trustee. Thus, the decision should be left with 
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 See Cassim (2012) 22-24; Schoeman (2012) 28. However, in Cassim (2013) 197 the author mentions that 
Ex Parte Gore clarified many of the issues raised in his 2012 article, but notes that it will be interesting to 
see how the statutory remedy will be developed further by the courts. 
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the Master. The next interviewee declared that all trusts should be required to have an 
independent trustee to prevent abuse of the trust form, which therefore will exclude the 
need for the exercise of a discretion to appoint such a trustee by the Master. Conversely, 
the fourth interviewee stated that there should be no requirement for an independent 
trustee and that the Master should not have any discretion in this regard. This interviewee 
also expressed concern about the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of “independent” 
and suggested that founders should be allowed to appoint whom they want as trustees. The 
last interviewee preferred to stay on the fence, but was not in favour of the Master having 
any discretion to effect the appointment of independent trustees. This interviewee also 
questioned who would qualify as an independent trustee and stated that one can assess 
independence only after the fact. This respondent emphasised, furthermore, that there is 
no guarantee that a person will be or will not be independent simply because he/she is a 
family member of the trust founder and/or trustees. Thus, the question rather should be 
whether he/she will act independently. This interviewee also pointed out that the term 
“discretion” is a subjective one, requiring that “independence” be defined and categorised, 
which could result in additional problems. In this instance, it may, therefore, be better to 
rely on the Master’s discretion and to question the Master’s decision if it causes 
dissatisfaction. Clearly, there was no consensus amongst the interviewees on point.  
However, since the Master is already in possession of this power of appointment, it is 
submitted that the decision remains with the Master and that no provision to this effect be 
inserted into the proposed Act. 
Question 19 Statutory provisions 
It was highlighted in chapter four that a trustee, like a director, does not stand in a fiduciary 
relationship to third parties yet provision is made in the Companies Act821 for third parties in 
terms of section 22(1) insofar as it prohibits a company from carrying on business recklessly, 
with gross negligence, with intent to defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose. The 
TPCA currently only affords third parties limited remedies such as requesting the removal of 
a trustee, approaching the court regarding a decision of the Master or applying to the court 
for an order directing a trustee to comply with the Master’s request or to comply with his 
                                                          
821  Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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duties. Hence, our courts are seeking remedies in other branches of law to protect third-
party interests, for example the application of rules on piercing the corporate veil (going 
behind the trust form) to trusts. It was thus submitted that a provision similar to section 
22(1) of the Companies Act should be incorporated into the proposed new Act because a 
failure by a trustee to comply with the core principles of trust administration could fall 
within the category of recklessness, gross negligence or even fraud (the latter, for example, 
where a trustee alleges that he has authority to bind the trust, while knowing that he does 
not) as contemplated in section 22(1). This submission was assessed during interviews in the 
following manner: 
Section 22(1)(a) of the Companies Act contains a reckless trading prohibition clause.  It provides, inter alia, that: 
“A company must not- 
(a) Carry on its business recklessly, with gross negligence, with intent to defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose”. 
Will including a provision similar to section 22(1)(a) of the Companies Act assist in not only ensuring that trustees abide with their 
common law and statutory duties, but protect the interests of third parties? 
All of the interviewees rejected the idea of including in the TPCA a provision similar to 
section 22(1)(a) of the Companies Act, noting that section 9 of the TPCA is sufficient to 
induce trustees to comply with their duties and to protect third parties. One observed that a 
trustee already can be held liable personally, and that including a disclosure clause in the 
TPCA would suffice, as a failure to comply then can be visited with personal liability. Two 
interviewees suggested that a sanction be added for non-compliance with section 9. One 
stated that a sanction is not necessary as an action for breach of trust is possible, whereas 
another suggested that estoppel rather be used. It is agreed that, while section 9 is 
sufficient to protect trust beneficiaries’ interests, it does not extend any comparable 
protection to third parties. This is because, as mentioned earlier, a trustee does not stand in 
a fiduciary relationship with third parties. So, while trust beneficiaries can rely on a trustee’s 
non-compliance with section 9 to seek the imposition of personal liability on the trustee, a 
third party cannot. Thus, it is submitted that a similar provision be included in the proposed 
Act, with the consequence of personal liability should a trustee’s conduct fall within the 
categories listed in the provision. Such a provision, it is submitted, will serve as a deterrent 
against maladministration on the part of a trustee and safeguard the interests of third 
parties who are currently afforded limited remedies in terms of the current Act.  
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Question 20 Implied warranty of authority 
In chapter four it was submitted that, since our courts have acknowledged the possibility of 
the remedy of implied warranty of authority in the trust-law context, this remedy can be 
invoked against trustees if the circumstances permit and if the requirements for the 
invocation of implied warranty of authority are met. It was proposed that this is a remedy 
that should be developed further in the context of trusts by our courts and, therefore, 
should not, be regulated under the proposed Act. This submission was tested during 
interviews in the following manner: 
Should the requirements of implied warranty of authority be statutorily regulated? 
Or should our courts instead develop rules pertaining to the application of this remedy to trusts? 
Again, there was no general consensus amongst the interviewees on the issue of implied 
warranty of authority. One interviewee opposed statutory regulation, and noted that if 
there were a compulsory disclosure clause in the proposed Act the courts need not 
intervene. Another also objected to statutory regulation, and agreed that the courts should 
develop these rules. The third interviewee preferred that a distinction be made between 
trustee authorisation on the one hand, and trustee capacity on the other hand, while the 
fourth felt that regulation or, rather, finding a civil basis on which to hold trustees liable, 
was necessary. The remaining interviewee considered that a statutory provision was not 
necessary, especially if a provision similar to that contained in the Scottish Trustee Act is 
included in the proposed Act. In light of these varied responses, it is submitted that, since 
rules governing implied warranty of authority exist in common law, it be left to our courts to 
continue to develop them in the trust-law context as and when required. Moreover, 
inserting a provision similar to section 7 of the Scottish Trustee Act as proposed earlier 
would, as the last-mentioned respondent pointed out, negate the need to rely on this 
remedy. 
Question 21 Breach of warranty and misrepresentation 
The investigation in chapter four on the question whether the rules pertaining to breach of 
warranty and misrepresentation should be incorporated into the proposed Act as a means 
of protecting the interests of third parties who deal with trustees yielded a negative answer 
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as these rules are well established in terms of the common law. This submission was posed 
in the following manner during the interviews: 
Should these common law rules be regulated in terms of the TPCA? 
Most of the respondents answered this question in the negative. However, one stated that 
it may be preferable to include a provision to the effect that conduct on the part of a trustee 
that amounts to a breach of warranty or misrepresentation to do the necessary will result in 
personal liability. It is submitted, however, that there is ample authority in the common law 
to this effect, and that to regulate these remedies legislatively would amount to overkill. 
Furthermore, the insertion of a provision similar to section 7 of the Trusts (Scotland) Act 
into the new proposed Act would negate the need to rely on these contractual remedies. It 
is recommended, therefore, that these remedies, insofar as they may be invoked against 
trustees, should not be regulated statutorily. 
Question 22 Pre-formation contracts 
It was argued in chapter four that, in light of the concerns regarding section 21 of the 
Companies Act with regard to its retrospective effect; the rights of the parties during the 
interim period between execution and ratification; the possibility of a third party 
withdrawing prior to the ratification of the pre-incorporation contract; a promoter’s right to 
contract out of his liability and whether the provision affords a court judicial discretion in 
apportioning liability between the company and the promoter822 and considering that the 
stipulatio alteri which enables a promoter of a company to contract in his own name as a 
principal for the benefit of the company to be formed823 appears to be the better option in 
the company law sphere, provisions regulating pre-formation contracts need not be 
incorporated into the proposed new Act.  Instead, it was submitted that reliance should be 
placed on the stipulatio alteri to deal with the issue of pre-formation as it is established well 
in the common law; moreover, such reliance would avoid concerns similar to those raised in 
respect of section 21 of the Companies Act. Whether these submissions are viable were 
tested during interviews by posing the following questions: 
                                                          
822
 Cassim et al (2011) 146; 149. 
823
 McCullogh v Fernwood Estate 1920 AD 204; Cameron et al (2007) 79-80; Cassim et al (2011) 150-151. 
See also Build-A-Brick v Eskom 1996 (1) SA 115 (O) 125F-H. 
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Should pre-formation contracts be regulated along similar lines to companies and close corporations in the TPCA in light of concerns raised 
in respect of section 21 of the Companies Act? 
Or does the stipulatio alteri, which appears to be the favourable option in the company law sphere suffice? 
Four of the respondents agreed that the stipulatio alteri would suffice in this regard. The 
remaining one adopted a conservative approach, stating that nothing done by a person 
before acquiring letters of authorisation is of any consequence. The majority view is, 
therefore, in line with the foregoing on point, and thus no provision regulating pre-
formation contracts will be inserted into the proposed Act. 
Question 23 Sale of a trust 
It was shown in chapter four that the sale of a trust has received formal recognition.824  
However, the resultant question that remains is whether the proposed Act should regulate 
the sale of trusts. It was also shown in chapter four that the most significant matter arising 
in respect of the sale of a trust pertains to transfer duty liability, which matter is governed 
by the Transfer Duty Act. It was submitted, therefore, that there is no apparent need to 
regulate the sale of a trust under the proposed Act.  It was nevertheless submitted that, for 
the purpose of providing certainty, a provision confirming this fact be included in the 
proposed Act. This submission was tested during interviews in the following manner: 
Should the sale of a trust be regulated in terms of the TPCA? 
Or would a provision such as the following suffice? 
“Any transaction involving the sale of trust is subject to the provisions of the Transfer Duty Act 40 of 1949 as amended by the 
Revenue Laws Amendment Act 74 of 2002”. 
One interviewee was unsure as to whether a trust indeed can be sold because such a ‘sale’ 
would result in the trust being terminated and a new trust being created. This respondent 
also questioned whether a trust can be sold to avoid transfer duty and, therefore, opined 
that the suggested provision does not belong in the proposed Act, since such matters 
already are governed by Transfer Duty Act. Another interviewee stated that if a trust were a 
legal person, then including such a provision would suffice as it amounts to a legal 
arrangement. The third noted that this issue is provided for in other legislation and thus 
including such a provision in the proposed Act would be superfluous. The fourth questioned 
whether one actually can sell a trust and stated that all issues pertaining to tax should be 
omitted from proposed Act. The last interviewee hesitated about tax being governed by the 
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 Pace and Van der Westhuizen (2015) B24 [24.5]. 
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proposed Act but considered that including such a provision can promote certainty, 
especially when the trustees are lay persons. 
There is evidently some uncertainty amongst practitioners as to whether selling a trust is 
indeed possible and what it would entail. Also, since the fiscal aspects of such a sale already 
are governed by the Transfer Duty Act as essentially a tax matter, it is submitted that it 
ought not to be regulated by the proposed Act. Thus a provision regulating the sale of a 
trust will not be inserted in the proposed Act.  
Question 24 Other practical/theoretical issues 
As a means of ensuring that the study is comprehensive, the following question was posed 
to the interviewees: 
Are there any other practical/theoretical issues that should be regulated in terms of the TPCA (new Act)? 
Here one respondent (the Chief Master) noted that the issue of the confidentiality of trust 
information should be included, for example, obtaining copies of trust documentation as 
well as defining “interest” in a trust. This matter, it is submitted, was clarified in the 
Kidbrooke case where the court stated that  the words “any person having an interest in the 
trust property” encompasses also parties other than trust beneficiaries and thus need not 
be governed statutorily. 
It was suggested also that documentation filed for purposes of registering trust information, 
other than those pertaining to income and capital beneficiaries, should be regarded as 
public information. As mentioned under question 9, regardless of the electronic database 
that is in existence, trust documentation are still not regarded as public documents as 
access thereto is limited to the parties mentioned in the current section 17 of the TPCA. This 
aspect is however, beyond the scope of the thesis, which it is submitted requires extensive 
research to justify why trust documentation ought to be regarded as public documents. The 
focus of the thesis instead is the TPCA in its current form and proposals to better regulate 
trusts. 
The remaining interviewees did not identify any additional issues, with some stating that the 
questionnaires were comprehensive and thorough. 
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5.6 Draft statute 
Below is a proposal for a revised statute to regulate trusts in South Africa. The proposal is 
informed by the following three considerations. 
Firstly, in chapter three the various provisions of the TPCA were arranged under specific 
headings. The proposed statute will be drafted in accordance with these headings, namely, 
definitions, documents deemed to be trust instruments, the role of the courts, the role of 
the Master, the duties of trustees, and the rights of beneficiaries/third parties. 
Secondly, the TPCA does not live up to its name, literally.  Very few of its provisions actually 
deal with trust property. Thus, it is submitted that, since the TPCA deals primarily with the 
administration of trusts, the title of the proposed statute ought to reflect this fact. 
Thirdly, the recommendations pertaining to certain definitions proposed in the SALRC 
Discussion Paper will be incorporated in the proposed statute. 
The analysis conducted in the previous chapters and the responses to the questionnaires 
suggested amendments/additions (subject to certain additional issues that were not 
addressed during interviews) to the TPCA which are set out in the draft statute which 
follows. 
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THE ADMINISTRATION OF TRUSTS ACT 
To regulate the administration of trusts; and to provide for matters connected therewith. 
1 DEFINITIONS 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates: 
 
“banking institution” means an institution registered as a bank in terms of the Banks Act, 
1990 (Act 94 of 1990). 
“building society” means a mutual bank registered in terms of the Mutual Banks Act, 1993 
(Act 124 of 1993), or a bank registered in terms of the Banks Act, 1990 (Act 94 of 1990). 
“court” means a division of the High Court having jurisdiction. 
“family agreement” means any agreement in terms of which testamentary trust 
beneficiaries agree to waive any rights they have in terms of a will, or dispose of their rights 
inter partes, or prior to acquiring their rights in terms of a will, agree to a re-distribution of 
benefits after acquiring such rights in terms of a will.  
 
“financial institution” means a financial institution as defined in the Financial Institutions 
(Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001. 
“Master” in relation to any matter, means the Master, Deputy Master or Assistant Master 
of the High Court appointed under section 2 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act 
66 of 1965), who under section 3 of this Act has jurisdiction in respect of the matter 
concerned. 
“Minister” means the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services. 
“Trust” “means the arrangement through which ownership in the property of one person is 
by virtue of a trust instrument made over or bequeathed as a trust fund consisting of cash 
and/or property which is/are separate from a trustee’s personal estate-  
(a) to another person, the trustee , in whole or in part, to be administered or disposed of 
according to the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person or class 
of persons designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the object 
stated in the trust instrument; or 
(b) to the beneficiaries designated in the trust instrument, which property is placed under 
the control of another person, the trustee, to be administered or disposed of according 
to the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person or class of 
persons designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the object stated 
in the trust instrument 
but does not include the case where the property of another is to be administered by any 
person who does not fall within the ambit of this Act.  
“Trustee” means any person who accepts the appointment of trusteeship to control and 
administer the trust fund in a fiduciary capacity and includes any person whose acceptance 
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of appointment as trustee is of force and effect at the commencement of this Act. 
“Trust instrument” means a written agreement or will or a court order according to which a 
trust was created. 
“Trust property” means property which in terms of a trust instrument is to be administered 
by a trustee. 
2 CERTAIN DOCUMENTS DEEMED TO BE TRUST INSTRUMENTS 
If a document represents the reduction to writing of an oral agreement, other than oral 
family agreements which relate to devolution, by which a trust was created or varied, such 
document shall for purposes of this Act be deemed to be a trust instrument. 
A ROLE OF THE HIGH COURT 
3 Variation of trust provisions 
“If a trust instrument contains any provision which due to a change in circumstances which, 
in the opinion of the court, the founder of a trust did not contemplate or foresee at the time 
that the trust was created: 
(a) hampers the achievement of the objects of the founder; or 
(b) prejudices the interests of beneficiaries; or 
(c) is in conflict with the public interest,  
the court may on application of the trustee or any person who in the opinion of the court 
has a sufficient interest in the trust property, delete or vary any such provision or make in 
respect thereof any order which such court deems just, including an order whereby 
particular trust property is substituted for particular other property, or an order terminating 
the trust”. 
 
4  Removal of trustees 
A trustee, on application of the Master or any person having a sufficient interest in the trust 
property, may be removed at any time from his/her office by the court if the court is 
satisfied that such removal will be in the interests of the trust and its beneficiaries. 
5  Failure by a trustee to account or perform duties 
If any trustee fails to comply with a request by the Master in terms of section 12 or to 
perform any duty imposed upon him/her by the trust instrument or by law, the Master or 
any person having an interest in the trust property may apply to the court for an order 
directing the trustee to comply with such request or to perform such duty. 
B ROLE OF THE MASTER 
6  Jurisdiction 
(1)(a) In respect of trust property which is to be administered or disposed of in terms of a 
will, jurisdiction shall lie with the Master in whose office the will or a copy thereof is 
registered and accepted and, in any other case, with the Master in whose area of 
appointment in terms of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act 66 of 1965), the 
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greater or greatest portion of the trust property is situated: Provided that a Master 
who has exercised jurisdiction shall continue to have jurisdiction notwithstanding 
any change in the situation of the greater or greatest portion of the trust property. 
  (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a), a Master who otherwise would   
have no jurisdiction in respect of a trust property may assume jurisdiction of that 
trust property, on written application by any person having an interest in that trust 
property, and with the consent of the Master who has such jurisdiction. 
(2)No act performed by a Master in the bona fide belief that he/she has jurisdiction shall 
be invalid merely on the ground that it should have been performed by another Master. 
(3) If more than one Master has in such belief exercised jurisdiction in respect of the same 
trust property, that property, without prejudice to the validity of any act already 
performed by or under the authority of any other Master, as soon as it becomes known 
to the Masters concerned, shall be administered or disposed of under the supervision of 
the Master who first exercised such jurisdiction, and any authorisation or appointment 
of a trustee made by any other Master in respect of that property, thereupon shall be 
cancelled by such other Master. 
7  Authorisation 
(1)Any person whose appointment as trustee in terms of a trust instrument or section 10 
comes into force after the commencement of this Act, shall act in that capacity only if 
authorised thereto in writing by the Master. 
(2)Pending the issuing of letters of authorisation, a trustee, whether required to furnish 
security or not, can apply in writing to the Master for interim authorisation to perform 
specific acts with regard to the administration of trust property. 
(3)Any trustee who administers a trust estate without authorisation is guilty of an offence 
and will be liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding six months.  
 
8 Security 
(1)The Master does not grant authority to the trustee in terms of section 7 unless- 
(a) he/she has furnished security to the satisfaction of the Master for the due and faithful 
performance of his/her duties as trustee; or 
(b) he/she has been exempted from furnishing security by a court order or by the Master 
under subsection (2)(a) or, subject to the provisions of subsection (2)(d), in terms of a 
trust instrument. 
(2)The Master, if in his/her opinion there are sound reasons to do so- 
(a) whether or not security is required by the trust instrument (except a court  order), may  
dispense with security by a trustee; 
(b)  may reduce or cancel any security furnished; 
(c)  may order a trustee to furnish additional security; 
(d) may order a trustee who has been exempted from furnishing security in terms of a 
trust instrument (except a court order) to furnish security. 
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9 Corporations appointed as trustees 
If any authorisation is given in terms of this section to a trustee which is a corporation, such 
authorisation, subject to the provisions of the trust instrument, shall be given in the name of 
a nominee of the corporation for whose actions the corporation as trustee is legally liable, 
and any substitution for such nominee of some other person shall be endorsed on the said 
authorisation. 
10 Appointment by Master of trustees and/or co-trustees 
(1)If the office of trustee cannot be filled or becomes vacant, the Master, in the absence of 
any provision in the trust instrument, shall appoint any person as trustee, after 
consultation with so many interested parties as he/she may deem necessary. 
(2) When the Master considers it desirable, notwithstanding the provisions of the trust 
instrument, he/she may appoint as co-trustee of any serving trustee any person whom 
he/she deems fit. 
11 Foreign trustees 
When a person who was appointed outside the Republic as trustee has to administer or 
dispose of trust property in the Republic, the provisions of this Act shall apply to such 
trustee in respect of such trust property and the Master shall authorise such trustee under 
section 7(1) to act as trustee in respect of that property: Provided that the Master has 
determined the issue of furnishing security. 
12 Trustee providing Master with an account/financial statements 
(1) A trustee, at the written request of the Master, shall account to the Master to his/her 
satisfaction and in accordance with the Master’s requirements for his/her administration 
and disposal of trust property and, at the written request of the Master, shall deliver to 
the Master any book, record, account, financial statements, or document relating to 
his/her administration or disposal of the trust property and to the best of his/her ability 
shall answer honestly and truthfully any question put to him/her by the Master in 
connection with the administration and disposal of the trust property: Provided that the 
Master, by notice in writing, may summon a trustee to appear before the Master at the 
place and on the date and hour stated in such notice to furnish the Master with all the 
information within his/her knowledge concerning the trust estate or the administration 
of the trust estate. 
(2) The Master, if he/she deems it necessary, may cause an investigation to be carried out 
by some fit and proper person appointed by him/her into the trustee’s administration 
and disposal of trust property. 
(3) The Master shall make such order as he/she deems fit in connection with the costs of an 
investigation referred to in subsection (2). 
13 Remuneration of trustee 
In respect of the execution of his/her official duties, a trustee shall be entitled to such 
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remuneration as provided for in the trust instrument or, where no such provision is made, 
to a reasonable remuneration, which shall be assessed according to a prescribed tariff and 
shall be taxed by the Master. 
14 Removal by Master 
(1) A trustee may be removed at any time from his/her office by the Master- 
(a) if he/she has been convicted in the Republic or elsewhere of any offence of which 
dishonesty is an element or of any other offence for which he/she has been sentenced to 
imprisonment without the option of a fine; or 
(b) if he/she fails to give security or additional security, as the case may be, to the 
satisfaction of the Master within two months after having been requested thereto or 
within such further period as is allowed by the Master; or 
(c) if his/her estate is sequestrated or liquidated or placed under judicial management; or 
(d) if he/she has been declared by a competent court to be mentally ill or incapable of 
managing his/her own affairs or he/she is admitted, by virtue of the Mental Health Care 
Act, 2002 (Act 17 of 2002), as a patient in an institution or as a State patient; 
(e) if he/she fails to perform satisfactorily any duty imposed upon him/her by or under this 
Act or to comply with any lawful request of the Master: Provided that before removing a 
trustee from office under this subsection that the Master forward to him/her by 
registered post a notice setting forth the reasons for such removal, and informing 
him/her that he may appear before the Master within thirty days of such notice to 
respond to any allegation that has been made against him/her. 
(2) If a trustee who has been authorised to act under section 7(1) is removed from his/her 
office or resigns, he/she shall return his/her written authority to the Master within thirty 
days from being removed or resigning from office.  Any person who fails to comply with 
this provision shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to 
imprisonment not exceeding three months. 
C DUTIES OF TRUSTEES 
 
15 Lodgement 
(1) Except where the Master is already in possession of the trust instrument in question or 
an amendment thereof, a trustee whose appointment comes into force after the 
commencement of this Act, before he/she assumes control of the trust property, upon 
payment of the prescribed fee, shall lodge with the Master the trust instrument in terms 
of which the trust property is to be administered or disposed of by him/her, or a copy 
thereof certified as a true copy by a notary or other person approved by the Master. 
(2) When a trust instrument which has been lodged with the Master is varied, the trustee 
shall lodge the amendment or a copy thereof so certified with the Master within thirty 
days of the trust instrument’s variation. 
16 Notification of address 
A person whose appointment as trustee comes into effect after the commencement of this 
Act, shall furnish the Master with a domicilium citandi executandi address for the service 
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upon him/her of notices and process and, in the case of a change of address, such trustee 
shall within 14 days notify the Master by registered post of the new address. 
 
17 The statutory duty of care 
(1) A trustee, in the performance of his/her duties and the exercise of his/her powers, shall 
act with the care, diligence and skill which reasonably can be expected of a person who 
manages the affairs of another. 
(2) Any provision contained in a trust instrument shall be void in so far as it would have the 
effect of exempting a trustee from or indemnifying him/her against liability for breach of 
trust where he/she fails to show the degree of care, diligence and skill as required in 
subsection (1). 
18 Trust account 
Whenever a person receives money in his/her capacity as trustee, he/she shall deposit such 
money in a separate trust account to be opened in the name of the trust at a banking 
institution or building society. 
19 Registration and identification of trust  property 
(1) Subject to the provisions of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act, 2001 (Act 
28 of 2001), section 40 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act 66 of 1965), and 
the provisions of the trust instrument concerned, a trustee- 
(a) shall indicate clearly in his bookkeeping the property which he/she holds in his/her 
capacity as a trustee; 
(b) if applicable, shall register trust property or keep it registered in such manner as to make 
it clear from the  registration that it is trust property; 
(c) shall make any account or investment at a financial institution identifiable as a trust 
account or trust instrument; 
(d) in the case of trust property other than property referred to in paragraphs (b) or (c), shall 
make such property identifiable as trust property in the best possible manner. 
20 Audits 
(1)A trustee shall ensure that the financial statements of the trust are audited on an annual 
basis, if so required by the regulations made in terms of subsection (2), taking into 
account whether it is desirable in the public interest, having regard to the economic or 
social significance of the trust, as indicated by- 
(a) its annual value; and 
(b) the nature and extent of its activities.   
(2)The Minister may make regulations and prescribe different requirements for the trusts 
that shall have their financial statements audited as contemplated under subsection (1).   
 
21 Separate position of trust property 
Trust property shall not form part of the personal estate of the trustee except in so far as 
he/she is entitled to the trust property as trust beneficiary. 
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22 Custody of documents 
A trustee shall not destroy, without the written consent of the Master, any document which 
serves as proof of the investment, safe custody, control, administration, alienation or 
distribution of trust property before the expiry of a period of five years from the 
termination of a trust. 
23 Resignation by trustee 
Whether or not the trust instrument provides for a trustee's resignation, a trustee may 
resign by notice in writing to the Master and the ascertained beneficiaries who have legal 
capacity, or to the tutors or curators of the beneficiaries of the trust under tutorship or 
curatorship.  A copy of the resignation letter with an acknowledgment of receipt thereof by 
the Master will amount to a valid resignation. 
D RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARIES/INTERESTED PARTIES 
24 Variation of trust instruments 
Whenever a trust beneficiary under tutorship or curatorship becomes entitled to a benefit 
in terms of a trust instrument, the tutor or curator of such a beneficiary may agree, on 
behalf of the beneficiary, to the amendment of the provisions of the trust instrument, 
provided such amendment is to the benefit of the beneficiary. 
25 Report of irregularities 
If an irregularity in connection with the administration of a trust comes to the notice of a 
person who audits the accounts of a trust, such person, if in his/her opinion it is a material 
irregularity, shall report it in writing to the trustee, and if such irregularity is not rectified to 
the satisfaction of such person within one month as from the date upon which it was 
reported to the trustee, that person shall report it in writing to the Master. 
26 Copies of documents 
Subject to the provisions of section 5(2) of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act 66 of 
1965) regarding the documents in connection with the estate of a deceased person, the 
Master, upon written request and payment of the prescribed fee, shall furnish a certified 
copy of any document under his control relating to trust property to a trustee, his/her 
surety or his/her representative or any other person who in the opinion of the Master has 
sufficient interest in such document. 
27 Access to court 
Any person who feels aggrieved by an authorisation, appointment or removal of a trustee 
by the Master or by any decision, order or direction of the Master made or issued under this 
Act, may apply to the court for relief, and the court shall have the power to consider the 
merits of any such matter, to take evidence and to make any order it deems fit. 
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E THIRD PARTY REMEDIES 
 
28 Non-compliance with the joint-action rule 
Any contract concluded by a quorum of trustees under any trust, with any person other 
than a beneficiary or a co-trustee under the trust and which such person concluded 
onerously and in good faith shall not be void or challengeable on the ground that any 
trustee or trustees under the trust was or were not consulted in the matter, or was or were 
not present at any meetings of trustees where same was considered, or did not consent or 
concur in the conclusion of the contract, or on the ground of any other omission or 
irregularity of procedure on the part of the trustees or any of them in relation to the 
conclusion of such contract. 
 
29 Prohibition Clause 
A trustee may not conduct the business of the trust with third parties recklessly, with gross 
negligence, with intent to defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose. Non-
compliance on the part of the trustee with this duty may result in personal liability being 
attributed to a trustee by the court, unless the court orders otherwise.  
F MISCELLANEOUS 
30 Regulations 
The Minister of Justice may make regulations regarding any matter which in terms of this 
Act is required or permitted to be prescribed. 
31 Application of Act 
This Act shall not apply to a trust which has been exempted by any other Act from the 
application of the Trust Moneys Protection Act, 1934 (Act 34 of 1934), or to a scheme in 
terms of the Participation Bonds Act, 1981 (Act 55 of 1981). 
32 Short title and commencement 
This Act shall be called the Administration of Trusts Act, 2016, and shall come into operation 
on a date to be fixed by the State President by Proclamation in the Gazette. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
The research has identified and highlighted the most current theoretical and practical 
problems in the South African law of trusts. While there have been several developments in 
this area of the law, there is evidently a need for further development based on the 
academic debate and the practical difficulties facing our courts and persons who deal with 
trusts. The thesis attempts to assist in this regard, by proposing a draft Administration of 
Trusts Act to amend and, it is hoped, improve the current regulation of trust administration 
by the Trust Property Control Act. 
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